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ABSTRACT
F IS FOR FILM, G IS FOR GREENAWAY:
THE CINEMATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE FILMS OF PETER
GREENAWAY
Dilek Kaya Mutlu 
M.F.A. in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Nezih Erdoğan 
May, 1999
This study aims at investigating the last eight feature films of the British filmmaker, 
Peter Greenaway, with regard to the cinematic representation. As opposed to the 
cinematic representation suggested by the principles and conventions of dominant 
cinema Greenaway’s films, which are based on a questioning of those principles and 
conventions and on a search for alternative forms of cinematic representation, are 
considered to be ‘sentences on cinema’ and investigated within the context of 
dominant and counter cinematic practices.
Keywords: Cinematic representation. Dominant cinema. Counter cinema.
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ÖZET
FİLMİN F’Sİ, GREENAWAY’iN G’Sİ: PETER GREENAWAY 
FİLMLERİNDE SİNEMATİK TEMSİL
Dilek Kaya Mutlu 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans
Tez yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Nezih Erdoğan 
May, 1999
Bu çalışmada İngiliz yönetmen Peter Greenaway’in son sekiz filminin sinematik 
temsil açısından incelenmesi amaçlanıyor. Egemen sinemanın temsilcisi olduğu ilke 
ve uygulamaların ortaya koyduğu sinematik temsile karşılık, temelde bu ilke ve 
uygulamaların sorgulanması ve alternatif sinematik temsil biçimlerinin arayışları 
üzerine kurulmuş olan bu filmler ‘sinema üzerine cümleler’ olarak alınarak hakim ve 
karşı sinema pratikleri bağlamında bir değerlendirmeye tabii tutuluyor.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Sinematik temsil. Egemen Sinema, Karşı Sinema.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Film Age is the title of a chapter in Arnold Hauser’s multivolume work entitled 
The Social History of Art. In this chapter Hauser amiounces film as the ‘most 
representative’ art of the twentieth centuiy by considering the effects of cinematic 
form on literature and the other arts in that era (4: 239). Keith Cohen, the editor of 
the book entitled Writing in a Film Age, supports Hauser’s argument by considering 
in addition cinema’s capacity to assemble the scientific and industrial developments 
(in optics, chemistry, machinery) of nineteenth century and its appeal to a mass 
audience (hence marking the beginning of the production of art for the masses) (1). 
Similarly Michael Gill argues that
In every culture there seems an art form that is uniquely appropriate to it...In  
the twentieth century the characteristic medium must be the moving image on 
film and its electronic successors on television and video (327).
I think although calling the age we live in the age of cinema may be an unjust act
against other forms of art it is possible to agree that cinema, as a communicative and
artistic medium, is an important part of the culture of the twentieth century which
becomes more and more visual. However today the term cinema does not associate
only various films but also various theoretical works on them and this study is goin
to be one of these works.
One might argue that such kinds of works have a secondary importance before the 
films themselves and the intentions of the directors as the constructors of the films. 
Such an attitude would derive from a misreading of the films and theoretical works 
on them. A film is not mere a group of successive images reflected on a screen. A 
film could be seen as a work which carries the traces of certain beliefs, thoughts, 
attitudes, and principles concerning the cinematic representation as well as life and 
art. In this sense the films and the theoretical works on them can be considered as the 
two complementary sides of a dialogue over cinema as a representative medium. 
Within such a framework Gilles Deleuze’s following argument seems to be quite 
meaningful
The great cinema authors are like the great painters or musicians: it is they who 
talk best about what they do. But, in talking, they become something else, they 
become philosophers or theoreticians (280).
When I look from such a perspective it seems to me that working on the films of 
Peter Greenaway is a right decision. Because Peter Greenaway first exemplifies very 
explicitly how the author of a film becomes a theoretician as well; in the sense that 
while making his films he also introduces and develops his own theory of cinematic 
representation and he opens a lot of room for thought with the questions he raises in 
his films about the art, the artist and the nature of representation.
Although the topics of Greenaway’s films such as the body, sexuality, nudity, death, 
violence are very suitable to discuss with respect to certain current debates, and fonn 
the basis of several theoretical works on his films I think the importance of 
Greenaway’s cinema lies mostly in its capacity to question and experiment with the
boundaries of cinematic representation. In this sense Greenaway’s films can be 
considered as statements over the nature of cinematic representation.
1.1. The Purpose of the Study
Peter Greenaway, who was originally trained as a painter and who started his cinema 
career in mid 60’s with several short films, gained worldwide acclaim with his 
second feature film The Draughtsman’s Contract (1982) (Lawrence 18). From 1980 
to 1998 he accomplished nine feature films, one multimedia work incorporating 
television, video, film and CD-ROM, several TV works, one opera and twelve 
exhibitions most of which relate to his ideas about and experimentation with the 
cinematic representation.
Greenaway’s short films can be considered as an introduction to some of the 
concepts that he would work on in his feature films as well such as the relationship 
between the image and the text, the limitations of structuralism, narration and its 
relation to truth.' His feature films, which deal with topics like sexuality, nudity, 
death, sexual and physical violence, artistic production, exhibit a careful visual 
arrangement in terms of lighting, color, selection and the organization of the 
elements in the frames. In addition Greenaway, being a filmmaker who is unsatisfied 
with the conventions of dominant cinema and who believes in the riclmess of the 
cinematic medium, tries to use the potentialities of cinematic representation for 
producing a cinema which is not based on dominant conventions. His films exhibit a
My argument here is based on the four of these films -collected in a video entitled Early Works- that 
I have been able to see and on the information provided in the books and articles on Greenaway’s 
works.
search for new ways of organizing the filmic material, such as using classification
systems and structures (numbers, alphabet, color-coding) as opposed to the dominant
textual narrative in cinema; restricting the movements of the camera and extensive
editing; using metaphors that will provide the spectator with multiple readings rather
than a single story; experimenting with multiple screens with different aspect ratios
in order to provide a multiplicity of views, to rearrange chronology, and to produce
lateral thinking; and establishing a relationship between the film and the spectator
outside identification and emotional involvement by avoiding close-ups, point-of-
view shots, by emphasizing the artifice. Greenaway extends his arguments to his
exhibitions too. In the catalogue of his exhibition entitled The Stairs Geneva
Location he states his purpose as follows
I am curious about the possibilities o f taking cinema out o f cinema. I am 
curious about presenting cinema as a three-dimensional exhibition. I am 
curious about what constitutes a vocabulary o f cinema. I am curious, I suppose, 
finally in respect o f  the new technologies and the apparent morbidity o f the old, 
how w e are to go about reinventing cinema. (9)
I think Greenaway’s engagement with the question of cinematic representation in
such an age where the conventions of dominant cinema are accepted without question
by the majority of moviegoers and filmmakers, makes him a distinguishable figure
among his contemporaries in the West. The number of theoretical works on his films
increases day by day. However the current number and scope of the journal articles
and the books about Greenaway’s works, suggest that there is still much room for
study in the area. I think an investigation of the cinematic representation tluough the
films of Greenaway, which operate in contrast to the conventions of dominant
cinema and which therefore can be mentioned within the examples of counter
cinema, could first enrich our views, thoughts, and discussions concerning cinema;
and I think this is what we need in such an age where dominant cinema invades 
movietheaters and cinema becomes more and more a commodity of consumption. 
Second this might show us that it is possible to get alternative pleasures from cinema, 
which derive from sources other than the story and identification. Finally this might 
construct a bridge to the efforts of several filmmakers of the past, like those of the 
French New Wave Movement, who come up with different ideas about cinematic 
representation, and remind us that there have always been, and can still be, other 
ways of making and watching films.
1.2. The Statement of The Problem
The history of the discussions over the nature of cinematic representation is as old as 
the history of the development of the cinematic apparatus. Although cinema at the 
begimiing was met with interest as a distinguished medium mainly due to its capacity 
to produce images in movement, it is possible to observe the existence of different 
approaches towards making cinema since its early days. The case of LumiDre; who 
used the apparatus to picture everyday life with a realistic perspective; and Melies; 
who made the apparatus serve his artistic imagination (Kraucer, 307) exemplifies this 
fact. These two early figures can be considered as the forerunners of the realist and 
formalist film theories which would develop in time and occupy the center of the 
discussions on cinema until 1970’s. The realist film theory would argue that the true 
objective of cinema should be to represent reality whereas the fomialist film theory, 
which would consider realism as an obstacle to the self expression of the artist.
would argue that the importance of cinema lies in not ‘what’ is represented but rather
‘how’ it is represented and put emphasis on the form rather than the content. In 1970s 
with the appearance of the psychoanalytical film theory, the discussions over cinema 
would gain a new dimension by the inclusion of a new term, the spectator (the 
subject), who engages with the film, which was supposed to be forgotten by the 
realist and the formalist film theories. The psychoanalytical film theory would look 
at the relationship between the spectator and the film and try to explain the pleasure 
derived from cinema, and therefore the desire for cinema by using Freudian and 
Lacanian concepts.“ The discussions over cinema would become even richer in time 
with the development of avant-garde film theories as well.
The theories on cinema and cinematic representation are also a subject of discussion 
among many contemporary film theoreticians, historians, and academicians some of 
whom will be mentioned throughout this study. The differing views among those 
people and the variety of the films of the directors of the cinema world, suggest that 
there is no single answer to what is cinema and what is the nature of cinematic 
representation; and I think there will never be such an answer. Therefore the purpose 
of this study is not to agree on a specific, unique answer to the question ‘what is 
cinematic representation’; but rather to encourage a critical approach towards
cinematic representation.
Greenaway’s engagement with the question of cinematic representation in this age 
can be considered as a continuation of an old inquiiy. Perhaps he does not know what 
the answers really are and I think his aim is not to offer strict answers but rather to
“ For a discussion of the film theories mentioned so far see Lapsley and Westlaken.
pose the questions. I believe that posing the questions is as important as offering the 
answers. It seems to me that Greenaway’s questions and arguments can build a new 
platform of discussion which can also serve as a bridge between the discussions of 
the past and the present. Therefore the purpose of this study is to investigate the last 
eight feature films of Peter Greenaway with regard to the cinematic representation 
which constitutes the central significance of these works.
1.3. Definition of Basic Terms
1.3.1. Cinematic Representation
One of the definitions of the term ‘representation’ offered in The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language is ‘the act of portrayal, picturing, or other 
rendering in visible form.’ Again in the same dictionary one of the definitions of the 
term ‘representational’ is ‘representing or depicting an object in a recognizable 
maimer (i.e. representational art).’ These definitions are in conformity with Lyotard’s 
statement that ‘the image is representational because recognizable, because it 
addresses itself to the eye’s memory, to fixed references or identification, references 
known’ (353). I think the explanations above can be considered as general statements 
about representation, which also explain why cinema has been considered as a 
representative art like painting and other pictorial arts. This consideration is based on 
cinema’s capacity of producing images that are recognizable.
It can be concluded from the definitions above that although the term representation 
can have a very general meaning, the term representational is used for a specific
meaning; it refers to recognizability. A confusion of these two terms could lead one 
to reduce representation to limited Platonic definitions such as copying of reality or 
faithful resemblance to reality. The term ‘representation’ in the term ‘cinematic 
representation’ in this study is used in general sense and is not limited to these 
Platonic definitions. Therefore the term ‘cinematic representation’ should not be 
taken as an attempt to reduce all cinema to a specific group of films that is called 
representational film:
Any film in which the images are direct representation o f  the real physical 
world as opposed to those avant-garde films that either distort the image o f  
reality or present abstract and nonrepresentational images (Königsberg 293).
By using the term ‘representation’ in general sense I acknowledge that representation
can have many different modes other than resemblance to reality. As it is stated by
Philip Alperson, in an attempt to explain some of the E.H. Gombrich’s arguments in
his book entitled Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial
Representation.
...the history o f  representative art is in large part a history o f its 
styles...D ifferent artistic styles are something like different languages o f  
representation, languages we must leam to read if  we are to understand them 
correctly (58).
Therefore the tenn cinematic representation in this study will refer in general to 
various styles of representation which use cinema as a medium.
1.3.2. Dominant Cinema
The tenn dominant cinema tliroughout this study will refer to Hollywood type 
movies, which extend beyond the films made in Hollywood. In other words it will be 
used as a general term which refers to a variety of films made in various countries of
the world on the basis of the same structural and narrative principles (marked with a 
tendency of effacing the traces of cinematic production process and establishing a 
relationship between the film and the spectator based on identification and emotional 
involvement) that are established first by the films made in Hollywood. In this sense 
the terms Hollywood cinema, mainstream cinema, classical cinema, conventional 
cinema could be used interchangeably.
1.3.3. Counter Cinema
The term ‘counter cinema’ throughout this study will refer to the films and the efforts 
of the directors which work against the structural and narrative conventions of 
dominant cinema. While keeping in mind the films that belong to the French New 
Wave Movement as specific examples of counter cinema, the term will be used in a 
broader sense including all the attempts which come up with different views of 
cinematic representation in terms of the organization of the filmic narrative, space, 
and time and which question the conventional viewing habits. Counter cinema can 
also be considered as a type of ‘avant-garde cinema’ if the temi ‘avant-garde 
cinema’ is taken in general sense as referring to the ‘films that deny the traditional 
narrative structures and techniques of commercial films by seeking to explore new 
modes of visual and emotional experience’ (Königsberg 22).
1.4. Limitations of the Study
The examination of the cinematic representation in Greenaway’s films will be limited 
to the analysis of his last eight feature films: The Draughtsman’s Contract (1982), A
Zed and Two Noughts (1986), The Belly of an Architect (1987), Drowning by 
Numbers (1988), The Cook, the Thief, his Wife and her Lover (1989), Prospero’s 
Books (1991), The Pillow Book (1996). The short films will not be analyzed as a 
separate category but will be referred to when they are considered to be illuminating 
for the arguments that will be made. The reason is that the feature films already 
involve the concepts that could be discussed within the short films. However a 
second, and perhaps more important, reason is that most of those films are not 
available on video. The first feature film by Greenaway, The Falls, will not be 
examined separately either, because although the film’s duration is 185 minutes it is 
more appropriate to consider it as being closer to Greenaway’s short films in terms of 
its structure and style.
The analysis of the eight feature films will mainly focus on the questions they raise 
about cinematic representation since I argue that this is the aspect, which constitutes 
their significance. Therefore the subjects of the films will be examined if they 
illuminate or contribute to the elaboration of my arguments on cinematic 
representation in those films. The possible psychoanalytic interpretations, which 
could be applied to the stories in the films, and the films’ political implications will 
not be a subject of inquiry in this study.
When evaluating the cinematic representation in Greenaway’s films dominant 
cinema’s conventions will constitute the main point of reference and comparison. 
Because it seemed to me that dominant cinema has always functioned, in the history
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of cinema, as an inevitable point of reference in evaluating the revolutionary attempts
of the other forms of cinema, which have come up with different views of cinematic
representation. Moreover I agree with Scott Macdonald that
The mainstream cinema . . .  is so fundamental a part o f our public and private 
experiences, that even when filmmakers produce and exhibit alternative 
cinematic forms, the dominant cinema is implied by the alternatives . . . 
whatever particular manipulations o f  imagery, sound, and time define these 
avant-garde film experiences as alternatives to the commercial cinema are 
recognizable only because o f the conventionalized context viewers have 
already developed. (1)
However beside dominant cinema there will also be references to counter cinema 
since Greenaway’s ideas and principles concerning cinematic representation exhibit a 
parallelism with those of the directors of counter cinema. Although I believe that 
Greenaway’s films cannot be considered as being identical with the films of directors 
like Godard in the final outcome, the study will not attempt to enter into such a 
debate since this requires a study which is wide enough to be the subject of another 
thesis study.
1.5. Procedural Overview
The study utilizes a variety of theoretical works on cinema, art history, and 
philosophy in order to clarify, support and enrich personal arguments. It starts with a 
critical account of the realist film theory by drawing on scientific and ideological 
perspectives employed in discussions over the nature of cinematic representation. 
The discussion on dominant cinema’s obsession with realism is based on Jean-Pieme 
Oudart’s distinction between ‘the reality effect (l’effet de réalité)’ and ‘the effect of 
the real (l’effet de réel)’. The conventions of dominant cinema, which are claimed to 
be resulting from its obsession with realism, are described and discussed not tlu'ough
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specific films but a general view of these films in the light of the arguments of 
several theorists such as Stephen Heath, Christian Metz, David Bordwell, Colin 
MacCabe, Daniel Dayan, Jean-Louis Baudry, Kaja Silverman, Robert Lapsley and 
Michael Westlake.
A separate chapter offering a general overview of Greenaway’s artistic background 
and his view of the cinematic representation without going into the details of the 
films individually is assumed to be necessary in order to highlight the most important 
characteristics that are valid for all of his films, and prepare a background for a more 
detailed analysis of the individual films. Moreover such a chapter made it possible to 
present Greenaway’s personal arguments as well as some other writers’ and critics’ 
view of Greenaway’s cinema. A general picture of the cinematic representation in 
Greenaway’s cinema is drawn through the combination of these with the personal 
arguments, which are based on the films themselves. This also made it possible to 
include a variety of secondary, but enlightening, information, which might not be 
mentioned within the structure of the following chapter. The information on 
Greenaway’s artistic background depends on the inteiwiews with the filmmaker, 
which are available on the Web and some of the books on his works. There has been 
also references to the theories of Bertold Brecht, Godard and Peter Wollen’s 
arguments on counter cinema, which help to see Greenaway’s practice as a 
continuation of and contribution to certain inquiries of the past as well.
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The films are also individually analyzed within a structure that is formally 
compatible with the purpose of the study. The films are considered as sentences 
expressing questions and statements on representation in general and cinematic 
representation in particular, and they are categorized with respect to the crucial 
argument they involve. If a film is included in a particular category this does not 
mean that it is not suitable for the other categories, but rather that it contributes more 
to the discussion when analyzed in that particular category. As an alternative 
organization, each film could be analyzed one by one within the framework of each 
category. However such an organization is avoided for it would make the analysis 
monotonously repetitive and prevent the focusing of the discussion on important 
points. The preferred organization in this study has provided in depth discussion of 
particular topics, while facilitating the comparison of films in order to see the 
developments and changes taking place in Greenaway’s practice. The title/categoiy 
under which a film is analyzed has determined the focus of the analysis of that film. 
A wide variety of information, including art history, different theories and modes of 
representation, mythology, philosophy, are referred to due to the films’ multilayered 
structure.
1.6. Summary of Each Chapter
The following chapter aims at describing and discussing the conventions of dominant 
cinema, which are argued to be deriving from its obsession with realism not only on 
the figurative level but also, and more importantly, on the narrative level. However in 
order to do that, the chapter first gives a critical account of the question of realism in
13
cinema through an examination of André Bazin’s and his followers’ arguments on 
the relationship between cinema and reality and several other theorists’ criticisms of 
the attitude, which assumes that there is a direct relationship between cinema and 
reality.
Chapter three offers a general picture of Greenaway’s artistic background and his 
view of the cinematic representation. It points to the role of his experiences in 
painting and his painterly attitude on the aesthetics of his films and in the 
development of his ideas on the cinematic representation. It continues with 
examining what kind of a spectator and cinema his films imply. It concludes with an 
examination of Greenaway’s ideas in relation to Godard, Brecht, and counter 
cinema.
Chapter four engages in a closer reading of the films individually with respect to 
their statements relating to cinematic representation. This is achieved through a 
grouping of these characteristics under four subheadings and grouping of the films 
according to them. Each film is discussed in detail within the framework detennined 
by those subheadings, which, in the end is linked to cinematic representation.
14
2. CINEMATIC REPRESENTATION AND DOMINANT CINEMA
2.1. Ideology of Realism
Eisenstein, in one of his texts dated 1934, states that arts’ chief task has been ‘the 
reflection of reality and the master of this reality-man’ (Williams, Christopher 18-9). 
It is possible to meet similar arguments in various books on the history of art and one 
could turn to painting in order to find some evidence for such an argument. The 
history of image making, from the depictions on the walls of caves to the works of 
nineteenth century landscape painters, shows that one of the greatest struggles of man 
in art has been to represent life as effectively as possible. In other words it could be 
said that the large part of the history of art is marked with the desire to capture 
reality. This desire for realism is quite evident in Leonardo da Vinci’s statement: 
‘The most excellent painting manner is the one that imitates best and makes the 
painting resemble the natural object it represents more closely’ (qtd. in Comolli, 
Technique and Ideology 52).
Of course the desire to capture reality can not be limited to painting and it can be 
forwarded as one of the factors that made many people welcome the invention of 
photography and later cinema as very important developments. The French critic
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André Bazin, who also interprets the history of arts as ‘the stoiy of resemblance or 
realism,’ considers photography and cinema as the two major developments 
satisfying ‘our obsession for realism’ in this history (1: 10-2). For Bazin, cinema by 
carrying movement to photographs has made them ‘a picture of life and a faithful 
copy of nature.’ In other words cinema, by bringing ‘the fourth dimension,’ which is 
movement, as an addition to the perspective in photographic image, which creates the 
illusion of tliree-dimensional space, has completed the missed part that was necessary 
for photographs to suggest life (1: 11). In this sense for Bazin, photography and 
especially cinema are two important new modes of representation which replaced 
painting in the search for realism, for capturing reality (1: 16). '
The following definition of the kinetoscope, which is the cornerstone in the invention 
of cinema, quoted by Norman K. Denzin in his book entitled Cinematic Society from 
1902 Sears catalogue reveals the extent to which moving picture had been considered 
as an amazing development creating the opportunity to capture reality in the most 
efficient way
THE UNRIVALLED EDISON KINETOSCOPE, moving picture machine, 
giving pictorial presentation, not lifelike merely, but apparently life itself, with 
every action and every detail brought so vividly before the audience that it 
becomes difficult for them to believe that what they see before them can be 
other than nature’s very self. (193)
All of the moving picture machines like zoopraxiscope (‘life-constructing viewer’), 
kinetoscope, which contributed to the invention of cinema were attributed a common 
characteristic; they were conceived as suggesting or capturing life due to their
Bazin explains the crisis that overtook modem painting with the invention of photography and 
cinema. He states that photography has freed painting from its obsession with realism and forced it to 
offer other pleasures like illusion since photography was able to satisfy masses’ obsession with 
realism more than the painting (1: 10-3).
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capacity to show photographic images in movement. It was the same conception that 
made the reaction of the first spectators at Louis Lumière’s L’arrivée d’un Train en 
Gare de la Ciotat (Arrivai of a Train at the Ciotat Station) (1895), which is supposed 
to mark the beginning of cinema, a prototype of the impression of reality in cinema : 
it is said that the spectators ran away as if the train would crash them because they 
mistook the images on the screen for reality.
Although today’s spectators are aware of the difference between the image and the 
reality, the impression of reality is still considered to be a distinguishing feature of 
cinema due to its capacity to combine various elements like photographic image, 
movement, duration, and sound which contribute to suggest real life." However 
realism in cinema should not be considered as a natural outcome of the filmic 
material used because the impression of reality can be produced on condition that the 
material is manipulated and presented in a specific way. I think Ira Konigsberg’s 
description of realism in film, in his The Complete Film Dictionary, carries in itself 
such an idea too:
In its most uncomplicated meaning, realism in film refers to direct and truthful 
view o f  the real world through the presentation o f characters and their physical 
surroundings with minimal distortion from either the filmmaker’s point o f view  
or from filmic technique. In this respect film realism is related to the traditional 
mimetic school o f criticism in literature and painting, which argues that art 
should be a representation o f  reality, heightening our consciousness about the 
world that suirounds us. (285)
As it is stated by the author this is a very general interpretation of realism in film, but 
I think it underlines the most important points stated so far. Susan Hayward in her
" For a detailed explanation of the factors contributing to the impression of reality in cinema see Metz, 
Film Lantiuage 3-15.
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Key Concepts in Cinema Studies offers a very similar description and one of her
statements seems to me to be very important. She states that
Realism functions in film on both the narrative level and the figurative (that is, 
pictorial/photographic). In this regard, physical realism marries into 
psychological realism via the narrative structures. (298)
The argument above reminds that realism in cinema does not refer to mere
photographic realism and this is one of the points that constitute the basis of this
section of the study. In this section I will first discuss realism in cinema ‘on the
figurative level’ through an examination of the realist film theory. Second I will
examine the dominant cinema and show the extent to which it is dominated by
realism ‘on the figurative level’ and, more importantly, ‘on the narrative level’.
2.1.1. The Realist Film Theory from a Critical Perspective
Cinema’s capacity to capture reality through moving photographic images has been 
put forward as one of its most powerful and distinguishing aspects by several film 
theorists since its early years. In this sense the question of realism in cinema can be 
considered as one of the earliest but long-lasting discussions on the nature of 
cinematic representation. It is possible to observe the most important aspects of this 
discussion of realism in cinema in the arguments of André Bazin who is supposed to 
be the most important theorist who turned the realism in cinema into a theory, and 
who, therefore, can be considered as one of the pioneering theorists who shaped the 
realist film theoiy with their ideas about the nature of cinematic representation.
The realist film theory suggests in summary that cinema is a window onto the world 
and in this sense it could be said that it continues the Renaissance perspective
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tradition, which has considered the eye and the man behind it as the center of the 
world and art as a transparent window on that world. As it is stated by Vivian 
Sobchack realist film theorists seek to reveal and discover the world’s expression in 
cinematic images’ meaning (46). The following statement which implies that cinema 
is a window onto the world shows that Sobchack’s argument applies to Bazin too. 
Bazin states,
Alone, hidden in a dark room, we watch through half open blinds a spectacle 
that is unaware o f our existence and which is part o f the universe. There is 
nothing to prevent us from identifying ourselves in imagination with the 
moving world before us, which becomes the world. (1: 102)
Chiistopher Williams rightly observes that for Bazin, film is either ‘a recreation of
world in its own image’ or the making of ‘an ideal world in the likeness of the real
world’(36). This situation can be considered as the outcome of Bazin’s approach to
the modes of representation in general since he argues that
...today the making o f images no longer shares an anthropocentric, utilitarian 
purpose. It is no longer a question o f survival after death but o f  a larger 
concept, the creation o f an ideal world in the likeness o f the real, with its own 
temporal destiny. (1: 10)
For Bazin, cinema is the most advantageous mode of representation capable to serve 
efficiently to the purpose above. However not only does Bazin believe in the capacity 
of cinema to represent reality but also claims that this must be the true objective of it.
Realism in cinema, for Bazin, does not refer simply to cases like ‘how the hair of 
Falconetti, in Joan of Arc, was actually cut for the film; or how the actors wore no 
make up;’ (1: 109) but rather to the need for making things seem more real than they 
naturally appear. As Colin MacCabe summarizes ‘for Bazin, as for almost all realist 
theorists, what is in question is not just a rendering of reality but rendering of reality
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made more real by the use of aesthetic device’ (181). This is why Bazin states; ‘But 
realism in art can only be achieved in one way -through artifice’ (2; 26).
According to Bazin the realism of cinema is firstly an outcome of its photographic 
nature (1; 108). It has generally been argued that photography is the most efficient 
medium in accessing objective reality due to its accuracy and neutrality which derive 
from its scientific base. An understanding of cinema, which holds this argument true 
and which defines cinema as photographic images in movement, could conclude that 
cinema is the most efficient medium for reflecting the objective reality. However as 
Jean-Louis Baudry suggests the reality, which is supposed to be provided by still 
photography or cinema, is always ‘a reality already worked upon, elaborated, 
selected’ (Ideological Effects 290). The problem with the definition of cinema as 
‘photographic images in movement’ is that it is quite simplistic and insufficient to 
comprehend cinema as a whole. As an alternative, the definition offered by Baudry; 
cinema as an inscription (shooting) followed by a process of transformation (editing), 
that is made invisible in the final product (projection), seems to be more plausible. In 
his famous article entitled Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic 
Apparatus Baudry argues that
...between ‘objective reality’ and the camera, site o f inscription, and between 
the inscription and the projection are situated certain operations, a work which 
has as its result a finished product. To the extent that it is cut o ff from the raw 
material ( ‘objective reality’) this product does not allow us to see the 
transfonnation which has taken place. (287)
Bazin also claims that cinema is not just photographic images in movement. That is 
why he ends his essay entitled The Ontology of Photographic Image with the 
sentence ‘On the other hand, of course cinema is also a language.’ (1: 16) Bazin in
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his arguments points to the need for certain organization in film but he presents this
as being necessary for rendering reality more real; he argues
Every fom i o f aesthetic must necessarily choose between what is worth 
preserving and what should be discarded, and what should not even be 
considered. (1: 26)
. . .  i f  the cinema is committed to communicate only by way o f what is real, it 
becomes all the more important to discern those elements in filming which 
confirm our sense o f  natural reality, and those which destroy that feeling. (1: 
110)
Bazin distinguishes between the directors who believe in images and those who 
believe in reality; and his arguments give the impression that he praises the works of 
the directors in the latter category (1: 24). Bazin considers montage, used by the 
directors in the first category, as an element which destroys the natural reality. The 
reason he presents is that those directors reorganize the elements of reality through 
montage according to their own point of view as if they want to impose their own 
preferred reading, leaving no space to the spectator for his/her personal reading. 
Moreover he states that in such a situation the meaning is no longer contained in the 
‘objective content’ of the images but derived from their juxtaposition according to 
the choices of the director. Through all these statements Bazin tries to point to the 
loss of objectivity brought about by montage. Bazin prefers the use of depth of field 
through deep-focus cinematography and long takes to montage as means for offering 
objective reality and leaving room for the personal interpretation of the spectator (1: 
24-40).
It has seemed to me that Bazin takes the possibility of representing reality effectively 
in cinema for granted and consequently insists on the idea that under certain
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conditions it is possible for cinema to offer objective reality. Bazin’s insistence on
such a possibility while considering at the same time certain organizations as a
necessary part of the process seems to be conflicting in itself Moreover Bazin
believes that there is one real world which one can represent objectively in cinema.
But if cinema, as Bazin suggests, is a language and not mere recording of images
then one could argue that every film speaks its own world in its own language. In this
sense I would agree with J. Dudley Andrew who asserts that
There is no primary real world which we subsequently subject to various types 
o f  representation. Rather it makes for more sense to speak o f  multiple worlds 
which individuals construct (38).
Therefore a film, whether it is produced by using montage or deep-focus 
cinematography, cannot be considered as ‘a window onto the world’. Even if the 
window is opened onto a world then this can only be the world of that particular film 
and not the real world. Contrary to Bazin’s argument, this is valid for the films using 
deep-focus cinematography too because cinema is always a process of 
transformation. Even at the very beginning of this process the camera selects its 
objects to be recorded among a variety of possibilities and it has a thousand way of 
elaborating them to construct a reality. Since it is not possible to offer any exact 
parameters for this selection and elaboration it could be argued that the 
transformation starts from the very beginning because once a certain construction of 
reality is selected it loses its objectivity.
The claims that cinema can reproduce objective reality have generally been based on 
the assumption that at the basis of cinema there lies photography which is believed to 
be capable of offering mechanically perfect resemblance to reality. As stated before
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Bazin also mentions that this is the primary factor producing realism in cinema. 
However even the belief in photographs’ resemblance to reality can be open to 
discussion. Christopher Williams offers an interesting argument which questions this 
belief. He argues that photography deforms the material and that it shows non­
resemblance rather than resemblance. He states
. . .  I never manage to identify the similarity o f views to the original, except by 
picking landmarks, or more exactly, differentiating details -a tree, a bench, a 
sign. Not because ‘it’s nothing like it,’ but because the view is isolated. What, 
in nature, only exists in association with other things and is not delimited, the 
photograph isolates into an autonomous entity... Once achieved it exaggerates 
individual features o f the view a thousand times and this is what provokes the 
effect o f ‘non-resemblance’. (140)
Moreover the camera reproduces images according to the codes of perspective of the 
Italian Renaissance, which organizes the visual environment according to a single 
point-of-view, but the way we see things can change according to our point-of-view. 
As a result it is possible to agree with Jean-Louis Comolli, as well as many other film 
theorists questioning the possibility of realism in cinema, that ‘the apparatus 
determines the structure of the cinematic reality it represents’ (Technique and 
Ideology 43).
The argument that film can reflect the truth of life by being realistic derives from the 
tendency of considering film mainly as a simple mechanistic recording of objects and 
events. This view represents mostly the scientific perspective employed in 
discussions over the nature of cinematic representation and it stands against the 
ideological perspective. Scientific perspective argues that cinema is constructed on 
its scientific basis whereas ideological perspective argues that cinema is constructed 
according to an ideology of representation.
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In fact the scientific perspective can be considered as being ideological by its vei'y
nature since it takes the ‘science=neutrality’ equation for granted and tries to render
the neutrality or objectivity of cinema unquestionable by pointing continuously at its
scientific base. Consequently within such a framework, the ideological aspect of
cinema is left out of discussion in an ideological way. Baudry, while questioning the
neutrality of the optical instruments in general, which is attached to their scientific
base, points to the close relation between this scientific perspective and ideology:
One could doubtless question the privileged position which optical instruments 
seem to occupy on the line o f intersection o f science and ideological 
productions. Does the technical nature o f  optical instruments, directly attached 
to scientific practice, serve to conceal not only their use in ideological products 
but also the ideological effects which they may themselves provoke? Their 
scientific base would ensure them a sort o f neutrality and help to avoid their 
being questioned. (Ideological Effects 286-7)
The scientific perspective reveals itself mostly in the consideration that camera’s 
scientifically accurate eye is a substitute for the imperfect human eye. This 
consideration and the scientific perspective behind it is expressed most powerfully in 
the words of Diziga Vertov describing the camera’s talents;
I am eye. I am a mechanical eye.
I, a machine, am showing you a world, the likes o f which only I can see.
I free m yself today and forever from human immobility, I am in constant 
movement, I approach and draw away from objects, I crawl under them, I move 
alongside the mouth o f a mnning soldiers, I turn on my back, I rise with an 
airplane, I fall and soar together with falling and rising bodies...
My road is towards the creation o f a fresh perception o f  the world. Thus I 
decipher in a way the world unknown to you. (qtd. in Sobchack 184)
A similar description of the apparatus -in a less poetical way- can be found in Walter
Benjamin’s famous essay entitled The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction as well, where he points to the transfonnations that occured in the
nature of art in terms of its production and consumption, with the developments of
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the means of mechanical reproduction, especially with the invention of photography 
and cinema. At some point in this article Benjamin, in an attempt to compare the 
painter and the cameraman, establishes an analogy between the painter and the 
magician, and between the cameraman and the surgeon. He argues that the 
cameraman penetrates into the reality in the same manner as the surgeon penetrates 
into a patient’s body (233). This suggests that the camera eliminates the distance 
from reality and penetrates into it like in the case of the surgeon who eliminates his 
distance from the patient by penetrating into his body.
At first look this cameraman-surgeon analogy used by Benjamin as opposed to 
painter-magician analogy might seem to be an extreme example of the scientific 
perspective towards cinema. Moreover this idea might be supported by pointing to 
Benjamin’s statements that the nature observed thi'ough penetration by the camera is 
different than the one observed by the naked eye due to the capacities of the camera 
and editing such as close-up, enlargement, slow-motion . Benjamin summarizes this 
aspect of the camera, and therefore cinema, in his statement: ‘the camera introduces 
us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses’ (236-7). 
However, while examining those scientific aspects of the camera Benjamin does not 
aim at attributing any neutrality or objectivity to cinema; on the contrary he points to 
the capacity of cinema to construct its reality and truth by taking the advantage of 
those aspects. While establishing his cameraman-surgeon analogy, Benjamin points 
also to the fact that in both cases the picture obtained does not consist of a whole but 
of ‘multiple fragments which are assembled under a new law’; and he argues:
25
Thus, for contemporary man the representation o f reality by the film is 
incomparably more significant than that o f the painter, since it offers, precisely 
because o f the thoroughgoing permeation o f reality with mechanical 
equipment, an aspect o f reality which is free o f all equipment. (234)
However he unmasks the reality, which is supposed to be provided inherently by the
cinematic apparatus, in his argument that
. . .  the mechanical equipment has penetrated so deeply into reality that its pure 
aspect freed from the foreign substance o f  equipment is the result o f  a special 
procedure, namely, the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and the 
mounting o f  the shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free 
aspect o f reality here has become the height o f artifice; the sight o f  immediate 
reality has become an orchid in the land o f  technology. (233)
I think it is for this reason that Benjamin names the products of the film industry as
‘illusion promoting spectacles and dubious speculations’ (232); and the public at the
movies as ‘an absent-minded examiner’ (241). His analysis is important in the sense
that it serves as a good demonstration of how the objectivity and neutrality claimed
by scientific perspective in cinema can be problematized within itself
Contrary to the scientific perspective the ideological perspective argues that film is a
process which involves transformation, which is based on a certain ideology of
representation, from the very beginning. The argument of Jean-Louis Comolli can be
considered as an exemplary of this ideological perspective:
...In reality the very fact o f filming is o f  course already a productive 
intervention which modifies and transfonns the material recorded. From the 
moment the camera intervenes a form o f manipulation begins (qtd. in Lapsley 
and Westlaken 158).
Within the context of Comolli’s argument, Linda Williams’ examination of the
2
images recorded by Edward Muybridge’s ‘zoopraxiscope’ shows that cinema has
 ^A machine developed by Muybridge in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was able to 
create the illusion of movement out o f instantaneous photographs taken at close intervals.
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proved to be more than simple recording of images from the very beginning. 
Williams’ study reveals how the capacity of cinematic apparatus to produce new 
forms of knowledge and pleasure, was demonstrated in its very origin; in an age 
when ‘the codes of narrative, editing, and mise-en-scene were not fully established’ 
(34-57).
Muybridge, in an attempt to exhibit the capacity of his machine to capture life by
creating an impression of movement, first used several slides of horses to make
movement visible and to reflect its knowledge. However when he replaced these
images of horses with the images of human bodies he proved, without being aware of
it, the fact that his machine could do more than providing ‘the truths of bodily
motion’. It was able to produce visual pleasure in a specific way as well. Williams
explains this fact by comparing the images of naked women and men performing
same activities. She points at the sexuality ‘encoded in the woman’s body’ tlirough
several extra details and argues that ‘women’s bodies are fetishized tlu'ough these
motion studies.’ Some of the examples she offers are as follows
When the women perform the same activities as the men, these activities are 
often accompanied by some superfluous detail, such as the inexplicable raising 
o f  a hand to the mouth, which lends a mark o f difference to the woman’s 
motion as compared to the man’s. If a woman runs, her run is marked by a 
similarly gratuitous gesture o f  grasping her breast... When a woman lies down 
in a sequence that parallels a male series entitled “Lying Down,” she does not 
just lie down; she lies down to read a newspaper, or she lies down to go bed in 
a bed equipped with pillow, sheets, and blankets. (39-40)
What Williams tries to do with these examples is to point to the existence of a mise-
en-scene in those images, which, I think, reflect the trace of the author of the film.
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She draws our attention from ‘what is shown’ to ‘how it is shown;’ or from assumed
‘objectivity’ to ‘mise-en-scene’. She claims that
What began as the scientific impulse to record the “tmth” o f  the body quickly 
became a powerful fantasy that drove cinema’s first mdimentary achievements 
o f narrative diegesis and mise-en-scene. (41)
Several film theorists who have had ideas similar to those arguments that I have
mentioned from Baudry, Comolli, Williams, have argued that cinema is ideological
by its veiy nature, as opposed to those who argued that it carries the neutrality and
objectivity of science which fonns its basis. However it is not the transformation
process by itself, which makes cinema ideological but rather the tendency of cinema
towards effacing the traces of this process. Baudry states
Cinematographic specificity thus refers to a work, that is, to a process o f  
transformation. The question becomes; is the work made evident, does 
consumption o f the product bring about a ‘knowledge effect’, or is the work 
concealed? If the latter, consumption o f  the product will obviously be 
accompanied by ideological surplus value (Ideological Effects 287).
Colin MacCabe’s following argument can be considered as a summary of the
ideology of realism
. . . classically realism depended on obscuring the relation between the text and 
the reader in favor o f  a dominance accorded to a supposedly given reality; but 
this dominance, far from sustaining a natural relation, was the product o f a 
definite organization which, o f  necessity, effaced its own workings. (194)
Today the best working of this ideology of realism can be observed in the examples 
of dominant cinema and this is what the next section aims at showing.
2.2. Dominant Cinema in the Web of Realism
Dirk Eitzen, in his essay entitled Comedy and Classicism, states that most film 
scholars have agreed upon the following characteristics of the classical Hollywood 
cinema (dominant cinema):
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. . . driven by protagonists’ needs and desires, organized overwhelmingly 
around the goal o f presenting a clear and coherent fictional world, and focusing 
viewers’ attention almost exclusively upon story outcomes (394).
The description above actually belongs to David Bordwell who has signed two
influential theoretical works on classical Hollywood cinema: The Classical
Hollywood Cinema and Narration in the Fiction Film. I think this is a very
economical but efficient picture of the films within dominant cinema and I believe
that the existence of such a picture can be tied to dominant cinema’s obsession with
realism; to its consideration of film as a slice of life, a transparent window onto the
world. At first look the connection I establish here between realism of dominant
cinema and BordwelTs argument above might seem irrelevant, but I will explain why
it is not.
The realism of dominant cinema does not derive merely from the photographic 
nature and representationality of the film but also from the narrative teclmiques that 
are employed. I think this could be explained better by using the distinction, that was 
established by Jean-Pierre Oudart, between ‘the reality effect (l’effet de réalité)’ and 
‘the effect of the real (l’effet de réel)’ in a system of representation (The Reality 
Effect 189). For Oudart, ‘the reality effect’ has to do with ‘the figurative structure as 
the product of specific pictorial codes;’ for example the perspective system; which 
enables analogical representation. In other words the inscription of the real objects in 
a recognizable manner by the system of representation is ‘the reality effect’. Whereas 
‘the effect of the real’, for Oudart, refers to the inscription of the spectator by the 
system of representation into what is represented so as to make him/her an element of 
the fiction (The Reality Effect 189-90). In such a case the spectator perceives the
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representation not as representation but as real to which he/she belongs as well. In 
my opinion dominant cinema’s realism is mostly based on this ‘effect of the real’; the 
inscription of the spectator into the diegetic space through narrative structures; and 
the characteristics described by Bordwell, which I have quoted above, are the 
outcome of such an approach. Therefore in this section I will examine the narrative 
strategies that are employed by dominant cinema in order to produce the impression
of reality through this ‘effect of the real’., 4
2.2.1.1. Strategies for Realism
2.2.1.2. Story
Umberto Eco states, in his book entitled Reflections on ‘The Name of the Rose’, 
‘man is storytelling animal by nature’ (13). If this is accepted as being true one can 
say that dominant cinema has proved, in the best way, this special characteristic of 
man by telling the most ‘beautiful’ stories of the history.
Dominant cinema seems to be motivated by tellihg stories,and this means at the same 
time that it believes in people’s desire for stories. Such an approach can be 
considered as the first step of a process in dominant cinema which aims at including 
the spectator into the film. Aumont, Bergala, Marie, and Vemet state, in their book 
entitled The Aesthetics of Film, that the classical fiction film is a discourse that is 
disguised as a story; and they define ‘story’ as ‘a narrative without marks of 
enunciation and without overt references to the situation that produces it’ (96).
It should be kept in mind that the strategies that will be mentioned cannot be isolated completely 
from one another. Therefore they should be considered as reciprocally effecting; depending on and 
deriving from one another.
30
Similarly Roy Armes -who distinguishes between the story and the plot, defining the 
story as ‘the embodiment of the action as a chronological, cause-and-effect chain of 
events occurring within a given duration and a spatial field,’ and the plot (discourse) 
as ‘the precise structuring of a particular story as it literally unfolds on the screen 
states that
All classical cinema -such as the Hollywood movie- concerns itself with 
the construction of a strongly plotted story line: the action is potentially 
richer in meaning and ambiguity than the plot. (17)
These arguments point to an important characteristic of the dominant cinema; to the
fact that the filmic elements -graphical, spatial, temporal- are organized in such a
way that they mostly support the narration of the events in a cause-and-effect relation
rather than drawing attention to themselves and encouraging the spectator to analyze
how the film works formally. Therefore what is important becomes what is told
(narrated) rather than how it is told. Stephen Heath refers to the same situation when
he talks about ‘the narrativization of the film.’ He explains ‘namativization’ as
follows
The narration is to be held on the narrated, the enunciation on the enounced; 
filmic procedures are to be held as narrative instances (very much as “cues”), 
exhaustively, without gap or coniradiciton. What is sometimes vaguely referred 
to as “transparency” has its meaning in this narrativization: the proposal o f a 
discourse that disavows its operations and positions in the name o f a signified 
that it proposes as its preexistent justification. (397)
Film’s lending of itself as a story without drawing attention to its formal
characteristics, is assumed to give the impression that it is led by nobody and
therefore it is as spontaneous as reality itself Christian Metz interprets the
motivation behind the story in an effective way:
The film is not exhibitionist. I watch it, but it doesn’t watch me watching it. 
Nevertheless it knows that I am watching it. But it doesn’t want to know. This 
fundamental disavowal is what has guided the whole classical cinema into the
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paths o f ‘story,’ relentlessly erasing its discursive basis, and making it (at best) 
a beautiful closed object which must remain unaware o f the pleasure it gives us 
. . . .  (The Imaginary Signifier 94)
In connection with this interpretation he argues that the ‘regime of the story’ makes 
the spectacle in the film unexpected, and makes it ‘bear the stamp of the external 
reality’ since story in this system of classical cinema is ‘a story from nowhere, that 
nobody tells, but which, nevertheless, somebody receives -otherwise it would not 
exist: so, in a sense, it is the ‘receiver’. . . who tells it’ (The Imaginary Signifier 96- 
7).
However, the realistic character of the story is an outcome of the nature of its content 
too. The story is kept as clear and comprehensible as the fictional world it represents. 
In general it consists of events unfolding in a cause-and-effect relation which follows 
a linear order: an undisturbed stage, followed by a disturbance (problem), the 
struggle, and the elimination of the disturbance (problem). This chronological chain 
is built around the actions of protagonists who encounter the problems while tiying 
to achieve their specific goals, and it is closed with the resolution of the conflicts and 
the achievement of the goals by the protagonists (Bordwell, Staiger, Thompson). The 
clearness and the comprehensibility of the story are important, in the sense that these 
make the story easy to follow for the spectator and, therefore, facilitate his/her 
involvement to the diegesis which seems plausible and natural. Moreover the 
construction of the story in the fomi of stability-instability-stability, in other words 
the inclusion of certain conflicts and their resolution, which occur around the 
protagonists, create a suspense, which absorbs the spectator to the film. Dirk Eitzen,
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while discussing the system of classical Hollywood cinema described by Bordwel, 
Staiger, and Thompson, argues that
The spectator in this system is motivated chiefly by suspense. The text creates 
‘gaps’, putting a protagonist into a clear predicament but holding back 
information about possible solutions or likely reactions, forcing the spectator to 
make guesses or hypotheses about what will happen next . . . Spectators are 
caught up in the process o f guesswork, anticipation, and partial satisfaction. 
This ‘gam e’ is the glue that holds the classical Hollywood film together. (394)
2.2.1.2. Identification
The following argument of Colin MacCabe, which summarizes in a good way ‘the 
effect of the real’ in dominant cinema; the inscription of the spectator into the 
diegetic space; can be considered at the same time as the main conclusion that should 
be derived from the previous section; especially from Metz’s arguments; he states 
that in cinema there is
. . .  a distinction between the spectator as viewer, the comforting ‘I ’, the fixed 
point, and the spectator as he or she is caught up in the play o f events on the 
screen, as he or she ‘utters,’ ‘enounces’ the film. Hollywood cinema is largely 
concerned to make these two coincide so that we can ignore what is at risk. 
(187)
The major mechanism, which enables this coincidence and encourages spectator’s 
involvement in the diegesis, is the production of the identification the spectator with 
the characters in the film (‘secondary identification’); and, in order to realize that, 
with the camera (‘primary identification’).
Making the events develop around the protagonists -who are presented with definit 
traits and mostly as sympathetic individuals- and their decisions, choices can be 
considered as one of the strongest strategies that dominant cinema employs in order
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to produce identification between the spectator and the characters in the film.
Although the secondary identification plays an important role in manipulating the
emotions of the spectator; in other words in making him/lier emotionally involve to
the film it has been argued by several theoreticians, like Baudry, Benjamin, Metz,
that it is the primary identification which forms the basis of all identification
mechanism in a film. Benjamin states this fact as, ‘The audience’s identification with
the actor is really an identification with the camera’ (228); while Baudry emphasizes
the role of the primary identification as follow
The spectator identifies less with what is represented, the spectacle itself, than 
what stages the spectacle, makes it seen, obliging him to see what it sees; this is 
exactly the function taken over by the camera as a sort o f  relay. (Ideologic^  
Effects 295)
However the primary identification can be produced under certain conditions. As 
Daniel Dayan points, in dominant cinema the filmic image is an image ‘designed and 
organized not merely as an object that is seen, but as the glance of a subject’ (439). 
We know that a film normally reflects the glance of the camera so this glance can be 
transformed into the glance of a subject (the spectator) only if the traces of the 
existence of the camera is effaced. Metz, who interprets spectator’s identification 
with the camera as an identification with himself, explains the primary identification 
and its effect as follow
. . . We are not referring here to the spectator’s identification with the 
characters o f  the film (which is secondary), but to his preliminary identification 
with the (invisible) seeing agency o f the film itself as discourse, as the agency 
which puts forward the story and shows it to us. In so far as it abolishes all 
traces o f the subject o f the enunciation, the traditional film succeeds in giving 
the spectator the impression that he is him self that subject, but in a state o f  
emptiness and absence, o f  pure visual capacity . . .. (The Imaginary Signifier 
96)
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The situation described by Metz is one of the most important factors which holds the 
impression of reality in dominant cinema alive. Spectator identifying with the 
camera, by this way, is made to feel that it is him/her who generate the film (both the 
images and the story) and this is what dominant cinema encourages in order to make 
him/her feel himself/herself as a part of the diegesis, and take what he/she perceives 
as being spontaneous and natural like reality itself For Baudry it is this relationship 
between the camera and the spectator which determines the ideological mechanism at 
work in cinema. He argues that
Everything happens as if, the subject him self being unable to account for his 
own situation, it was necessary to substitute secondary organs, grafted on to 
replace his own defective ones, instruments or ideological fonnations capable 
o f filling his function as subject. In fact, this substitution is only possible on the 
condition that instrumentation itself be hidden or repressed. (Ideological 
Effects 295)
It is possible to conclude out of all these arguments that dominant cinema works on 
the basis of the manipulation of the spectator in certain specific way. Jean-Pierre 
Oudart argues that in Renaissance painting ‘the spectator excluded from the 
representation, is involved in it in a phantasmatic way’ (The Reality Effect 191). As 
Oudart’s text implies, this is valid in the case of dominant cinema as well, and the 
identification mechanism at work, that I have tried to describe above, is the major 
tool for realizing that purpose.
2.2.1.3. Control of the Looks
The film is what I receive, and it is also what I release, since it does not pre­
exist my entering the auditorium and I only need close my eyes to suppress it. 
Releasing it, I am the projector, receiving it I am the screen; in both these 
figures together, I am the camera, which points and yet which records. (Metz, 
The Imaginary Signifier 51)
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As it can be concluded from Metz’s argument, the relation between the film and the 
spectator is visual before every thing. Therefore the film should first be able to 
control the looks of the spectator in order to direct him/her in the way it desires. This 
is the most necessary element in the achievement of the mechanisms that are 
mentioned so far: the concealment of the discursive elements, the work of the 
camera, the production of the identification... Cinema has been interpreted by many 
film theorists as an apparatus of looks: there are the look of the camera, the look of 
the spectator, and the looks of the characters at one another and things around them 
(Lapsley and Westlaken 140). One of the mechanisms employed by dominant cinema 
to control the looks of the spectator is to make the first and third types of looks above 
coincide with the second one. This is achieved partly during the shooting process and 
partly during the editing process, but in fact the mechanisms employed in both 
processes complement one another.
For example in dominant cinema the camera usually imitates the human vision 
motivated by bodily movements^; it continuously gives characters’ point of views, it 
orders shots in the form of shot/reverse-shot. These organizations are very important 
for dominant cinema because they help to produce the system described as ‘suture’ 
which refers mainly, as Kaja Silverman suggests, to the means by which subjects 
(spectators) emerge within discourse (219); and therefore which plays the major role 
in the absorption of the spectator into the film.
 ^The camera generally has been considered as imitating human vision -as something not only specific 
to dominant cinema- . But 1 think this is not a rule because the examples of shots offering vision 
which can not be assumed by human eye or camera movements that are not motivated by the 
movement o f the human body can be observed in avant-garde films or in the films that are considered 
to lie outside the limits of dominant cinema. It is dominant cinema itself which forces the camera to 
imitate the human vision motivated by bodily movements.
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2.2.1.4. Suture
Daniel Dayan’s argument, ‘the system of suture is to classical cinema what the verbal
language is to literature’ (439), explains in an economical but efficient way the
importance of suture in dominant cinema. Jean-Pierre Oudart, the first theoretician
who transported the concept of suture into cinema, defines suture as follow
Prior to any semantic ‘exchange’ between two images . . . ,and within the 
framework o f a cinematic i inonc j  constructed on a shofreverse-shot principle, 
the appearance o f a lack perceived as a Some One (The Absent One) is 
followed by its abolition by someone (or something) placed within the same 
field. (Cinema and Suture 47)
Oudart suggests that for every filmic field; what the spectator sees on the screen (the 
present one); there is a complementary field which he names as the field of the 
Absent-One, and which makes the spectator experience a sense of lack. This is the 
field that the spectator feels he/she is not allowed to see, and which makes him/her 
think that what he/she sees on the screen is actually nothing more than the the things 
in the field of vision of some other spectator (The Absent One) in this absent field. 
Oudart argues that the sense of lack, which produces unpleasure in the spectator and 
which is caused by this absent field and its owner, the Absent One, is eliminated 
through shot/reverse-shot system. However the lack is never fully satisfied and the 
system of suture is kept continuous throughout the film in the form of a play of 
absence and presence. It is for this reason that Oudart summarizes suture in a 
sentence as ‘the abolition of the Absent One and its resurrection in someone’ 
(Cinema and Suture 47). According to Metz, who also sees cinema as a play of 
presence and absence in which the absence never fully filled, it is this sense of lack 
which makes the desire for cinema perpetuate itself
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It must be pointed that the shot/reverse shot system is one of the crucial mechanisms
which keep the system of suture alive. Daniel Dayan explains the effect of the
shot/reverse shot system on the spectator in a clear way
The spectator’s pleasure, dependent upon his identification with the visual 
field, is interrupted when he perceives the frame. From this perception he infers 
the presence o f the absent-one and that other field from which the absent-one is 
looking. Shot two reveals a character who is presented as the owner o f the 
glance corresponding to shot-one. That is, the character in shot two occupies 
the place o f the absent-one corresponding to shot one. This character 
retrospectively transforms the absence emanating from shot one’s other stage 
into a presence. (448)
The system of suture and shot/reverse-shot that keeps it work are among the most 
necessary elements that help dominant cinema perpetuate its ideology. Because as 
Dayan observes, with those systems dominant cinema presents the images in the film 
as the point-of view of characters, and keeps the meaning within the filmic text by 
eliminating outside of the film in the mind of the spectator. Kaja Silverman interprets 
this effect of the shot/reverse shot system on the experience of the spectator as 
follows
The shot/reverse shot formation . . . alerts the spectator to that other field 
whose absence is experienced as unpleasurable while at the same time linking 
it to the gaze o f  a fictional character. Thus a gaze within the fiction seives to 
conceal the controlling gaze outside the fiction. (221)
As Dayan rightly observes, with such an organization of the shots dominant cinema
naturalizes its functioning and messages. Dayan argues that filmic message in
dominant cinema, by providing imaginary answers to the questions “who is viewing
this? Who is ordering these images? For what purpose are they doing so?” restricts
spectator’s attention to the message while making the codes that produce it uimoticed
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(447). I think Dayan’s following argument summarizes in the best way the
ideological outcome of the suture in dominant cinema
By means o f  the suture, the film-discourse presents itself as a product without a 
producer, a discourse without an origin. It speaks. Who speaks? Things speak 
for themselves and o f course they tell the tmth. Classical cinema establishes 
itself as the ventroloquist o f  ideology. (451)
As it can be concluded from all these arguments, all of the mechanisms mentioned so 
far mainly serve to focusing the spectator’s attention to story outcomes by avoiding 
any kind of distraction in the spectator that could draw his/her attention to the 
artificial organization of the film. The efficient working of those mechanisms, and so 
the achievement of the purpose above, requires several rules to be obeyed during the 
shooting process, but which also have effects on the editing process. Lapsley and 
Westlake summarize some of the major ones as
1. The provision o f a master or establishing shot, enabling the spectator to 
orientate him self or herself with respect to each new shot in sequence.
2. The 180° mle, ensuring the spectator always finds the same characters in the 
same part o f the screen.
3. The 30° mle, which prevents the spectator experiencing a jump in space and 
permits a smooth continuity between shots.
4. The orchestration o f  actors’ movements so that refraining and camera 
movement do not draw attention to themselves. (140-1)
Some other details that serve to the same purpose are stated by Bordwell and
Thompson, in addition to the rules above, as
... graphic qualities are usually kept constant from shot to shot. The figures are 
balanced and symmetrically deployed in the frame; the overall lighting tonality 
remains constant; the action occupies the central zone o f the screen.fFilm Art 
261)
All these explain why dominant cinema has been described as a mle-bound art fomi 
by several film theorists. The employment of these rules facilitates also the editing 
type preferred by dominant cinema, which is called continuity editing or seamless
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editing and which is the most important strategy serving to the purposes of dominant 
cinema in the best way.
2.2.1.5. Continuity Editing (Seamless Editing)
Continuity editing is characterized by its invisibility and, dependent on that, by its 
capacity to produce a spatially and temporally coherent narrative (Hayward 57). 
Bordwell and Thompson state that a feature-length Hollywood film typically 
contains between 800 and 1200 shots (Film Art 246). If the spectator never gets such 
an impression during watching the film this is because the shots are connected to one 
another through continuity editing, which renders the cuts invisible by keeping the 
transition between the shots as smooth as possible, and by keeping the continuity of 
space and time with the help of the rules employed during the shooting process.
As it can be concluded from the statements above the editing process is the final but 
the primary process through which dominant cinema effaces the traces of the 
production process of the film so as not to distract the spectator from the story to the 
narrative and plastic forms of the film. The effacing, or the concealment, of the 
production process is the most important factor which makes the film be perceived 
not as a film, not as something artificial, but rather as being natural, as life, as reality. 
This is what makes us interpret the realism in dominant cinema as ideological 
realism, in the sense that, it presents film as a natural reality while disguising the 
illusion of realism through the concealment of the mechanisms that produce this 
illusion. I think the long quotation below, which belongs to Alain Robbe Grillet,
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explains this illu sion  o f  realism  and its ideologica l aspect in dom inant cinem a in an 
attractive w ay
Thus, the definition accepted by all filmmaking schools: Correct splicing is the 
one the spectator doesn’t see!... Echoes o f this academic definition o f  
supposedly proper editing can be found at all levels o f film production... Good 
framing is the framing that the spectators will be unaware o f it; in other words, 
the one in which the borders o f  the frame play no role whatsoever. Good 
lighting: the one that seems the most ‘natural.’ Best camera position: the one 
with the least personality, the better to conceal the material origin o f the shot. 
(Moreover, because the camera must disappear from view, mirrors become the 
bane o f the camera operator’s existence.) The best actor is the one who is not 
perceived as an actor, but only as a character. Etcetera. A certain theoretician o f  
the sound track has even gone so far as to write that ‘the best film music is the 
one which the spectator doesn’t hear.’
All o f  this leads us to the following definition o f realistic illusionism: The best 
film is the one whose narrative and plastic forms have the least existence and 
the least force, and in which only the diegesis -the story that is being told- is 
perceived by the public. Since according to this view, the cinematic material is 
supposed to be perfectly transparent, the screen is nothing more than a window  
opened onto the world. Not surely the window is opened only onto the world o f  
realism and not the real world! (116)
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3. A WALK THROUGH GREENAWAY AND HIS VIEW OF THE CINEMATIC
REPRESENTATION
Borges had once said ‘it’s much more difficult to be a reader than a writer.’ 
Greenaway, who is an admirer of Borges, adapts this sentence to cinema and argues 
that it is much more difficult to be a viewer than a filmmaker since ‘the viewer has to 
work harder because the material is not his. To comprehend it, he or she has to 
refashion it in some way’(qtd. in Hacker and Price 216). I think this is very true, at 
least, in the case of Greenaway’s films and their viewers; because the details and 
references involved in those films make them resemble encyclopedias bringing 
together various kinds of information ranging from mythology to science, from 
history to theory of art, from philosophy to politics and sexuality, from literature to 
painting and cinema... I think this is why Amy Lawrence, who has written one of the 
most thoughtful books on Greenaway, mentions Greenaway’s films as being ‘easy to 
recognize and difficult to describe’ (1). Having acknowledged this difficulty, below I 
will try to offer a general framework of Greenaway’s works and their implications.
3.1. Greenaway: A Painter Working in Cinema
In this study Greenaway will appear mainly with his filmmaker identity. However 
defining Greenaway only as a filmmaker would be incomplete. It is not only because
42
he is engaged in other activities outside cinema such as painting, installation, writing, 
curating exhibitions, but also because his films, in terms of their visual organization, 
involve several principles guiding painting as well as they are full of references to the 
history of painting. Therefore I prefer to describe Greenaway as a painter who works 
in cinema. This is the way Greenaway considers himself as well: T m  sometimes 
described as a filmmaker, but it’s a definition I sometimes have difficulty with, as I 
believe I am a painter or a writer who just happens to be working in cinema’ (qtd. in 
Wells 25).
3.1.1. Background: From Painting to Cinema
Greenaway was educated as a painter. Bom in 1942 in Newport, Wales, he entered
Walthamstow College of Art to become a mural painter despite the opposition of his
parents. His first interest towards making films was a result of an accidental
experience. At the age of sixteen, in an attempt to escape from the rain, he entered
into a movietheater with a friend of his. The film on show was Ingmar Bergman’s
The Seventh Seal which would introduce Greenaway to the possibilities of cinema
and produce in him an interest towards film. Greenaway explains the effect of that
film, which he would go to see many times, as follows
Until I was 16, cinema to me was American or English and basically 
entertainment -popcorn, Saturday night stuff. Then I saw, completely by 
accident, my first year at art school, Ingmar Bergman’s The Seventh S e a l . . . 
the movie was a knockout for me . . .
I had no idea that cinema could deal with metaphor, with mythology, with 
history, with time, and still have a strong, gripping narrative about sex and 
death. But here it was . . .  I went back to see that movie five or six times. I 
decided I was certainly going to take a great interest in this phenomenon, (qtd. 
in Acker 4 4 ) '
Years of thoughts on and experiences in cinema would bring Greenaway to such a point that in 
1998, in an interview with Carla Scura, he would describe this first film which attracted him to 
cinema as being devoid of ‘the cinematic ingenuity he is continuously looking for.’
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After this event Greenaway became interested in European cinema and he tried to see 
all the European films he could in England, especially those of Antonioni, Passolini, 
Godard, Resnais (qtd. in Hacker and Price 208-9). This ended in his desire to make 
his own films and he applied to The Royal College of Art film-school but he was 
rejected. After graduating from Walthamstow College of Art he worked in several 
small jobs and wrote articles on cinema and film which he has called to be 
‘unreadable’ (qtd. in Hacker and Price 209).
His getting into the film industry occurred with his entrance to BFI (British Film 
Institute) as a doorkeeper. After a few time he moved to the distribution department 
where he wrote catalogue notes for movies and, more importantly, found the 
opportunity to watch many American underground movies (qtd. in Acker 45). 
However it is in COI (Central Office of Information) that he started to learn much of 
his craft and really started to make his own films. From 1965 to 1976 he worked at 
COI, first as a film editor (especially on documentaries) then as a director of 
infoiTnational films, and starting from 1966 he made several non-narrative short 
films.
Greenaway’s short films carry the traces of his experiences of the documentaries 
made in BFI and COI and of the anti-narrative avant-garde and underground films he 
had been able to see there. His early films can be considered on the one hand as 
parodies of documentaries, in that they reflect Greenaway’s disillusionment with the 
concept of ‘documentary truth’, and on the other hand they can be seen as the first
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experimentations of Greenaway with the cinematic medium in order to discover 
alternative ways of making cinema and to develop his own theory of cinema: a 
cinema which is not slave to narrative. In this sense those films seem to be influenced 
by the works of American underground filmmakers like Hollis Frampton and 
Michael Snow, which he had been able to see before.
Greenaway made his first feature film in 1980, The Falls, which was on the same line 
with his short films. Although the film was ‘the first British film to win the BFI 
award for the Best Film for thirty years’ (qtd. in Hacker and Price 189) his work did 
not draw much attention until 1982 when he made his second feature film The 
Draughtsman’s Contract. The film was shown in many major festivals (Edinburg, 
Venice, New York, Rotterdam, London, Berlin) and brought Greenaway 
international acclaim and reputation as a filmmaker (Lawrence 18).
3.1.2. The Painting in the Cinema, The Cinema in the Painting
Although it is possible to observe references to other artistic forms such as literature,
architecture, sculpture Greenaway’s basic tool for his cinematography seems to be
painting.
Greenaway explains his turning from painting to cinema with cinema’s capacity to 
involve elements like sound track, music, text which are lacking in the vocabulary of 
painting (Interview on Radio NRK). However he still believes that painting is much 
more ‘sophisticated, radical and investigative’ than cinema is. He finds cinema very
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conservative when compared to the revolutionary changes that took place in literature 
(for example Nouveau Roman) and painting (for example Cubism) (AVS Regional 
News in Belgium). It is therefore that Greenaway works in cinema without giving up 
his painterly attitude. In this context it is possible to agree with Alan Woods’ 
suggestion that Greenaway’s cinema is partially a continuation of painting by other 
means (79).
When Greenaway is asked in interviews about the directors whose work have been
influential on him, he answers that he was much more influenced by the aesthetics of
painting than by the works of any director. He cites Godard, Resnais, Antonioni as
being the directors whose works have impressed him; but he always emphasizes the
role of the aesthetics of painting on his work. His talks in interviews are full of
references to the history of painting. Moreover he confesses that it is more interesting
for him to talk to a painting historian or an art critic because his temis and attitudes
are rooted in what they know and have studied (qtd. in Woods 254). He states.
I ’ve chosen to work in moving images. I’ve chosen to work in cinema, but I 
want to bring with me all the aesthetic preoccupations of, as I see it, an ideal 
radical investigative painter, to try to make them work in cinema. So that I can 
talk to painters and painting theorists in a more satisfactory way than I can to 
those equivalent people who associate themselves with cinema, whose 
preoccupations so often have little interest form e . (qtd. in Woods 283)
For Greenaway, cinema has its roots in the history of painting as well. He refers to
Godard’s point about seventeenth century Dutch painter Vermeer and claims that
cinema has started with Venneer because he had already defined most of the
vocabulary of cinema two centuries before the Lumière brothers. He argues
Godard suggests Wermeer was one o f  the first cinematographers because he is 
primarily interested in two most important elements o f cinema -the world 
modeled entirely by light, and the event o f  the split second; the maid pouring
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the milk from the jug didn’t happen a second before, didn’t happen a second 
later... (qtd. in Woods 245)
Sarah Street describes Greenaway’s films as ‘animated paintings’ (180). This is 
partially true because the images in Greenaway’s films associate several 
characteristics of painting. These are apparent mainly at the level of the use of the 
camera, composition and lighting.
In Greenaway’s films the camera is usually stationary and if it moves, the movement 
takes place mostly along the horizontal axis -lateral tracking. As a result the frames 
are usually very static producing a consciousness of the frame like in the case of 
painting. If we consider also the fact that this is accompanied by long takes rather 
than being made subject to extensive editing we can argue that the position attributed 
to the viewer in front of the film is quite similar to the position of the viewer in front 
of a painting.
The compositions in the frames are mostly symmetrical and full of small details (i.e. 
still lives) like in the case of Baroque paintings' visually balanced and influenced by 
the Renaissance perspective. The use of color and light, which are mostly artificial, 
associates seventeenth century painting as well. Moreover Greenaway confesses that 
he has used lighting styles of certain painters in some of his films: dramatic lighting 
of Carravaggio an De La Tour in The Draughtsman’s Contract, Vemieer’s lighting in 
A Zed and Two Noughts (qtd. in Woods 246). He also states that the works of certain 
mid-Victorian painters were important to Drowning by Numbers like those of Arthur 
Huges, William Dyce, William Windus, Madox Brown (qtd. in Woods 246). He
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explains his use of Vermeer’s lighting after an examination of his paintings in A Zed 
and Two Noughts as follows
The light for Vermeer invariably entered the painting from the left hand side, 
and at about a meter and a half o f  the ground -this simple equation became a 
device for lighting the film. (qtd. in Woods 245)
Again we learn that Greenaway has examined the whole European painting with
respect to the production and the use of the color by painters while he has been
working on The Cook, the Thief, his Wife and her Lover from his own explanations
(qtd. in Kaçmaz 66). He also states that his films are very much based on the notion
of the grid which has determined the works of several painters, like Mondrian (qtd. in
Abbott) and this seems to be one of the main factors contributing to the visual order
and balance of his films.
Greenaway uses the reproductions of seventeenth century paintings in his 
compositions as well; for example Franz Hals’ Banquet of the Officers of the St. 
George Civic Company in The Cook, the Thief, his Wife and her Lover, Breughel’s 
paintings in The Draughtsman’s Contract. He also uses costumes designed according 
to the costumes appearing in specific paintings. For example Alba (Andrea Ferreol) 
in A Zed and Two Noughts is dressed like a lady in one of Vermeer’s paintings; the 
skipping girl in Drowning by Numbers is dressed like a VelDzquez Infanta 
(Lawrence 93), Albert (Michael Gambon) and the men in his crew in The Cook, the 
Thief, his Wife and her Lover are dressed like the men in Hall’s painting whereas 
some of the kitchen staff is dressed like the maid in Vermeer’s Woman Pouring Milk 
and there are many of such examples; not only in terms of costumes but also settings; 
in Prospero’s Books and Amy Lawrence observes some of these as follows
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He models the youngest Ariel after a “curly-headed child” in Branzinno’s 
Allegory with Venus and Cupid. “Prospero’s ‘poor ce ll’” from de M essina’s St. 
Jerome in his Study, and Prospero’s “Palace o f Libraries” on “an exact copy” 
o f M ichalengelo’s Laurenziana Library. (155)
As it can be concluded out of all these facts Greenaway’s films are full of references 
to seventeenth century, especially to its visual arts. His films were usually associated 
with Baroque aesthetics and Greenaway explains the reason for his reference to 
seventeenth century and Baroque by pointing to the similarity between Baroque and
cinema:
The Baroque is the first period when all arts come together into . 
.intennediality, when art was self-consciously used as a form o f propaganda. 
So that somebody like Bernini working in Rome in 1650’s would use light and 
color, incense and music, tableaux vivants, and all the sensations that it was 
possible to evoke, in order to put up an act o f propaganda for the suspension o f  
disbelief In tenns o f  the seventeenth century, this would have been to 
disbelieve in rationality and therefore to believe in god. It’s easy to transpose 
those terms to the end o f 20th Century, when cinema fulfills the same 
functions, a highly baroque medium containing vast amounts o f  
interdisciplinary intermediality, supporting a suspension o f disbelief obviously 
no longer associated with ideas o f faith but with capitalism (qtd. in Purdon).
Prospero’s Books and The Pillow Book reveals that Greenaway expresses his
painterly attitude in ways other than the ones mentioned so far. In these films
Greenaway has added advanced video postproduction techniques to his
cinematography like HDTV and the computerized paintbox which have enabled him
to use frames with different aspect ratios, multiple-screens, frame-within-frame, to
combine image and text on the same frame. In this sense these films, where the
director becomes a painter and the film a mise-en-page, can be considered as the
experimentations of Greenaway with the language of cinema. Greenaway explains
the use of the paintbox and its effects as follow
The paintbox, as its name suggests, links the vocabulary o f electronic picture­
making with the tradition o f the artist’s pen, palette and brush. Now 1 know that 
cinema is not painting and vice-versa, but there’s a whole language there that
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can be used in cinematic terms and that can make cinema a thousand times 
more exciting and interesting, (qtd. in Elliot and Purdy 21)
Greenaway’s reference to art history has been interpreted by some people as a
repetition of art history and therefore has been subjected to criticism. However while
imitating the style of several artists or reproducing their paintings in his films
Greenaway does not repeat art history, but he puts it under his service. By doing so
Greenaway poses the question, as Amy Lawrence argues, ‘how to make art out of
ideas about art?’ (5). As it is stated before, for Greenaway cinema has so many of its
origin in painting. He explains his use of imagery from the history of painting as an
attempt to use the accumulation of the past in asking new questions and producing
new conclusions, new ideas. Therefore his engagement with painting in cinema can
be considered as an attempt to enrich his cinematography. Moreover he considers
such an attitude to be necessary because for him cinema is a part of image making
practice, which has a long history. In this context he considers the history of painting
as a rich source for cinema which should be acknowledged by those who are engaged
in filmmaking. He argues.
My own particular baggage is as a painter and it strikes me that all the 
problems that have ever been set by somebody else for a painter to solve, or 
any problems that any painter has set for him self and solved, have been done 
time and time again in the 2000 years o f European visual history; those same 
problems come up in terms o f cinema -There’s obviously a slight difference if  
you have to content with ideas like sound and movement which a painter 
doesn’t have in his vocabulary- but constantly for me, the whole 2000 years o f  
European painting is a vast encyclopedia for dipping in, for making 
comparisons, for seeking what other people have done under same 
circumstances. With such a fantastic, rich, ready source o f  reference, it seems 
to me that filmmakers are doing themselves disservice if  they do not look back 
and see what other people have done. (qtd. in Wells 27)
I think Paula Willoquet-Maricondi interprets in the best way the implications of the
use of art history in Greenaway’s films:
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Greenaway’s references to art history are one but particular 
manifestations of his comprehensive investigation of what it means to 
represent. Greenaway’s films explore the means through which humanity 
has sought to represent itself and the world -through images (paintings, 
drawings, photography, films), objects (architecture, sculpture), words 
(print, calligraphy), sounds (speech, music), and bodies (dance, sex, 
death).
All these reveal that for Greenaway cinema is a field of representation which should
be thought in relation to the history of representation and should contribute to that
field. In other words it is a field for investigation, thought, discovery and production
rather than consumption of the material at hand for unproductive, temporary ends.
Greenaway summarizes what cinema means to him as follow
I was trained as a painter, disciplined as a film editor, have delighted in English 
literature . . . All the time I’m aware o f the continuities. You must remember 
that I ’m totally outside the American concern for living o ff yourself Therefore, 
for me cinema is the philosophy o f art. It’s about the way man represents 
him self I always come back to this. (qtd. in Acker 51)
3.2. Cinema and the Spectator
Greenaway argues that dominant cinema attributes a very passive role to the 
spectator by forcing him to stare in one direction at ‘shadows coerced to tell a story’ 
(The Stairs Munich 11), to forget that what he/she sees on the screen is a series of 
representation in other words to suspend his/her disbelief, and by offering just ‘a 
service of catharsis, an opportunity purgative for privately repressed emotions’ (The 
Stairs Munich 23). Cinema is generally a passive medium since the spectator just sits 
in the dark, look in one direction, use only his/her eyes and ears... What Greenaway 
argues about is that dominant cinema not only cuts down the potentialities of 
spectator’s physicality but also his/her ‘emotional and intellectual approach to the 
world’ (qtd. in Abbott). He argues.
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It seems to me that dominant cinema seems to require an empathy or sympathy 
between the film and the audience which is basically to do with the 
manipulation o f the emotions, and it seems to me again -and this is a very 
subjective position- that most cinema seems to trivialize the emotions, 
sentimentalizing them or romanticizing them. (qtd. in Wells 27)
Greenaway suggests that the spectator should be able to appreciate the cinema with
the mind as well as he/she can through emotional empathy, and he refers to painting
in order to explain what kind of appreciation he expects from the spectator in cinema.
H e argues that
. . .  the relationship a viewer has with painting is somewhat different. You 
don’t go into National Gallery o f any famous capital city and cry, sob, laugh, 
fall about on the floor, become very angry -it’s a completely different reaction. 
It’s a reaction which is to do with a much more composed sense o f  regarding 
an image; it’s a reaction with a thought process as opposed to an immediate 
emotional reaction. It’s my contention that there is no reason why we cannot 
bring this sort o f reaction over into cinema, (qtd. in Wells 27)
A s it can be concluded from the argument above, the first step for G reenaway in
producing a more intellectual reaction of the spectator to the film is to make him/her
realize that what is seen on the screen is a film which consists of a series of
representations lending themselves to free interpretation and imagination of the
spectator. However it should be noted that Greenaway does not argue for the
elimination of ‘emotional’ cinema but he suggests that suspending disbelief and
producing catharsis through manipulation of the emotions should not be the sole
function of cinema; since cinema, as a rich medium, provides many other ways to
make movies (qtd. in Hacker and Price 213).
Greenaway’s approach to the spectator and his/her relationship with the film seems 
to be Brechtian. Greenaway’s distinction between emotionally involved spectator and 
detached, intellectually involved spectator is similar to Brecht’s distinction between
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‘Roundabout type’ of spectator and ‘Planetarium type’. For Brecht roundabout type 
of spectator refers to ‘those who identify themselves with an incident like a child on a 
roundabout’ and planetarium type refers to ‘those who are confronted with a 
demonstration and observe it, like the spectators in a planetarium’ (qtd. in Woods 
28). The spectators in the first type are in illusion where as those in the second type 
are just observers standing outside. In fact with the term ‘roundabout type of 
spectator’ Brecht refers to the spectator in front of ‘the dramatic theater’ where 
he/she is ‘involved in something’ whereas ‘planetarium type of spectator’ refers to 
the spectator in front of ‘the epic theater’ where he/she is ‘made to face something.’ 
In the first case the spectator ‘shares the experience’ and in the second case he/she 
‘stands outside, studies.’ Brecht argues that dramatic theater ‘provides the spectator 
with sensations and wears down his capacity for action; whereas epic theater ‘forces 
the spectator to take decisions and arouses his capacity for action’ (37). For Brecht 
distanciation is necessary to make the spectator take a critical attitude towards what 
he/she sees and therefore he argues for the elimination of empathy and identification 
both for the actors and the audience. Actors who seems to be just showing a 
character, quoting his lines; placards announcing acts, divisions; direct references to 
the audience are some Brechtian tools which reveals the artifice and alienate the 
audience. These arguments and attitudes are quite similar to those of Greenaway and 
even the Brechtian techniques mentioned above can be observed among the 
techniques employed by Greenaway which is the subject of the following section.
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3.3. Cinema and Artifice
Greenaway considers the fondness for realism in cinema; the attempt to disguise how
the film works and make the spectator believe that what he/she sees on the screen is a
slice of life; as a limiting attitude which is not able to see the full potential of cinema.
He states that cinema has been enslaved to the ideas of truth due to its being a
photographic medium, its being mimetic in essence. He describes such ideas as being
‘erroneous’ and completely rejects the Bazinian idea that cinema is a window onto
the world fThe Stairs Geneva 1). He claims,
The screen is only a screen is only a screen; it is only an illusionary space 
and I would quarrel seriously with Bazin on the knowledge that cinema is 
a window onto the world. It is not. It is an artificial construct which is 
contained within its own conventions and devices, and I think we should 
acknowledge that in a very self-conscious way. (qtd. in Abbott)
Not only does Greenaway claim the artifice in cinema he also believes that ‘cinema
is at its most successful when it acknowledges its own artificiality’ (qtd. in Woods
240). He supposes this ‘self-knowledge’ to be a common characteristic of ‘all great
works of art’; like in the case of Hamlet which is said to be a play about play-acting,
and Rembrandt’s Nightwatch, a painting about painting. For him the first and best
exemplary person of this ‘self-knowledge’ in cinema was Eiseinstein who created
“hundreds of images all working on different levels and saying, ‘look, this is how
film works’” (qtd. in Hacker and Price 214-5). Greenaway claims a resemblance
between the work that is made apparent in a film and the brush-strokes observed in a
painting which shows how the content has been arrived at without taking anything
away from the appreciation of it (qtd. in Woods 240). He argues that cinema should
not try to hide its artifice because this would make it only unsuccessfiil:
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It seems to me that cinema is least successful when it pretends to be about the 
real, when it pretends to offer a slice o f  life, when it pretends to offer a frame 
around a window on the world. When it totally tries to persuade you that it is 
not cinema. The cinema as total illusory manipulation, to me, has always been 
suspect, perhaps deceitful. Select a frame, employ an actor, employ an editor, 
and you are into falsification. Why not admit that falsification? Arrive at some 
aspect, idea or comment about the world working with your audience with their 
belief intact, not cajoling them to retreat from believing that all they are seeing 
is shadows on a screen, (qtd. in Woods 240)
Greenaway's arguments and works imply that cinema does not lose anything from its 
value by being artificial, on the contrary the rich vocabulary of cinema starts to show 
itself once the artifice is admitted and the passion for realism is put aside. Greenaway 
suggests that the whole vocabulary of cinema should not be overlooked just for the 
sake of producing the impression of reality which is nothing more than an illusion, a 
deception.
At first look, Greenaway seems to be a follower of the formalist film theory which 
stands against the realist film theory; since the formalists have also considered the 
passion for realism as an obstacle to the self-expression of the artist and emphasized 
the primacy of the form, the importance of the frame and the structural elements 
existent in it. In other words both Greenaway and the formalists recognized the 
artifice in cinema and preferred to work within this artifice. However Greenaway’s 
relationship with the film differs from the formalists’ approach in several ways. First 
of all Greenaway’s tools which shape the form of its films are numerous and not 
limited to montage, which is preferred by the formalists as being necessary for the 
production of meaning and artist’s self-expression. Greenaway puts his signature on 
the film quite before the montage. For example Eiseinstein’s films, who is the most 
representative director of formalist approach, involve extensive editing which is
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totally lacked in Greenaway’s films. Because Greenaway extends the artifice to the 
film overall even without leaving a need for montage. Moreover Greenaway enriches 
his films with metaphorical meaning which make the film offer multiple readings 
without using montage. In other words his films are richer in mise-en-scene than 
montage. The important thing is how a scene is organized, framed and shot; fast cuts, 
changing camera angles do not play any role.
One of the main factors differentiating Greenaway’s cinema from dominant cinema 
is the absence of ‘the effect of the real’; the inscription of the spectator into the 
diegetic space; which means at the same time the absence of the strategies previously 
discussed such as a single coherent story, identification, emotional involvement, 
suture, extensive editing in the way they are employed by dominant cinema. Instead 
of trying to inscribe the spectator into the diegetic space Greenaway, on the contrary, 
aims at alienating the spectator and the major mechanism he employs for this is 
revealing the artifice of the film at all levels; in other words implying that what is 
seen is just a film; and avoiding any kind of visual manipulation that can produce 
identification such as point-of-view shot, close-up of the faces, shot/reverse-shot 
formulation.
I have already mentioned the resemblance of the static frames in Greenaway’s films 
to paintings -to flat surfaces where certain forms and figures come together. Now I 
can say that this is one of the factors contributing to the alienation of the spectator by 
drawing attention to the formal characteristics of the film. I have also mentioned that
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the stationary camera offering continuously static frames plays an important role in 
keeping the frames seem like paintings. In this context it is possible to argue that the 
way the camera is used plays an important role in the revealing of the artifice in 
Greenaway’s films and in the prevention of the spectator’s involvement into the 
diegetic space. Remember Daniel Dayan’s argument stating that in dominant cinema 
the filmic image is an image ‘designed and organized not merely as an object that is 
seen, but as the glance of a subject’ (439). I have argued that such a situation serves 
to make the spectator identify with the camera and with, the. characters and so involve 
in the film. In Greenaway’s films the camera generally does not move and if it 
moves, it moves with a very static frame, without being motivated by the actions of 
the characters, without reflecting their point-of-view, and sometimes, even without 
caring about the activity, the event around it.^  It has seemed to me that such a use of 
the camera shows the opposite of the point Dayan makes for dominant cinema; in the 
sense that in Greenaway’s films the filmic image is designed and organized just as an 
object that is seen by the camera which always make the spectator feel its existence, 
rather than as the glance of a subject.
Greenaway explains the camera’s stationaiy character in his films with his goal of 
drawing attention to the frame (qtd. in Cody), which is one of the main indicators of 
artifice in cinema. Since Greenaway does not care about the unpleasure that the 
awareness of the frame will produce at the spectator he does not try to conceal it
■ A scene in The Draughtsman’s Contract exemplifies this last situation in a very good way. This is 
the scene where people are sitting along a long table at mealtime and talking among them. The camera 
in this scene pans laterally from left to right and right to left without following the dialogue and by 
ignoring the activity around it. It does not have a goal like moving to and showing the character who 
speaks.
57
through shot/reverse-shot formulation either. Therefore it is possible to argue that in 
his films there is always an ‘absent field’ which is never made present. The spectator 
always perceive the frame and becomes aware of the absent field and of a controlling 
gaze, and there is never ‘a gaze within the fiction’ which will serve to conceal ‘the 
controlling gaze outside the fiction’ that are mentioned by Kaja Silverman (221).^
The identification of the spectator with the characters in the film is avoided not only
tlirough the elimination of point-of-view shots, shot/reverse-shot but also through the
revealing of the artifice at the level of the characteristics of the characters as well.
The characters in Greenaway’s films are presented generally as flat, non-sympathetic
characters telling dialogues that sound artificial. Card Rowe argues that
Greenaway’s characters resemble to ‘human chipers’ in the sense that they are cold,
psychologically arid, lacking empathy between the actor and the character he/she
plays (234). She also describes the actors as follows
Actors pose or move about uncomfortably in the landscapes and architecture 
like two-dimensional characters stmggling to come to life in three-dimensional 
paintings. Sometimes they are missing from the frame but overheard on the 
soundtrack; often they are lost or dwarfed by architecture or overwhelmed by 
elements o f mise-en-scene like art direction and musical score. Foregrounded, 
they must be searched out. (236)
Greenaway employs some other elements which emphasize the artifice in a more 
direct way like producing strong symmetries in the frame even making human body a 
part of it (A Zed and Two Noughts), using artificial mechanisms structuring the
 ^ It should be kept in mind that Greenaway’s emphasis on the frame does not mean that he defends 
and tries to keep it. He only tries to show that it is an unavoidable component of cinema that can not 
be ignored. His experimentations questioning the notion of a rectangular frame with a constant aspect 
ratio in Prospero’s Books. The Pillow Book and in his exhibitions (especially The Stairs') reveals that 
he is not contended with it and tries the ways of making the frames explode; but this is not because he 
wants to offer impression of reality but rather because he wants to challenge the existing vocabulary 
of cinema.
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narrative such as numbers (Drowning by Numbers), letters (A Zed and Two 
Noughts), color-coding (The Cook, the Thief, his Wife and her Lover)'^ . division 
mechanisms which bring theatricality such as curtains (Prospero’s Books. The Cook, 
the Thief, his Wife and her Lover. The Baby of Macon). Moreover two of his films, 
Prospero’s Books and The Baby of Macon have a completely self-reflective 
character. In Prospero’s Books the spectator is watching a play which is being 
written by Prospero (John Gielgud) in the film; in other words Prospero is both the 
author of the play, in the sense that he creates everything the spectator sees, and the 
main fictional character of the film. Similarly in The Baby of Macon the spectator is 
watching a three-act play that is being presented to a group of spectator in the film. 
Greenaway produces artifice with the use of technology as well. The use of digital 
video techniques in Prospero’s Books and The Pillow Book gives these films a veiy 
artificial appearance on the screen: frames within frames and multiple screens with 
different aspect ratios, text written on top of images, the use of black and white and 
color within the same composition...
3.4. A Cinema Beyond Psycho-Drama
In an attempt to investigate the limitations and potentials of cinema as a medium, 
Greenaway has opened a series of exhibitions in different cities like Geneva, Munich, 
which all shared the same title. The Stairs. In the catalogues of these exhibitions 
Greenaway describes his disenchantment with cinema at present and he asks an
 ^ In the film the kitchen, the restaurant, and the lavatories are shown in different colors; green for the 
kitchen, red for the restaurant, and white for the lavatories. Moreover the clothes of the characters 
change in color as they pass from room to room. This characteristic of the film will be discussed in 
detail when analyzing the film individually.
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interesting question: ‘have we seen a film yet?’ Greenaway responds to that question 
negatively and argues that what we have seen so far has been a sort of cinema 
prologue which still mimics theater, which is still ‘in the business of transferring text 
into film,’ which is still a sort of ‘illustrated literature.’ He implies that we have not 
seen any films whose ‘content could not be presented in any other way as effectively’ 
(The Stairs Munich 13). It seems that Greenaway tries to point to the lack of really 
‘cinematic’ films if we define ‘the cinematic’, following Christian Metz, not as 
whatever appearing in films, but rather as that which is capable of appearing only in 
films. Greenaway refers to Eisenstein who argues that ‘only Disney truly made films’ 
because his ‘whole cinematic world was truly invented,’ with no reliance on mimetic 
photographic representation of the real world. He adds that Alain Renais, for him, 
with his Last Year in Marienbad  ^ ‘has probably come the closest of any filmmaker to 
make a film which cannot be manifested in any other art form’ (qtd. in Cody).
These arguments should be considered as certain questions Greenaway poses in his 
way to investigate the nature of cinematic representation in terms of its potentials and 
limits rather than as strict arguments downgrading the whole cinematic practice. 
Moreover Greenaway does not claim that his films are totally outside of this practice 
and I think it is because of this that he carries his most radical questions on cinema to 
another medium, which is exhibition. It seems to me that he carries his questions on 
cinema to his exhibitions because the current situation of the film industry does not
 ^The film was made in 1962 and written by Alain Robbe-Grillet. In the film a man tries to convince a 
woman that they have spent some time together the year before “...at Frederiksbad, or perhaps 
Marienbad.” However the woman denies everything and claims that she has never met him. The film 
exhibits a complicated sense of chronology where the present and the past, narration and the action 
melt into each other and contradict each other both on the visual and narrative levels.
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provide much room for radical investigations. Greenaway refers to this fact by
quoting often John Cage’s statement; ‘introduce twenty percent of novelty into an art
product and you lose eighty percent of your audience’ (qtd. in Woods 264). He
explains the motivation behind all of his investigations in the introduction of the
catalogue of the exhibition The Stairs Munich Projection as follows
I am curious about the possibilities o f taking cinema out o f cinema. I am 
curious about presenting cinema as a three-dimensional exhibition. I am 
curious about what constitutes a vocabulary o f  cinema. I am curious, I suppose, 
finally, in respect o f the new technologies and the apparent morbidity o f the 
old, how we are to go about reinventing cinema. (9)
Greenaway often points to the conservativeness of dominant cinema in front of the
developments and varieties manifested by the history of painting and literature and
argues that despite its hundred-year past and despite the technological development
there has not been any change in the vocabulary of cinema. He states that
. . . although we all might be amazed and delighted at the special effects in 
Tenninator 2 . as indeed I was, it’s only servicing the same narrative and 
fonnulaic cinema o f Griffith . . . However much we might respect Scorcese, 
he’s still making the same cinema as Griffith, the vocabulary’s not changed or 
challenged . . .  and that seems tragic, (qtd. in Woods 264)
In fact Greenaway’s claim reflects a general critical approach to classical cinema
which is based on the observation that, as it is described by Aumont, Bengala, Marie
and Vemet, ‘those films simply repeat the same old story in the same old way, which
ends up reducing the cinema to novelistic plot while ignoring both its plastic effects
and its effects on the spectator’ (73).
Greenaway describes the films of dominant cinema as ‘psycho-drama’: films which 
are dominated by actors and which does not have any goal except telling a story in a 
cause and effect chain where the action arises from the psychological motivations of
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the characters played by those actors (qtd. in Hacker and Price 215; Acker 46). In 
other words these are psychological films concerned mainly with the revelation of 
the character’s motives. In this sense Greenaway considers these films as being 
similar to illustrated novels (qtd. in Hacker and Price 215).^ In an attempt to explain 
what is lacked in his films he describes the main characteristics of those films as
well:
. . . linear narrative, tying ends neatly, finding solutions o f completion, locking 
the whole together in an orthodox manner, sending the audience home satisfied 
that good has prevailed, a solution has been found, evil has been put back in its 
box, the waters have been calmed, (qtd. in Woods 240)
As a response to the criticisms that his films have been subjected to Greenaway
argues that, for him, cinema is an art form and that there is no one way to make film
(qtd. in Hacker and price 210). Moreover he argues that cinema is such a rich
medium that it cannot be left to storytellers, that its whole vocabulary cannot be
‘slayed for the whole purpose of telling stories’ (qtd. in Hawthorne).
For Greenaway the richness of cinema is an outcome of its ability to handle so many 
different elements like ‘music, writing, picture making of all kinds . . .’ Greenaway 
argues for the use of this capacity of cinema in order to make films that are ‘infinitely 
viewable’; that offer new things and new perspectives each time it is viewed (qtd. in 
Wells 31). Based on this belief he tries to endow his films with multiple readings and 
the most common method he employs for this is using metaphors and symbols from 
history, mythology, science, history and theory of art. Although Greenaway is 
considered to be a visualist, the visuality of his films never obscure the content and
' I think the term novel here refers to 19th century romantic novel.
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his use of metaphor and symbol plays an important role in this situation. Kathy 
Acker, who distinguishes Greenaway’s films from those in dominant cinema by their 
being not interested in telling only one story but rather having desire to compose a 
filmic world as complex as the world outside, describes Greenaway’s films in a 
similar way:
All o f  Greenaway’s major films can be identified by a certain style. Visual 
surfaces that are so lush that almost seem to obscure the subject matter, but 
never do. For the content itself, a complex o f  myths and stories, is always too 
rich to be hidden with sensuous pleasure. (42)
Of course one can deduce simple stories out of Greenaway’s films as Carel Rowe 
does:
Greenaway’s well-w om  proclamation that “The Cinema is too important an art 
to be left for the storytellers” is deceptive. No matter how abstract his 
narratives may seem, they are loosely linear stories about initially empowered 
men who become pitiful losers, and sympathetic women who cannily conspire 
to survive the odds and become winners. (223)
Even if that might be true such an argument ignores ‘the complexity of the filmic
world’ in which that outcome (but not the only one) appears. For example it is
possible to read The Cook, the Thief. His Wife and Her Lover as a simple revenge
tragedy but it is also possible to read in it creation myth, French revolution, a critic of
capitalism, questions on death, violence, sexuality, questions on the nature of
cinematic representation . . .The film is about each of them and all of them at the
same time; it is up to the spectator to depict them.
3.5. Greenaway, Godard, Brecht, Counter Cinema
One of the names, which comes to mind when one considers Greenaway’s ideas and 
practices concerning cinematic representation, is Jean-Luc Godard. Godard’s name
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has been associated with the movement of ‘counter-cinema’, a term which is coined 
first by Peter Wollen in 1970s (Byg 229),which refers to ‘a cinema that, through its 
own cinematic practices, questions and subverts existing cinematic codes and 
conventions’ (Hayward 58). Godard was one of the first filmmakers in this 
movement who began to question dominant cinema’s system of representation and 
finally who began to come up with different ways of making film; different ways of 
manipulating the relationship between the filmic elements. Peter Wollen compares 
the characteristics of ‘Hollywood cinema’ and ‘Counter-Cinema’ with respect to 
Godard’s films in a table (501):
Hollywood cinema Counter Cinema
Narrative transitivity
Identification
Transparency
Single diegesis
Closure
Pleasure
Fiction
Narrative intransivity
Estrangement
Foregrounding
Multiple diegesis
Aperture
Unpleasure
Reality
Wollen offers a detailed explanation of these characteristics in his article and I will 
not repeat them here once more; but in summary it could be said that counter- 
cinematic films aim at distancing the spectator rather than stitching him/her to the 
film so that he/she can produce an intellectual response to it. This is achieved by 
intentionally drawing attention to the manufacture of the film; how the film works 
and produces meaning. Godard has used several mechanisms for this purpose such as 
non-linear narrative, split characters, direct addressing to the spectator, open endings.
As it can be easily observed these characteristics carry in them the influences of 
Brechtian theater. The opposition established between dominant cinema and counter­
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cinema is very similar to the opposition established by Brecht between ‘Aristotelian 
Drama’ and ‘non-Aristotelian Drama (or between dramatic theater and Brechtian 
theater). Reinhold Grimm describes ‘non-Aristotelian Drama’ as a threefold rejection 
(38):
1. Brecht rejects Aristotelian catharsis which is seen as the result of total empathy; 
because, for him, empathy calms the spectators. Instead of empathy he favors the 
production of a critical distance and detachment of the spectators in order to 
activate them.
2. Brecht rejects Aristotelian notion of organic unity in favor of an artificial 
construct. He argues for the replacement of homogeneous ‘living organism,’ 
which is a metaphor used by Aristotle for the work of art, with the montage and 
collage of heterogeneous elements.
3. Brecht rejects the tight ‘tectonic structure’ for the drama, with its absolute 
interdependence of parts and breaks it down into a sequence of more or less 
independent scenes which can be rearranged in an unlimited fashion.
The same rejections can be observed in Godard’s cinema as well. However the 
concept which lies at the core of Brecht’s theory and which has been the most 
influential aspect of Brechtian theater on counter-cinematic movements is 
‘alienation’ or ‘alienation-effect’ {Verfremdungseffekt) .
As it can be concluded out of all these Greenaway’s principles concerning the 
cinematic representation exhibit a parallelism with Brechtian theory and with the 
principles owned by the counter-cinematic practices preceding his own works. In this
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sense his arguments on cinematic representation might not seem to be very original. 
However the particularity of Greenaway’s work lies in the way he applies those 
principles in his films, as it will be seen in the following chapter, rather than the 
principles themselves. Moreover being able to see the reworking of these ‘old’ 
principles in the films of a contemporary director is, I think, another factor which 
makes these films important.
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It is Neville who chooses the location and the time of the drawings. Before each 
drawing his off screen voice introduces a series of rules that will be obeyed by the 
residents and the guests in the estate: the location will be kept clear along the time 
Neville makes the drawing; no one will enter and exit, the animals grazing in the 
location will be permitted to do so. This is one of the means through which he 
exercises strong control over what he draws. However despite Neville’s effort to 
keep the locations clear some objects such as a shirt, a pair of boots, a ladder leant on 
the window of a room, a Jacket -which will finally lead to his death- intrude his field 
of vision and he records these objects on his drawings as well; because throughout 
the film, he takes pride in having a ‘neutral eye’ and in drawing just what the eye 
sees. He uses two viewfinders (optical grids), which he looks through at the location, 
and drawing papers divided into squares which reproduce the grid of the viewfinders 
on the paper. These emphasize Neville’s desire in keeping an exact proportional 
relationship between the drawing and the original, in other words his desire in 
remaining faithful to what he sees in his representation.
After the first six drawings, which are claimed by Neville to be totally objective, 
Mrs. Talmann (Anne Louise Lambert), the daughter of Mrs. Herbert, who knows her 
mother’s contract with the Draughtsman, offers Neville an alternative reading of 
them, an allegorical interpretation, which might suggest that Neville has become ‘a 
witness’ and more than that ‘an accessory’ to a ‘misadventure’. She interprets the 
objects appearing inexplicably in the drawings as being belonging to her father who 
might have become the victim of a murder. Neville rejects this idea and argues that
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he just draws what he sees. Mrs. Talmann offers a new contract to Neville according 
to which she will protect him and he will comply her requests concerning her sexual 
pleasures in return. After the settlement of the new contract Neville continues to 
make the remaining drawings under her direction. Later we learn that Mrs. Talmann 
has used Neville to get pregnant and to insure a successor to the estate because her 
husband is impotent.
When Mr. Herbert’s dead body is dragged out of the water people of Compton- 
Anstey starts to wonder about the murderer. Through the dialogues between people 
we leam that anyone could be the murderer; but it is Neville who is made the 
scapegoat. This situation is emphasized through a dialogue between Mrs. Talmami 
and Mr. Talmann (Hugh Fraser). Mr. Talmann who is informed by Mr. Noyes about 
the infidelities of his wife starts to quarrel with her. Once Mrs. Talmann rejects his 
claim Mr. Talmann asks her about her clothes, and the ladder leant to her window 
which appear in the drawings. Then Mrs. Talmann asks similar questions to Mr. 
Talmann. She asks about his shirt and riding boots in the drawings. Mr. Talmann 
states that they do not belong to him. Mrs. Talmann tries to make him understand 
that those objects could belong to anybody, and could be interpreted in any way. 
Then she argues that the drawings contained a more valuable evidence; the evidence 
that Mr. Neville has become party to the death of her father. So Neville has become 
the scapegoat. He is beaten and killed after his eyes are removed by other people in 
the location where he has been making the thirteenth drawing and his drawings are 
burnt.
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Although this seems to be the main story in the film the purpose of the film seems to 
be more than telling such a story. At the center of the film lies a contradiction 
between Neville’s ‘seeing’ of his drawings and other people’s ‘reading’ of them and 
this contradiction refers to an important historical dichotomy in art, which is rooted 
in seventeenth-century but which is still valid in today’s art, especially in today’s
cinema.
As Martin Jay’s essay entitled ‘Scopic Regimes of Modernity’ suggests the scopic 
regime of modernity does not exhibit a homogeneous character but rather it consists 
of several ‘visual subcultures’ (4). In this respect Jay distinguishes between Cartesian 
perspectivalism or Renaissance perspective, seventeenth-century Dutch art and the 
Baroque as being the three main visual subcultures of the modem era. Here I will 
focus on the distinction between the first two, which is discussed by Svetlana Alpers 
in his book entitled ‘The Art of Describing’ in a more elaborated way. Both Jay and 
Alpers describe Italian Renaissance art, which is dominated by Cartesian 
perspectivalism, as being ‘narrative’ in that it is motivated by storytelling tlirough 
textual references. In this respect Alpers defines the picture in Italian renaissance art
as
a framed surface or pane situated at a certain distance from a viewer who looks 
through it at a second or substitute world. In the Renaissance this world was a 
stage on which human figures performed significant actions based on texts o f  
the poets, (xix)'
Alpers calls this definition the Albertian definition of picture, which takes its name from 
Renaissance theoretician of perspective, Alberti.
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Alpers implies that Italian Renaissance art is ‘the art of reading privileging a 
monocular viewer and emphasizing his/her reading and interpretation of the picture 
dependent on his/her position in front of it. This means that ‘the meaning is disguised 
beneath the surface’ and waits for the constitution and interpretation of the 
‘positioned viewer’ (xxiv, xxv).
On the other hand Alpers describes seventeenth-century Dutch art as being an ‘art of 
describing’ and based on that distinguishes it from the ‘narrative art of Italy’ (xx). 
We learn from her arguments that what distinguishes the Dutch ‘art of describing’ 
from ‘the narrative art of Italy’ is its being based on seeing the world empirically and 
rendering the picture a flat surface (like a mirror or map) representing what the 
objective eye sees rather than a window on a world where significant human actions 
take place. This suggests that the emphasis is put on describing (seeing and 
representing) rather than on offering a plot for viewer’s reading and allegorical 
interpretation. In this respect Alpers argues that ‘Dutch art offers a delight to the eyes 
and as such seems perhaps to place fewer demands on us than does the art of Italy’ 
(xxii). She claims that it does not offer an easy verbal access. I think the reason is 
that Dutch paintings visually draw the attention of the viewer to many small things 
through exhibiting ‘fragmentary, detailed and richly articulated .surfaces’ (Jay 13) 
which do not seem to belong to any plot that can be read and interpreted 
allegorically. The way these small things are represented in terms of the use of light, 
color and composition contributes to the suppression of the narrative and textual 
interpretation as well. I think Alpers’ contrasting of the Dutch art and the art of Italy
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includes enough information to make us understand the comparatively closed
character of Dutch paintings to reading and interpretation:
attention to many small things versus a few large ones; light reflected o ff  
objects versus objects modeled by light and shadow; the surface o f  objects, 
their colors and textures, dealt with rather than their placement in a legible 
space; an unframed image versus one that is clearly frames; one with no clearly 
situated viewer compared to one with such a viewer. (44)
Based on all these Alpers describes the seventeenth-century Dutch art as being
‘visual’, in that it emphasizes ‘seeing’, as opposed to the art of Italy, which she
describes as being ‘textual’, in that it emphasizes ‘reading’. She argues that this
visual characteristic of Dutch art is related to the emergence of optical devices such
as the camera obscura, the microscope, the lenses and to the emergence of the trust in
the representations of the world offered by those devices, especially by the camera
obscura. However, for her, the emergence of such a tmst in representations of the
world is more important than the emergence of the devices themselves in teims of
their effect on Dutch painting. She posits Kepler’s definition of ‘human eye itself as a
mechanical maker of pictures’ and his definition of ‘to see’ as ‘to picture’ as an
exemplary of this seventeenth-centuiy trust. She argues that Kepler’s definition
provides the model of picture which offers appropriate channels to deal with the
nature of seventeenth-century Dutch images which also exhibit a trust in the eye and
2
representation (26-33).
As it is stated before The Draughtsman’s Contract, where Neville is the exemplary 
figure of this trust in the eye and representation, involves direct references to this
It should be noted that these characteristics could be easily adapted to the realist perspective in
cinema.
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dichotomy in the history of representation that is described by Alpers. Neville’s 
claim that he draws only what is before him without adding or leaving out anything 
and without any allegorical intent put his practice within the framework of ‘the art of 
describing’ or let us say ‘the art of seeing’ in which the dispassionate eye becomes 
the central means of representation. However his claim does not prevent other people 
in the estate from reading his drawings allegorically and coming up with a different 
conception of them, which ultimately leads to his blinding and death. In this respect 
the film seems to be based on seeing/reading or representing/allegory dichotomy and 
therefore it can be considered as an allegory of this dichotomy as well.
The dialectic between seeing and reading or between representation and allegory 
represented by the film can be discussed with reference to Benjamin’s concept of 
allegory and Foucault’s discussion on ‘representing’ and on the relation between 
visual and discursive spaces too. Benjamin presents allegory, in his The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, as a characteristic of Baroque works which stands against the 
organic symbol in classical works. He argues that allegory is inorganic, in that it is 
formed of fragments isolated from their original context rather than of a totality fixed 
in meaning. As Peter Bürger argues when he discusses Benjamin’s concept of 
allegory, ‘the allegorist joins the isolated reality fragments and thereby creates 
meaning. This is posited meaning; it does not derive from the original context of the 
fragments’ (69). In this respect it could be argued that allegorical formations require 
more interpretive ability. Benjamin’s distinction between organic symbol and 
allegory can be thought in parallel with Foucault’s distinction between Renaissance
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tradition of interpretation through resemblance and the tradition of ordering of things 
through discrimination (55-7). Foucault argues that up to the end of sixteenth century 
it was resemblance which made possible the knowledge of things and the art of 
representing them (17); but that later this was replaced by an analysis and ordering of 
things on the basis of their identities and differences (55). He argues that in this later
case
The activity o f the mind . . .  no longer consists in drawing things together, in 
setting out on a quest for everything that might reveal some sort o f kinship, 
attraction, or secretly shared nature within them, but on the contrary, in 
discriminating, that is, in establishing their identities, then inevitability o f the 
connections with all the successive degrees o f a series. In this sense, 
discrimination imposes upon comparison the primary and fundamental 
investigation o f difference: providing oneself by intuition with a distinct 
representation o f things, and apprehending clearly the inevitable connection 
between one element in a series and that which immediately follows it. (55)
What Foucault calls ‘discrimination’ can be considered as being similar to what
Benjamin calls ‘allegory’. In this respect it seems to me that The Draughstman’s
Contract posits Foucault’s ‘discrimination’, Benjamin’s ‘allegory’ and Alper’s
‘allegorical reading’ against their ‘interpretation through resemblance’, organic
work’ and ‘seeing’ respectively, through the conflict between Neville’s and other
people’s conception of the drawings made by Neville. Neville continuously claims
that he draws only what he sees. He considers the relationship between the drawings
and their referents as being nothing else then an analogical representation. The
viewfinder of his optical grid and his drawing papers divided by squares imply that
he considers his art to be visual mimesis and they function as an indicator of his
desire for visual mastery over what he sees and draws. He considers his drawings as
an organic whole, as being self-contained representations of different parts of the
estate at different times, which do not necessitate any additional interpretation or
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allegorical readings. However the conception of the drawings by other people is 
totally different. The objects intruding in Neville’s field of vision, which he records 
in his drawings in order to remain faithful to his representations, are used by those 
people to read the drawings as separate fragments that can be ordered in such a way 
that they become evidence of Neville’s becoming party to Mr. Herbert’s death. In 
other words they interpret the drawings allegorically so as to provide a connecting 
plot and make Neville the scapegoat of the murder. Based on all these it could be 
argued that ‘the art of seeing’, ‘organic work’, and ‘representation through 
resemblance’, which are discussed before, are the concepts that characterize Neville’s 
relation to his work and that ‘the art of reading’, ‘allegory’ and ‘discrimination’ 
characterize other people’s relation to Neville’s work. In this sense the film can be 
considered as a reference to the different theories of representation and this is what 
makes it an allegorical work as well.
The film presents Neville’s understanding of representation as a kind of blindness.
First of all Neville’s field of vision is always framed by his viewfinder making him
remain blind to everything outside of it. There is a direct reference to this kind of
blindness in the words of Mrs. Talmann. She says to Neville,
I’ve grown to believe that a really intelligent man makes an indifferent painter, 
for painting requires a certain blindness, a partial refusal to be aware o f all the 
options. An intelligent man will know more about what he is drawing than he 
will see, and in the space between knowing and seeing, he will become 
constrained, unable to pursue an idea strongly.
Throughout the film Neville remains blind not only to the appearances outside the 
frame of his viewfinder but also to the events around him and to the possible 
meanings that could be produced by the connection between the objects in his
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drawings. In the end of the film, after Neville is enlightened about those meanings he 
is literally blinded and punished for not knowing or for misreading what he sees. 
This literal blindness is in parallel with the metaphor of blindness in literature, which 
refers to the fact that the heroes who are unable to see the truths with their open eyes 
becomes literally blind in the end, like in the case of King Oedipus and King Lear, 
and blindness works for them as a window opening onto vision.
The film deals with the question of representation at another level as well. It raises 
questions on the relation between different modes of representation such as drawing, 
language, and film. The relation between drawing and film is expressed more directly 
by making Neville’s viewfinder coincide with the static cinematic frame at various 
moments of the film. At those points an analogy between the draughtsman and 
cinematographer and between their arts is produced. In this sense the draughtsman 
becomes the cinematographer as well. The parallel cut between what Neville, and so 
the spectator, sees and their drawings on the paper is another aspect of the film which 
establishes such a relation between the film and the drawing and between the 
filmmaker and the draughtsman. At those moments the viewer is forced to compare 
the drawings to the filmic image which makes sometimes hard to decide which one is 
the copy of the other: do we see what Neville draws or does Neville draw what we 
see? The scene where Neville passes in front of his viewfinder, which coincide with 
the cinematic frame, and remains there blocking the view of the location until the 
location is cleared of people emphasizes this relation between the draughtsman and 
the filmmaker; it is Neville who decide what he will see in the location as well as
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what we, as spectators, will see in the film. Based on this continuous relationship 
established between drawing and filmmaking, between the draughtsman and the 
filmmaker, it could be argued that all of the characteristics of the draughtsman and 
his art applies to cinema and to the filmmaker as well. For example it could be said 
that the restricted vision of the draughtsman and his desire for visual mimesis applies 
to the cinematographer as well. Although there is a reference to cinema’s capability 
of representing life more fully than drawing because it involves movement and 
sound, the challenge to the draughtsman’s control over his drawings through 
multivocal interpretation is directed to the cinematographer’s control over his work 
as well. The film gives the idea that despite the efforts of the cinematographer to 
have visual mastery over his work the film always resists univocal interpretation. 
This seems to be mainly a criticism of the ideology of realism in dominant cinema 
which equates knowledge and truth and their objectiveness with visual 
representation.
The analysis of the distinct levels of representation in The Draughtsman’s Contract 
offered by Elliott and Purdy shows very clearly that the film is open to multiple 
readings none of which can be considered as the right and adequate one (Architecture 
and Allegory 41). They ask what we, the audience, see when we look through 
Neville’s viewfinder: do we see what he sees, an objective view of the landscape 
devoid of allegorical meaning, which he authors and controls; do we see what Mrs. 
Talmann wants him to see, an allegory which she authors and controls; do we see 
what Greenaway wants us to see, ‘an allegory of a higher logical type which
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represents the dialectic between the first two levels and which he authors and 
controls’; or do we see something quite different? They argue that if we think in 
Foucauldian terms Neville’s case can be considered as an attempt to discipline the 
landscape, Mrs. Talmann’s as an attempt to discipline Neville (the artist), and 
Greenaway’s as an attempt to discipline/liberate the viewers.
In the first case we see what Neville ‘sees’, in the second what Mrs. Talmann ‘reads’ 
and in the third the interplay between ‘seeing’ and ‘reading’. Neville seems to draw 
what he sees not what he knows whereas Mrs. Talmann reads what she knows. As a 
result the relationship between seeing and reading can also be interpreted as the 
relationship between seeing and knowing. Mrs. Talmann moves us from ‘the 
empirical world of seeing’ to ‘the constructed world of knowing and reading’ 
through a speech she makes to Neville (Elliott and Purdy, Architecture and Allegory 
40-1). Before she offers her alternative reading of the drawings she says to Neville, 
‘let me make a little speech’ and then she offers her own reading in her speech. At 
that point we are introduced to the interplay between visual and discursive spaces, 
and we might ask which one is adequate. Greenaway’s answer to that question seems 
to be similar to Foucault’s argument on the relationship between those spaces in 
Velazquez’s Las Meninas (3-16).
Foucault argues that Las Meninas represents representation itself; which could be 
said for The Draughtsman’s Contract too. He argues that ‘perhaps there exists, in this
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painting by Velázquez, the representation as it were, of Classical representation, and 
the definition of the space it opens up to us’ (16).
Foucault suggests that the models being painted by the painter in the painting are not
present directly in the scene but they are seen indirectly through a mirror on the
background of the painting. Then in an attempt to detemiine the identities of the
figures present in the painting he suggests that
it would be better to say that Velázquez composed a picture; that in this picture 
he represented himself, in his studio or in a room o f  the Escurial, in the act o f  
painting two figures whom the Infanta Margarita has come there to watch, 
together with an entourage o f duennas, maids o f  honor, courtiers, and dwarfs; 
that we can attribute names to this group o f people with great precision: 
tradition recognizes that here we have Doña Maria Agustina Sarmiente, over 
there Nieto, in the foreground Nicolaso Pertusato, an Italian jester. We could 
then add that the two personages serving as models to the painter are not 
visible, at least directly; but that we can see them in a mirror; and that they are, 
without any doubt. King Philip IV and his w ife Mariana. (9)
Foucault suggests that those proper names ‘would avoid ambiguous designations’ but
that this is not the case; this is not what the painting asserts but just the product of the
relationship between language and painting which he considers to be infinite. He
states that neither words nor the visible can be reduced to the other’s terms:
It is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say. 
And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use o f images, metaphors, or 
similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their splendor is not 
that deployed by our eyes but that defined by the sequential elements o f syntax. 
And the proper name, in this particular context, is merely an artifice: it gives us 
a finger to point with, in other words, to pass surreptitiously from the space 
where one speaks to the space where one looks; in other words, to fold one over 
the other as though they were equivalents. (9)
As it can be concluded out of this argument Foucault points to the uselessness of the 
search for making the visual space and discursive space coincide in a unique way. He 
argues that one should treat the incompatibility of both spaces as a starting point and
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therefore one should ‘erase those proper names and preserve the infinity of the task’ 
in order to let the painting ‘release its illuminations’ (9-10). He states that the main 
task is to interrogate ‘the reflection in the depths of that mirror’ in its own terms; on 
the level of its existence rather than on the level of its name (10). Foucault’s 
arguments suggest that this is the way to get what the painting/representation really is 
about: Not a scene where particular people, who can be identified by their proper 
names, grouped together; but rather the representation itself ‘with its images, the eyes 
to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being’ 
(16).
If we look at The Draughtsman’s Contract from such a perspective we can see that 
the main question it raises is not whether Neville or Mrs. Talmann was right; or 
whether the objects drawn in the first six drawings belonged to Mr. Herbert as Mrs. 
Talmami argued, or whether the clothes drawn in the last six drawings belonged to 
Mrs. Talmann, as her husband argued, or whether the riding boots and the shirt 
belonged to Mr. Talmann, as his wife argued. Even the film does not offer an answer 
to the question, who really killed Mr. Herbert because this is not what Greenaway 
wants to communicate, it is rather, as we have seen, the nature of representation 
itself In this respect the film seems to be mainly a travel through different theories of 
representation and different modes of representation. It is mainly about how man 
sought to represent himself and the world through the history.
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In this film representation appears to be a group of structures and control that the 
artist or the people impose on their work, on their world. Perhaps it is a way of 
‘ordering things’ Greenaway here does not offer a single correct model for 
representation; rather he suggests a multitude of representations. He talks about 
representation and makes the viewer think about it. However it seems to me that 
there is still a strong argument in the film, which is the argument that reality cannot 
be represented, or ,more correctly, that what is represented as being reality cannot be 
considered as being about the real. There is a living statue in the film who poses as a 
stone statue at various places of the estate without caring about what is happening 
around him. The film’s explanation for his existence, at first look is that he is a 
servant of Compton-Anstey whose job is to decorate the gardens (Lawrence 70).  ^
However I agree with Brigitte Peucker that what the living statue represents, more 
precisely is ‘the desire to bring the real in the form of body into representation’ 
(158). And it is only that living statue which Neville cannot put into his 
representation. In the thirteenth drawing Neville draws a statue of a horse and omits 
the living statue who has posed as its rider. He says to others that he has finished the 
drawing but we see that Neville, who was proud of drawing exactly what he sees 
along the film, did not include this time in his representation the living statue on top 
of the horse. After Neville’s murder at the location where this horse statue is placed, 
the living statue gets off the horse -turning the last drawing of Neville into a tme 
representation-, beats a pineapple and spits what is in his mouth at the camera. This 
is the concluding scene of the film. Elliott and Purdy argue that this action of the
 ^Brigitte Peucker states that Greenaway’s own explanation for this figure is that ‘late seventeenth- 
century English landowners who were too poor or too stingy to buy statuary for their estates would 
ask as servant to pose as a statue (210).
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living statue which ends the film ‘suggests a rejection of the film itself with its 
elaborate games’ (44). I think we can interpret this also as the uncaring and humor of 
the real before all the representations which tries to ‘discipline’ it.
4.1.2. The Belly of an Architect
The Belly of an Architect, like The Draughtsman’s Contract, evolves around the
decline of an artist (an architect) who loses the control of his artistic work. The film
is described as being the most conventional and most humane film of Peter
Greenaway by certain circles and this was related to the acting of Brian Dennehy, an
American actor of Hollywood tradition, who played the architect in the film (Hacker
and Price 202, 204). It seems that Greenaway had allowed Brian Dennehy to
empathize with the character he was playing, something which is unusual in
Greenaway’s films. Brian Dennehy confesses this fact as follows
There is much o f myself, and my own life and emotions up there. On reading 
the script I was scared to death. I was very moved . . . Greenaway is the only 
really intellectual director I’ve worked with. We had to talk through translators 
but I let him be the intellectual, I wanted to be the human being, (qtd. in Hacker 
and Price 204)
Demiehy’s statement points to an important aspect of Greenaway’s approach towards 
actors in his films, in that it refers indirectly to Greenaway’s conception of actor as 
an element among other filmic elements which serves like the others to pursue some 
ideas which go beyond emotional or humanely acting. Moreover as it will be 
discussed in this section Dennehy’s physical presence and his acting do not dominate 
the whole film; in other words the film is far richer in terms of the ideas it presents 
for thought than the presence and acting of its actors.
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The film tells the nine-month story'* of an American architect, Stourley Kracklite 
(Brian Demiehy) who comes to Rome with her wife Louisa (Chloe Webb) to prepare 
an exhibition on the visionary eighteenth-century French architect Etienne-Louis 
Boullée (1728-99), who actually built almost nothing but known for his designs on 
paper. This nine-month duration in Rome becomes a painful experience for 
Kracklite, in that both his wife and his project slips tlirough his hands while the pain 
in his stomach makes him physically suffer. Throughout the film we learn that 
Kracklite and his wife have been married for seven years, during which Louisa has 
had several miscarriages and Kracklite has failed to complete several projects despite 
his fondness in his job and neglect of everything else. In this respect this nine-month 
duration serves as a new period in their life, during which Louisa gets pregnant and 
gives birth in the end whereas Kracklite fails to complete his project on his own and 
commits suicide. In this way biological creativity/artistic creativity opposition, which 
can also be formulated as biological reproduction/artistic production, appears to be 
one of the major themes that the film deals with through the metaphor of pregnancy..
After their arrival to Rome Kracklite starts to have pain in his stomach, which 
motivates him to examine the bellies of certain male figures such as Augustus Caesar 
- who was poisoned by his wife with figs- through enlarging their photographs in the 
photocopy machine. First he thinks that his wife is poisoning him but later doctors 
inform him that he has stomach cancer. His physical pain is accompanied by a mental 
distress as well because his wife engages in a sentimental and sexual relationship
At the beginning of the film Kracklite and Louisa are seen in a train making love. This is later 
followed by Louisa’s pregnancy and the film ends with her giving birth. Based on that I use the term 
‘nine-month story’.
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with the young Caspasian (Christopher Lambert), another architect who is the son of 
the exhibition’s chief fund-raiser and the rival of Kracklite throughout the film. 
Being effected by all these, Kracklite commits suicide by letting himself down the 
exhibition building on the opening ceremony, at the moment when his pregnant wife 
gives birth to his heir.
However, The Belly of an Architect is not just the story of suffering Stourley 
Kracklite. The film is rich in metaphor and it opens several channels to think about 
art and the artist in general once ‘the architecture’ is taken as a metaphor for art and 
‘the architect’ is taken as a metaphor for artist. It seems to me that the film deals 
most apparently with two themes. On one hand it debates on the question of artistic 
creativity by establishing a parallel/contrast relation with human 
reproduction/fertility. This is revealed by the relationship between Kracklite and his 
wife Louisa. On the other hand it deals with the question of immortality on several 
levels; immortality and durability of artistic products, mortality of human being, and 
immortality of human being through art. This is realized by carrying the names and 
the works of artists from the past, like Boullee, Piranesi, to the present and by 
bringing different modes of representation such as sculpture, painting, photography, 
photocopy in Kracklite’s engagement with his own belly and the bellies of 
historical/mythological figures. The film indirectly debates on the cinematic 
representation in terms of the durability and immortality of the artwork and the artist 
as well.
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If we consider the fact that the stomach is the organ where digestion -a process which
separates ‘the good’ from ‘the bad’- starts then it seems that Kracklite’s problem with
his stomach could have a metaphorical meaning. I guess Michael Schoenfeldt’s essay
entitled Fables of the Belly in Early Modem England could help us for such a
metaphorical interpretation. Schoenfeldt argues that
The stomach, the organ that accomplishes digestion, provides a particularly 
intense focus o f inwardness because it is the part o f our body that makes its 
needs felt most frequently and insistently. It demands to be filled at least a 
couple o f times a day, and to be emptied at least once. When these demands are 
not met, the entire organism suffers. (244)
Schoenfeldt in his essay examines certain legends formulated to explain digestion 
and some of the conclusions he comes up with are as follows
Since all illness was imagined to be the product of a lack or excess of some 
bodily fluid, the stomach assumed an important position in early modem regimes 
of mental and physical health (244).
- Digestion is a very literal assimilation of something that is not part of one to the 
essence of one’s being (245).
- The stomach was imagined to complete physiologically a process that begins in 
the ethical judgment: the discrimination of dross from nutrition, of good from the 
bad (245).
- The regulation of what goes into and out of the stomach is a matter of discipline 
over appetite’ (251).
- Diet and digestion were seen to affect not just mood and mental capacity but even 
the soul (253).
Schoenfeldt also observes that the belly where the stomach is situated was described 
like a ‘labyrinthine architecture’ (246) and that the descriptions of the digestion as
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being occurring throughout the organism implied that the human body was a giant 
stomach (245).
Kracklite, like Neville in The Draugtsman’s Contract, is an outsider. In both films the 
artist is figured as a person who is vulnerable to the interruptions from outside. The 
arguments above suggest that the stomach is the place where the self meets with the 
outside, the other. If we consider the fact that Kracklite’s pain starts after his arrival 
to Rome and engages in a collaborative project then we can interpret his pain as 
referring metaphorically to his problem with ‘the outside’; to a conflict between his 
inside and outside. Again in the light of the arguments above his pain can also be 
interpreted as his failure to discipline his ‘appetite’, his arrogance and his egotism. 
This last case is revealed in the words of the doctor who tells Kracklite that he is not 
being poisoned but he is suffering from ‘dispersia, fatigue, over excitement, excess, 
unfamiliarhood, lack of exercise, too much coffee, and maybe also too much 
egotism.’
The presentation of architecture as a metaphor for art in general does not seem to be a
coincidence if we follow Walter Benjamin’s statement that ‘its [architecture’s]
history is more ancient that any other art’ (240) and Vitrivius’ description of the
architecture, in his Ten Books on Architecture, as a site of convergence of several
kinds of knowledge and as a site where other arts are judged. Vitruvius writes.
The architect should be equipped with knowledge o f many branches o f study 
and varied kinds o f  learning, for it is by his judgment that all work done by the 
other arts is put to test . . . Let him [architect] be educated, skillful with the 
pencil, instructed in geometry, know much history, have followed the 
philosophers with attention, understand music, have some knowledge o f
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medicine, know the options o f the jurists, and be acquainted with astronomy 
and the theory o f heavens. (5-6) ^
It is possible to observe a parodied reference to Vitrivius’ argument in the film, in the 
words of Caspasian who tells Louisa that ‘architects ought to know about everything; 
reproduction, sex, especially sex.’
The metaphors of architecture and architect, for Greenaway, serves another purpose
too: establishing an analogy between the architect and the filmmaker. In an interview
he describes the common points of them as follows
I suppose you could call The B elly o f  an Architect, The B elly o f  a Film-Maker. 
Film-maker and architect share the same need for many collaborators o f  vastly 
different disciplines. They are both very costly, they both need large 
management skills. The film and the building are used and judged by a public 
that has many constituents. They both have a probable basis in a commission 
and a producer. They are maneuvered and circumscribed by financiers, 
insurance guarantees, contracts with small prints. They have to satisfy at the 
moment o f  completion and, one hopes, to find satisfaction with succeeding 
generations o f users. They have in some sense to be both practical and 
aesthetic. They have to be judged in many curreneies -money, technique, 
durability, kudos, aesthetics. And they both have a great many competitors in 
the market place -competitors from the past and the present. As in The B elly o f  
an Architect, there are not a few occasions when the central initiating figure - 
the filmmaker or the architect- can be foreibly removed from his assignment, 
(qtd. in Woods 236-7) ^
Based on all these it could be argued that the presentation of the architect as a 
metaphor for artist in general is quite meaningful too. Kracklite is not the only 
architect in the film, there is also Etienne-Louis Boullée and Giovanni Battista 
Piranesi. A brief look at the life of Boullée, the architect hero of Kracklite whom he 
identifies with, shows that the employment of his name and his works in the film
Vitrivius explains the reasons for the necessity of these knowledge’s for the architect one by one in 
his book (6-13).
 ^I think Greenaway’s statement summarizes totally the situation of Kracklite in the film.
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among so many other architects, has important functions in relation to the statements 
of the film on art and the artist.
Boullée, who studied first painting and later left it unwillingly for architecture, is 
mentioned in art books as a visionary architect, which means that he is known more 
for his visionary designs which influenced others than for anything he actually built 
(Lemagny 16). Jean-Claude Lemagny explains that this was the case because 
Boullée’s ‘creative power far exceeded the economic feasibility of his buildings.’ 
Based on the manuscript of Boullée available in Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris he 
also argues that ‘Boullée regards the art of architecture as far superior to the mere 
technique of building’ (16).
Greenaway, in an interview, points to the similarity between Boullée ‘whose 
reputation is based on paper buildings’ and filmmakers making ‘paper films that 
haven’t reached the screen’ (qtd. in Woods 236). He argues that ‘perhaps film­
makers, like architects, are inevitably condemned to be always making dream 
projects -projects that never come to pass.’ It seems to me that Greenaway might be 
identifying with Boullée too. Greenaway, like Boullée, studied first painting and he 
has several ‘paper films’, like 55-Men on Horseback, The Stairs, and a film on 
necrophilia, which could not reach the screen because of financial problems.
When we look at the visionary designs of Boullée we observe that they consists of 
simple masses, simple architectural forms such as cylinders, pyramids, cones.
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spheres (Lamagny 19-38) and that they exhibit an Apollonian universe characterized 
by order, balance, and beauty based on form. In general The Belly of an Architect 
exhibits such a universe too with its balanced, symmetrical, and static compositions. 
Boullee’s Cenotaph de Newton (TSfewton’s Cenotaph! (1784), the work that is seen 
in the film more than his other works, consists of an enormous sphere. Christian 
Thomsen argues that this work ‘was seen to embody not only Newton’s universal 
science but also the perfection of the cosmos, eternity and infinity’ (57). ’ I think it is
g
quite interesting that a work having death in its content becomes to signify eternity 
and I think the employment of this work in the film is very conscious, in that it 
embodies the question of immortality through art by itself: The ‘paper work’, which 
is about immortality although it reminds of death, is itself immortal and it, in a way, 
makes Newton immortal as well as Boullee.
As it is stated before, another visionary architect to whom Boullee is contrasted by 
people around Kracklite and by Greenaway is Piranesi (1720-78). A comparison of 
the works of both architects reveals that while Boullee’s works are dominated by 
simplicity and clarity Piranesi’s works are dominated by complicity, details, non­
symmetry and richness. Christian Thomsen asserts that today Piranesi is understood
as
the first visual artist to capture what his contemporary, Laurence Steme, had 
captured in language: the traumatic experiences o f  an anxious ego that had 
become just as aware o f its psychologically precarious position as o f the 
societal compulsions to which it was subject. In this respect, Steme and
’ Boullee explains that he has preferred the sphere as form because ‘of all bodies, it offers the largest 
surface to the eye, and this lends its majesty. It has the utmost simplicity because that surface is 
flawless and endless’ (qtd. in Lemagny 26). Based on that argument it could be suggested that Boullee 
associates his work with eternity and infinity too.
Most of Boullee’s designs consists of cenotaphs and cenotaph is ‘a monument put up in the memory 
of a person or persons buried elsewhere’ (A Learner’s Dictionary of Current English 157).
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Piranesi were legitimate predecessors o f James Joyce and many other 
twentieth-century artists. (46)
Thomsen argues that Piranesi’s visionary designs have been influential on film set 
designers as well. He states that
Piranesi has not only supplied the models for the series o f English Frankenstein 
movies o f the early 1960s, but he is invariably referred to whenever a 
filmmaker wishes to create an effect o f  terror, evoke an ambivalent 
psychological mood, or produce a vision o f incarceration or apocalypse in a 
monumental architectural setting. (55)
Thomsen forwards Greenaway’s employment of the architecture of Piranesi in the 
settings of Prospero’s Books as an example to the fact above. It is possible to observe 
such compositional references to Piranesi, in The Belly of an Architect as well. For 
example Kracklite’s workspace associates Piranesi’s Le Carceri (The Prisons) (1760) 
with its archways, shadows and lights. Moreover, I think, the stairs that seem to be 
temporarily constructed for the organization of the exhibition building -I guess they 
form a scaffold- constitute the most direct reference to Le Carceri. In this respect it 
could also be suggested that Kracklite’s workspace is, in a way, his own prison. 
Another moment in the film when the composition expresses the change in the 
atmosphere is the scene where Louisa gives birth and Kracklite commits suicide. The 
symmetrical, centered and static compositions seen from the front in the film until 
that moment is broken for the sake of a more dynamic composition where the scene 
is seen from below and the symmetry is collapsed. According to Greenaway such a 
composition suggests that ‘the Apollonian universe that Kracklite tried to maintain 
has been destroyed’ (qtd. in Elliott and Purdy, Architecture and Allegory 18).
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It seems to me that the reference to these two visionary architects by the film as 
secret heroes and the use of their aesthetics, which exhibit a contrast, as formal 
devices have another function too. The works of these architects do not have any 
materiality; they can be formulated as mere ideas on papers. However as Thomsen 
suggests and as it is observed in Greenaway they still influence art and imagination 
and this is what constitutes their values. Similarly a film does not have any 
materiality. It can be considered as imaginations ideas on a filmstrip. Therefore it 
could be argued that a film derives its value from the creative ideas present in it 
rather than the actual existence, or seeming existence of what it represents; and this 
could be forwarded as something which makes the fondness of realism in cinema 
something meaningless or irrelevant since what remains out of a film is just a set of 
ideas and imaginations.
Having taken the architecture as a metaphor for art in general and the architect for the 
artist now let us look at some more specific themes in the film. One of the questions 
the film debates is ‘why an artist engages in art’ and.the answer it seems to offer is 
‘to create’, to leave traces behind in other words to become immortal through artistic 
creations. However the film questions the validity of these answers too, in other 
words the validity of artistic creation.
Greenaway asserts that
the film [The Belly o f an Architect] is about the way man reproduces him self 
At the beginning we see a lot o f  three-dimensional sculpture . . .  A little later 
on we begin to examine painted representations . . . and then there’s that 
representation o f man through photography, and finally the most banal o f all, 
through photocopying, (qtd. in Lawrence 136)
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The location where the film is set is Rome, which is considered to be a living 
museum of art with its buildings and statues. We, as spectators, travel through Rome 
with Kracklite and see its architecture and statues. We also see the representations of 
Rome on the postcards that Kracklite sends to Boullee. When Kracklite engages with 
the bellies of certain male figures (Augustus, Boullee, Andrea Doria, himself as 
Andrea Doria) and starts to enlarge their pictures through a photocopy machine we 
witness a series of pictures which become reproductions of reproductions of 
sculpture, engraving, painting and photography. Towards the end of the film we see 
Kracklite sitting on the ground of his hotel room, which is covered by numerous 
photocopies. This situation demonstrates a passage from more expansive but more 
durable representations to cheaper but less durable ones. Moreover we observe that 
Kracklite reproduces reproductions of sculptures, paintings, and photographs not 
with an artistic purpose but with a more practical purpose. However he gets nothing 
from this photocopying process as well as he creates nothing. What he gets is mere 
enlarged reproductions of reproductions. The translation of representations through 
different modes of representation, which becomes more and more mechanical, 
expresses in a sense, the loss of aura caused by changes in techniques of 
reproduction, which is discussed by Walter Benjamin in his essay entitled The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. Benjamin in his essay tries to point to 
the change in modes of reception brought by mechanical reproduction and does not 
aim at offering a negative criticism of this situation. However The Belly of an 
Architect seems to offer such a criticism. ICracklite, by reproducing reproductions, 
further decreases their effect and turns them into something very banal.^ The
9 In the film we also witness other kinds of representations as banal as photocopy such as Boullee’s
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exaggerated green light of the photocopy machine can be considered as symbolically 
representing the sickness, and the creative infertility inherent in the process, which is 
also inherent in ICracklite.'® Another point revealed by this photocopying process is 
that the photocopy is the most exact copy of his original. When Kracklite enlarges a 
detail from the picture of the belly of Augustus and put it on his own belly and 
examines himself in a mirror the photocopied belly seems like the belly of Kracklite. 
I think this scene problematizes the relation between the copy and the original, and 
the function of the photocopy in this relation. However at the same time we know 
that a photocopy has almost no aesthetic value -in the way it is used in general- so it 
could be argued that offering an exact copy cannot be the measure of the aesthetic 
value of the work.
Beside the loss of uniqueness and authenticity through mechanical reproduction, this 
array of translations (sculpture-painting-photography-photocopy) also problematizes 
the status of the artwork in the face of time. A stone building or a statue is more 
durable and it can benefit from aging compared to the ephemeral photographic 
negative or paper. The scene at the beginning of the film where Kracklite and his 
associates applaud the Pantheon in Rome” is an expression of the advantageous 
situation of the architecture in the face of time. The applause for Pantheon, as Alan 
Woods observes, was partly for its ‘magnificent decay’ (93). The passage of time has 
increased the significance of the Pantheon.
Cenotaph in the form of a cake, Newton’s image on a paper money.
Throughout the film we see nothing created by Kracklite. Even the exhibition, which he can not 
complete on his own, is not on his works but the works o f Boullee. It could be said that the exhibition 
is also a kind of reproduction by Kracklite, like his other reproductions in the photocopy machine.
This seems to be similar to the Draughtsman’s applauding the landscape in The Draughtsman’s 
Contract.
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When we consider cinema as a representative medium from such a perspective we 
see that film is also threatened by the passage of time. There is a direct statement of 
this problem by Greenaway in the catalogue of his exhibition The Stairs Geneva 
Location. He states,
For me it is a frustration that cinema has no substance in the way that, for 
example, architecture and sculpture -even painting- have substance. And, as a 
consequence, I doubt whether cinema has any real history in the world. The 
passage o f History effects inevitable material changes in an artifact. In that 
sense, cinema, or film, cannot profitably age, and it can have no intimacy with 
History. Even a very short history permits an object to attain provenance, 
heritage and cultural power. Even attain cultural magic, certainly currency and 
usage. The physical touch o f History, which is not necessarily inimical to the 
well-being o f a cultural artifact, can ‘improve’ its substance and enhance its 
significance. Without exception material changes in film are irredeemably 
disadvantageous. Film will not sustain aging processes or be made profitably 
resonant by them.
A film cannot be photographed and rephotographed like a piece o f architecture 
or sculpture, it cannot be re-interpreted like a piece o f theater or music, it 
cannot grow a patina o f provenance like a painting, or be reproduced in its 
entirety as a painting can be reproduced; it is immediately fixed in a strange 
sort o f present tense that will not profit by aging. (3-4)
I think in The Belly of an Architect, Greenaway experiments with the question of
reproducibility of the film as well -the translation of the film into different modes of
representation. This is most apparent in the scene where Kracklite meets the
photographs showing himself, Louisa and Caspasian in different places and
moments, which cover an entire wall in the work place of Flavia (Stefania Casini),
the sister of Caspasian. The photographs, like a storyboard, summarize the film so far
and forms a little nairative (photographs) within the narrative (film).
Throughout the film we hear the names of several artists, who died years ago, 
through their works. In this sense the artwork, especially durable artworks like
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architecture, sculpture, seems to be a ticket to immortality. Greenaway also refers to 
this in his argument below
I f you are interested in immortality then perhaps it’s best to be an architect - 
think o f the evidence in bricks and marble and imperishable stone. What price 
the immortality ticket for a film-maker with brittle celluloid and fading 
emulsion? (qtd. in Woods 252-3)
However the film also gives the impression that all effort to be immortal through 
artwork is transitory. We see that Boullée’s Cenotaph is eaten as a cake; the paper 
money on which Newton’s image appears bums or drops out of circulation. The film 
puts a question mark in the end, which makes us think about all the arguments the 
film -and we, as the audience- makes about immortality and the artwork so far*^ . 
Kracklite dies leaving a heir behind; which suggests that perhaps the biological 
creativity, through which man reproduces himself, is the only means to immortality. 
This Darwinian idea is also apparent in Greenaway’s answer to a question in an 
interview. He states that he has achieved his purpose in this world by having two 
girls (qtd. in Barker 30).
4.2. On Reality/Illusion and the Suspension of Disbelief
Kendall L. Walton argues that ‘fictions are games of make-believe’ (qtd. In Poidevin 
229). I think dominant cinema offers the examples of fictions, which confirm this 
argument in the best way; in that the films attempt to conceal their artifice and make 
the audience believe in the illusion. This is what we call the suspension of disbelief, 
through which the spectator is forced to take what is represented on the screen not
■ It seems to me that this is very similar to the ending of The Draughtsman’s Contract, where the 
living statue spits to the camera, which can be interpreted as the rejection of the film itself. The 
ending of The Belly of an Architect seems to be the questioning of what the film says so far.
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just as a film/fiction but reality. I think we can call this deception as well.The 
suspension of disbelief is assumed to be the necessary condition of being able to 
produce emotional response of the audience to the characters and events in the film. 
This is also implied by Walton’s argument that to respond to a fictional character is 
to ‘enter into’ the fictional world in which the character lives, and to be a part of that 
world make-believedly iqtd. in Boruah 66).
However there are two phenomena in cinema, as Greenaway points out, which make 
the artifice reach its height and thus make the suspension of disbelief difficult to be 
sustained. These are ‘death and copulation’. ‘For a certainty no actor ever reallly dies 
on screen. No actor copulates on screen. The more they die and the more they 
copulate, the less we can sustain our suspension of disbelief (Deceiving is 
Believing). Greenaway, who is against the concealment of the artifice in cinema, 
offers a critique of the illusion of realism and suspension of disbelief in all of his 
films. However it is in The Baby of Mâcon that such a critique becomes most 
appearent. In this film Greenaway tluough certain bodily phenomena such as 
copulation and death, questions the tiny space between fiction and reality or between 
representation and reality and the audience’s suspension of disbelief about these 
phenomena.
Catherine Russell, in her book entitled Narrative Mortality offers a discussion of the 
relation between ‘narrative mortality (the discourse of death in narrative film) and
Such a critique is present especially in The Cook. The Thief, His Wife and Her Lover. Prospero’s 
Books and The Baby of Mâcon.
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cinematic representation, which, I think, has many points in common with
Greenaway’s conception of the same relation. Russell argues that
The representation o f violent death in film constitutes a special crisis o f  
believability, a threshold o f realism and its own critique. Enacted death, bodily 
violence, and corporeality (such as surgical operations) are privileged points at 
which realism makes film break with the real, as the bullet-ridden corpse is at 
once the height o f artifice and horror. (23)
Although Russell mentions very little about Greenaway, and only about his The 
Cook, the Thief. His Wife and Her Lover, her argument above applies totally to The 
Baby of Mâcon. Even it could be considered as a sentence written particularly after 
this film.
Greenaway in The Baby of Mâcon questions the passivity of the audience with which 
they accept the believability of the cinematic illusion. Russell, like Greenaway and 
all other filmmakers and film theorists who argue against the illusion of realism in 
cinema, suggests that ‘the illusionist impression of reality in the cinema is . . . 
narrative’s disawoval of its own mortal condition as a series of discrete photographic 
images’ (12). She relates the representation of death in film to the believability of the 
image and argues that
Insofar as this belief depends on the denial o f  the film ’s celluloid status, its 
twenty-four-frames-a-second ‘mortal’ state, the illusion o f reality sustains itself 
through a strict censorship o f this reminder. (7-8)
Another important argument Russell makes is that in most films death serves as a
means for closure but, she points out, in New Wave cinemas; in the films of directors
such as Godard, Wenders, Oshima; it is something more. She argues that those films
split death from closure, and prevent meaning and ending from fitting neatly 
together. While the death o f a protagonist may often be interpreted 
psychologically as the loss o f an ideal, the spectacular representation o f violent 
death suggests that loss is also articulated on the level o f  the image and the
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very language o f representation. Narrative materiality is thus an allegory o f the 
limits o f representation . . .. (3)
I think the same argument applies to Greenaway’s The Baby of Mâcon too; in that 
death in this film is not just ‘a means of wrapping things up’; more than that it -as 
well as copulation- serves as a tool for understanding the cinematic representation 
and for experimenting with the limits of cinematic representation.
Although death and copulation are the two particular phenomena in the film 
questioning the suspension of disbelief and the limits of cinematic representation, the 
film in general is structured as an investigation of the relationship between 
representation and reality and the relation of the audience to the representation.
4.2.1. The Baby of Mâcon
Within the terminology of Robin Le Poidevin we can say that The Baby of Mâcon is 
structured as an ‘embedded fiction’, in that it is in the form of ‘a fiction within a 
fiction’ (227).''' A play entitled The Baby of Mâcon is being staged in a cathedral to 
a crowded group of audience for the seventeenth birthday of Prince Cosimo de 
Medici, who is the most important guest among them. This is a play in ‘grand opera 
format of three acts, two intervals, a prologue/overture and an epilogue/curtain call’
(Greenaway, Deceiving is Believing) 15
The term ‘embedded fiction’ is used by Robin Le Poidevin to refer to works such as novels about 
dreams, plays about plays, novels about films, paintings about paintings.
Greenaway states that The Baby of Mâcon was conceived as a grand opera, but that because the 
music would enslave the text and thus he would not be able to hear words clearly in the end it did not 
become an opera. However, he adds, it still retained the grand opera format D^eceiving is Believing).
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Poeidevin argues that ‘we would expect the relation between an embedded fiction 
and the fiction in which it is embedded to be the same as that between fiction and real 
world’ (227). The narrative of The Baby of Mâcon is structured as a play (the 
embedded fiction) taking place within the film (embedding fiction). Therefore based 
on the formulation of Poeidevin it is possible to consider the events taking place 
within the play as fiction and those taking place in the film as reality.
The play is started by the figure of Famine who looks like a freak, with an 
introductory speech describing the suffering of the city of Mâcon from famine, 
diseases, and sterility, which is believed to be a punishment for ignoring God and for 
not repairing the city cathedral. A very old woman is about to give birth on the stage 
to a baby, which is expected to be a monster. The midwives attending the woman 
provoke laughter and applause from the audience of the play. The behavior of the 
audience of the play shows that this is not the first performance of the play.’^  While 
one of the actress brings a doll to be given to the midwives, the old woman gives 
birth to a flesh-and-blood beautiful boy, which surprises everybody. Since this flesh- 
and-blood baby appears for the first time in the performance that the film presents, 
the birth and the real baby can be considered as the intervention of the reality into the 
fiction (the play). The sudden arrival of a real baby, which did not happen in previous 
performances, marks the beginning of a series of events, which will blur the 
distinction between fiction and reality throughout the film. Greenaway points out that 
the sudden arrival of the baby surprises not only the actors of the play and the
° The members of the audience, who have seen also the previous performances and who therefore 
know the dialogues, shout the dialogues before the actresses.
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audience of the play but also the audience of the film by making them unable to 
sustain their suspension of disbelief. Because ‘babies cannot act. With a baby you 
can only get the real thing’ ^Deceiving is Believing).
Back to the film, once the baby is believed to be a miracle child, the Daughter of the 
old woman, the sister of the child (Julia Ormond) attempts to take advantage of it. 
She locks up her parents and claims that she is the mother of the child while she also 
claims that she is a virgin. She manages to persuade everyone and she starts to 
exploit the child by letting him bless the people, who have problems and who are 
willing to pay anything to get the child’s blessing. The only person, who does not 
believe the daughter, is the Bishop’s son (Ralph Fiennes), who has a scientific point 
of view and who therefore does not believe in religious superstitions and miracles. 
The Daughter attempts to seduce him in a stable in order to convince him that she is 
a virgin. Once they start to make love, before the child, a cow which was donated by 
Cosimo de Medici to get child’s blessing, and a sheep, the child, who is voiced by 
the stage prompter, intervenes and induces the cow to kill the Bishop’s son in a 
violent manner. The Daughter, who becomes crazy, kills the cow with a scythe. At 
that moment the wooden door of the stable falls down on the ground and a 
community, including the Bishop, the members of church, midwives and some other 
people, moves into the stable/the scene and read the daughter who is covered with 
blood as the murderer of the Bishop’s son. The church, which claim that the 
Daughter is unfit to be the mother of a miracle child, takes the child into its direct 
protection.
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The scene in the stable points to an important aspect of the relation of the spectator to 
the representation. In this scene the audience of the play are not present during the 
violent event; it is the audience of the film who witness everything. Therefore we, as 
the audience of the film, know that in reality that the daughter is not the murdered. 
The audience of the play, who comes to the scene later, do not know that the 
Bishop’s son is killed by the cow, which is motivated by the child. They take the 
blood covering the daughter and the low age of the child as the proofs of daughter’s 
being the murderer. Their misreading of the daughter is based on the assumption that 
what is visible is the truth; in other words what makes the truth (the reality) 
knowable is the visibility. Greenaway questions the relationship between seeing and 
loiowing; between seeing and believing; throughout the film, like in this scene, by 
showing that being a witness to an event does not ensure that truth can be known and 
that believing totally to what is seen can produce disastrous outcomes. He implies 
that truth, as Marsha Gordon argues, ‘is construed through ambiguous signifiers such 
as the blood that covers the Daughter’s body.’
Once the church takes the child into its direct protection it starts to exploit him 
through selling by auction his bodily liquids such as spittle, tears, urine, phlegm and 
blood. The Daughter, who becomes jealous, suffocates the child on his bed. This 
leads to her condemnation to death by the church. However according to local rules a 
virgin cannot be executed. A solution is offered by Cosimo de Medici (Jonathan 
Lacey), who has been watching what was happening so far with a naïve curiosity.
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Upon his suggestion, The Bishop (Philip Stone) decides that the Daughter should be 
imprisoned in the guard-house, deflowered by the milita and then executed. Based on 
this decision the Daughter is enclosed into a bed covered by curtains to be raped 208 
times.
The curtains in this scene have an important function, in that they separate what the 
audience of the play are allowed to see and what the audience of the film see: The 
audience of the film see also behind the curtains whereas the audience of the play see 
only the shadows on the curtains. The difference between these two views is 
confirmed in a dialogue between the Daughter and the two men holding her down on 
the bed. We, as the audience of the film, see them together behind the curtains (the 
camera has entered through the curtains). The Daughter jokes with the two men and 
screams as if she is acting. One of the men states, ‘no need to act anymore, the 
audience can’t see.’ At the beginning the daughter -perhaps it is more appropriate 
here to say the actress- does not take them serious; but it becomes clear that the two 
men are really serious. They restrain her from moving and the first man who enters 
inside rapes the actress. The actress screams but the audience of the play, who see 
nothing except the shadows on the curtains, do not know that her screams are ‘real’.
In fact the audience of the film are not allowed to see the act of rape either. They are 
‘put outside’ as soon as the man starts to rape and after that moment they are allowed 
to see just what the audience of the play see, the shadows on the curtains. The 
soldiers enter one by one through the curtains and rape the Daughter. The scene lasts
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ten minutes and during that time we continue to see the shadows accompanied by the 
screams of the Daughter (actress). The representation on the bed’s curtains look like 
a shadow-play. In fact both the audience of the play and the audience of the film do 
not know what is really happening behind the curtains. However the film provides 
enough clue to make the audience of the film think that the actress might be really 
raped and that the screams are real. I think this is another moment where Greenaway 
questions the relationship between seeing and knowing. He makes us think that what 
we are allowed to see might not reflect what is actually happening, and I think this 
thought is more important that the reality or artifice of what is happening behind the 
curtains.
Marsha Gordon points to a possible similarity between the rape scene and the
situation in the process of making and projection of a film. She argues that
Like a director, Cosimo enumerates the ‘acts’ o f  rape in the same way that 
‘takes’ are called on a film set. In fact the bed’s curtains look much like a film 
screen, literalizing Cosimo’s directoral role. The daughter’s screams become 
horrific background ‘music’ throughout the painfully long ten-minute scene, 
while the aristocracy eats and Prince places papers with each rape-number onto 
a stake.
Gordon’s interpretation of Cosimo’s act as something resembling to the calling of 
takes seems interesting; but it seems to me that the resemblance she establishes 
between bed’s curtains and film screen is not only interesting but also right. What is 
seen on the screen is also a kind of shadow play, which is based on illusion, and this
4
is what makes Greenaway’s questioning of the relationship between seeing and 
knowing; between representation and reality not something which is directed only to 
The Baby of Mâcon but to the whole situation in cinema.
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When the final rape is executed and the body of the Daughter is rolled from the bed 
everybody learns that she is dead. Like the ‘real’ rape this seems to be a ‘real’ death, 
in that it is not only the Daughter who is dead but also the actress playing the 
Daughter. This is supported by the words of one of the soldiers, who says ‘a very fine 
actress indeed.’
After all these the child is proclaimed a saint. During his funeral his body is 
dismembered and distributed among the crowd as relics. The figure of Famine, who 
has started the play, ends it with a speech, which informs that famine, sterility and 
misery returned to the city of Mâcon as punishment. Although this seems to be the 
end of the play, but I do not think so, it is not the end of the film. The film ends with 
a long crane shot during which the relationship between fiction and reality is further 
blurred. We see the head of the dismembered child hanging in the void. With the clap 
of the stage prompter the music starts and the Daughter (actress), the Bishop’s son 
(the actor), and the cow are brought to the scene in carts. Since they all seem dead, it 
could be said that there have been four ‘real’ death in today’s performance. Then the 
other actors of the play come to the scene and salute the audience of the play. While 
the camera continues its backward movement the audience of the play, including 
Cosimo de Medici and his entourage, turn and salute the camera too. Finally a larger 
audience, who are not seen so far, appear while they are clapping the all performance. 
However they turn and salute the camera as well. As a consequence all the audiences 
are transformed into actors in the end of the film, which suggests that everything was 
a part of another play. However, I think, the film denies to offer any release with this
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fictional aspect of everything after presenting so many violent acts, since there are 
four dead bodies which belong to two actors, one actress and a cow among the actors 
saluting the camera. Moreover the ending of the film gives the impression that we, as 
audience of the film, are going to get up, turn and salute another audience behind us 
as well, which implies that we are also a part of all these.
The Baby of Mâcon has been subjected to severe criticism of the audience especially
for the way it exhibits violence. Derek Malcom, in an article in The Guardian, which
is about the films in Cannes Film Festival in 1993, declares the film to be ‘one of the
chief disappointments’ of the festival. He states
Peter Greenaway’s The Baby o f  Mâcon, one o f the chief disappointments o f  
this year’s Cannes Festival, seems a sad decline not because o f what it tries to 
encompass but because o f the way it does so . . .
English movie-theaters could stand The Baby of Mâcon only one week, and it has
never been shown in American movie-theaters. It has also received negative reactions
of the audience in Hamburg and Toronto. This does not seem to be surprising
because the most apparent aspect of The Baby of Mâcon is that it questions the
conventional habits of viewing and the relationship between the spectator and the
film.
Greenaway agrees with the general definition of performance, which is ‘an event -
any event- that is witnessed by an audience. He argues that
To turn any event -from the assassination o f dictators to frogs spawning, from 
sky-diving to leaves falling, from baby-watching to dustblowing- into a 
performance, all we need is an audience. Maybe events not witnessed by an
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audience are not only non-perfonuances but non-events. CThe Stairs Munich 
23)'"17
The ending scene of The Baby of Mâcon is in conformity with this definition. We 
distinguish between different levels of performances through the appearance of 
audiences. The audience, who applaud a performance become the part of that 
performance once another audience watching the previous one appear.
Greenaway states that ‘such a definition would appear to throw emphasis on the 
audience rather than on the performance’ and based on that he asks ‘what constitutes 
an audience -who are they, what do they want, how can they be entertained? How 
will they sit or stand?’ (qtd. in Steinmetz 122).
An examination of the characteristics of the audience in The Baby of Mâcon shows 
that the film asks several questions and makes several arguments on the nature of the 
audience in cinema. Although the play’s audience belong to different social classes 
such as aristocracy, bourgeoisie, peasants, clergy, which is also reflected in their 
sitting in the fonn of separate groups, they respond to the events as a single 
community. For example in the birth scene they repeat the words of the old woman 
and midwives all together, sometimes they laugh, sometimes they boo, they shout. In 
this sense they participate to the play, become a part of it. It could be said that they 
constitute an example to ‘roundabout type of spectator’ described by Brecht, which i 
have previously mentioned about, in that they approve the illusion of the play.
’’ The scene where Kracklite and his associates applaud the Pantheon in Rome in The Belly of an 
Architect exemplifies how even architecture can become a performance with the existence of an 
audience in front of it.
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involve in it by identifying themselves with the incidents. The scene where they 
come to the stage to share the relics shows clearly that they believe in the 
representations of the play and want to actively participate in it. Therefore it could be 
argued that the play/representation standardizes the audience by making them equal 
to each other in terms of their appreciation of the representation. This is, in fact, an 
aspect of dominant cinema, which is continuously criticized by Greenaway.
18
The spectator, who is most willing to participate into the play, is Cosimo de Medici, 
who represents the kind of spectator, who is eager to believe all the illusions 
presented by the representation. At the beginning of the play he examines the props 
curiously, he continuously asks naive questions about the events on the stage, and in 
fact, he actively participates to the play by causing the rape of the Daughter by the 
milita. However he is different from other spectators in one respect. It seemed to me 
that through his interrogation of the acts in the play he represents the conscience of 
the audience. He seems to be very innocent but he plays an important role in the two 
biggest disaster in the play/film: the Bishop’s son is killed by the cow he has donated 
to the Daughter and it is him who proposes the rape. Although he feels sad and 
regrets when he sees the outcomes, once he hears that he is forgiven he becomes 
released. In that sense, I think Cosimo de Medici particularly represents the kind of 
spectator who is involved and moved by the illusory representation and who does not 
feel any responsibility over the disasters, but only a temporary, double-faced sadness 
which he is ready to give up.
Greenaway use the term ‘Rocky Horror Show participants’ to describe the audience of the play 
(Deceivinu is Believinai.
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The concluding scene of The Babv of Mâcon implies that all the audiences are 
indeed actors, which means in a metaphorical way that everyone is responsible for 
the violence represented. The rape of the daughter exemplifies this fact as well. 
Everybody contribute to the violence. Cosimo makes the suggestion, the Church 
confirms it, the milita execute it, and the audience accept it by not intervening.
While the audience of the play is made to emotionally involve in the play, the 
audience of the film is intentionally distracted and distanced through the exhibition 
of the illusory nature of representation, and through the questioning of the passivity 
of the audience before the representation; in other words through the disruption of 
the conventions of dominant cinema. According to Poeidevin the distancing of the 
spectator is a natural characteristic of embedded fictions. He argues, ‘because an 
embedded fiction is defined as fictional by something that is itself fictional, we are 
distanced from it, both logically and, sometimes, emotionally’ (227). Although this is 
also one of the characteristics of The Babv of Mâcon, in my opinion, the film owes 
much of its distancing character to its high artifice and to the Brechtian teclmiques it 
employs.
The film exhibits a high level of theatricality and artifice. Each act is announced with 
Brechtian placards; it continuously reveals that the world seen in the play and in the 
film is no more than sets; the actors speak through very stylized dialogues, which 
make them seem flat; it exhibits a visual excess, which often distracts the attention
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from the action to the way things are composed. In this sense the most apparent 
aspect of the film, which refers to Brecht’s epic theater is that it eliminates ‘the 
fourth wall’, which separates the audience from the spectacle. The dialogue below, 
which is taken by Alan Woods from Brecht’s Messingkauf Dialogues, offers a good 
understanding of what that means (168-9).
THE DRAMATURG: What about the fourth wall?
THE PHILOSOPHER: What’s that?
THE DRAMATURG: Plays are usually acted as if  the stage had four walls, not 
three; the fourth being where the audience is sitting. The impression given and 
maintained is that what happens on the stage is a genuine incident from real 
life, which o f course doesn’t have an audience. Acting with a fourth wall, in 
other words, means acting as if  there wasn’t an audience.
THE ACTOR: You get the idea? The audience sees quite intimate episodes 
without itself being seen. It’s just like somebody looking through a keyhole and 
seeing a scene involving people w ho’ve no idea they’re not alone. Actually, o f  
course, we arrange it all so that everyone gets a good view. Only we conceal 
the fact that it’s being arranged.
THE PHILOSOPHER: Ah yes, then the audience is tacitly assuming that it’s 
not in a theater at all, since nobody seems to take any notice o f it. It has an 
illusion o f sitting in front o f a keyhole. That being so it ought not to applaud 
until it starts queuing for its hats and coats.
THE ACTOR: But its applause confirms the very fact that the actors have 
managed to perform as if  it weren’t there.
THE PHILOSOPHER: Do you think we need this elaborate secret 
understanding between the actors and yourself?
THE WORKER: I don’t need it. But perhaps the actors do.
THE ACTOR: For realistic acting it’s considered essential.
THE WORKER: I’m for realistic acting.
THE PHILOSOPHER: But it’s also a reality that you are sitting in a theater, 
and not with your eyes glued to a keyhole. How can it be realistic to try and 
gloss that over? We want to demolish the fourth wall: I herewith announce our 
joint operation. In future please don’t be bashful; just show us that you’ve 
arranged everything in the way best calculated to help us understand.
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This dialogue refers also to the situation in dominant cinema and its critique. If I 
have quoted the passage in length it is because it offers a good insight to what 
Greenaway is trying to do in The Baby of Mâcon. Greenaway continuously 
underlines the illusory nature of the representation by emphasizing the artifice of the 
representation, and how it is formed and thus invites the spectator to abandon the 
illusion, to break his/her suspension of disbelief I think this is what the philosopher 
wants through the elimination of ‘the fourth wall’.
The film also distracts the audience of the film by preventing voyeuristic 
consumption of the film. This is achieved by making different layers of the film 
coincide throughout the film, which obscure which one is reality and which one is 
illusion; who is the actor and who is the audience. It is possible to observe six major 
layers in the film. The story in the play constitutes the first layer, which seems to be 
an illusion. The interruption of the play by some real incidents such as real birth, real 
death of the Bishop’s son, real rape and death of the Daughter, real death and 
dismembering of the body of the child, forms the second layer, which makes artifice 
reach its height and questions the suspension of disbelief The third layer consists of 
the inteiwentions of Cosimo de Medici to the play, which produce important effects 
on the progress of the play. The audience of the play and their participation to the 
play forms the fourth layer whereas the audience of the film constitute the fifth layer. 
The final layer is the final scene of the film where all other layers are unified. In this 
final layer all the audiences are transformed into actors. This layer sharply makes the 
spectator aware that he/she is not ‘sitting in front of a keyhole’ and that the is also an
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actor -but not a character- in this complicated play too. In this sense, I think, the film 
offers its most clear critic of the passive voyeuristic spectator in this final layer.
This challenge to passive voyeurism is present in the violence scenes as well. As I 
have stated before in these scenes artifice reach its height and makes the suspension 
of disbelief unsustainable. However these scenes are important in another sense as 
well. They imply that like the cause of the violence in the play is distributed to 
Cosimo, the Church, the milita and the audience of the play, the violence in cinema 
can be distributed to the director, the actors, and the audience as well. In other words 
they point to the fact that violence in films does not derive merely from the content 
of the events but also from the way they are represented and appreciated. Death and 
rape are events that we often meet in films. However many films render them 
attractive through their representation and provides the spectator with a safe place by 
transforming him/her into a guiltless, irresponsible voyeur. In the Baby of Mâcon 
neither the representation is attractive nor the spectator is in safety. For example in 
the rape scene spectator’s attention is focused on the violent act during ten minutes 
without any editing; without making him release by looking elsewhere; point- of- 
view shots, which are one of the tools providing emotional identification are avoided; 
and in the final scene the spectator is made to think that he is also a part of 
everything, even the rape.
The fact that Greenaway, on one hand interrogates the suspension of disbelief by 
making artifice reach its height and on the other hand he deals with violence in a
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serious manner might seem conflicting in itself: How can the audience take violence 
to be serious within such an artifice which makes the suspension of disbelief 
unsustainable? How can the audience become distressed -as the reactions of the 
audience to the film in different countries show- in such a film which tries to make 
you understand that everything is the product of artifice?
I think we can explain this fact by referring to Eva Schaper’s distinction between
first-order beliefs and second-order beliefs (Boruah 55-9). Within Schaper’s
distinction first order-beliefs refer to beliefs that are imposed by the believer’s
knowledge that he is dealing with fiction whereas the second-order beliefs refer to
beliefs about characters and events in fiction, which are involved in believer’s
emotional response to the events in the fictional world. Schaper argues that first-
order beliefs imply second-order beliefs but second-order beliefs do not imply first-
order beliefs. She explains this fact as follow
Beliefs about colour patches on a canvas or a wall, words on a page, 
musical notes in a score, actors on a stage, are what first makes possible 
my beliefs about Herod, Anna Karenina, or Richard II, for exemple. But, 
my beliefs about these personages are not beliefs about canvas or wall, 
words on a page, or actors on stage. They are beliefs about the doings and 
sufferings of these characters, (qtd. in Boruah 59)
In the light of Schaper’s argument it could be said that The Baby of Mâcon make the
audience of the film have first order beliefs since they are continuously made aware
that they are dealing with fiction. Therefore it could be claimed that their feelings
about the violence does not necessarily derive from the witnessing of the sufferings
of victims. It seems rather that, as I have tried to show before, it is the fonn of
representation of the fiction which gives the violence its seriousness and which
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produce distress in the spectator. This is a representation which makes the spectator 
stand outside, examine, and think. In such a situation it is the idea, the thought 
expressed by the representation which becomes effective rather than the ‘real’ 
sufferings of the characters.
Greenaway shows us that cinematic representation is based on deception where it is
not only the actors who deceive but also the director. The Baby of Mâcon never
imply that what the audience of the film see is exactly the reality. The crucial point in
the film is not whether the actor and the actress really suffered and died or not; but
their importance, as well as the importance of the other elements of the film, lie in
the ideas they reveal and make us think about as Greenaway implies:
I would like audiences to think about movies as well as to feel the need to 
emotionally identify with their content or characters. . . I want to proselytize for 
a cinema o f  ideas without necessarily arguing for any particular idea. I’m not 
overtly a political film-maker but I suppose there is a strong political motive in 
this position, for I am arguing for cinema for its own sake, and for its ability to 
hold thought and ideas without necessarily having to use conventional 
illustrative drama, without necessarily demanding that an audience should be 
battered into suspending disbelief or that such a thing is cinema’s sole function, 
(qtd. in Hacker and Price 213)
4.3. On Narrative
Narrative is the most common tool used by dominant cinema to organize the material 
at hand. This is such an important characteristic of dominant cinema that many films, 
which do not conform the dominant conventions, have been distinguished from the 
films of dominant cinema by their being non-narrative. I think we can characterize 
the films of Peter Greenaway neither as being narrative; in the sense the films of 
dominant cinema are; nor as being totally non-narrative. However it is possible to say
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that his films problematize narrativity, in that they involve several experimentation 
with narrative and with the alternative ways of structuring the material.
Claude Brémond describes the minimal condition in which a message can be said to
have the status of narrative as follow
The message should place a subject (either animate or inanimate) at a time t, 
then a time t+n, and what becomes o f the subject at the moment t+n should 
follow the predicates characterizing it at the moment t. (qtd. in Elsaesser Early 
Cinema 68)
This definition, most importantly, points to the temporal, linear and chronological
character of narrative. Christian Metz, who similarly defines narrative as a temporal
sequence of events with a beginning and ending, points to an important function of
narrative. He argues that narrative invents ‘one time scheme in terms of another time
scheme- and that is what distinguishes narrative from simple description (which
creates space in time), as well as from the image (which creates one space in another
space).’ In order to exemplify this difference Metz gives the following example
A motionless and isolated shot o f a stretch o f desert is an image (space- 
significate - space-signifier); the several partial and successive shots o f this 
desert waste make up a description (space-significate - time signifier); several 
successive shots o f a caravan moving across the desert constitute a narrative 
(time-significate - time-signifier). (Film Language 18).
This formulation points to the fact that narrative is an economy of ordering various
elements through time. Although cinema involved a sense of narrative starting from
the films of Lumière brothers, but which are closer to image and description, it is not
possible to observe such an economy until the films of D.W. Griffith. In this sense
Griffith has been considered the inventor of narrative forms. For example in
Intolerence (1916) he managed to tell the story of four historical events that took
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place in different ages and different locations in 210 minutes by economizing on 
language-like codifications.
According to Greenaway many contemporary filmmakers are still using the same 
vocabulary used by Griffith; they are still making films that are based on novelistic 
unfolding of the plot; ‘one story at a time told chronologically’ (The Stairs Munich 
21). This seems to be the definition of narrative, which can be derived from the 
definitions of Bremond and Metz as well.
Gilles Deleuze characterizes such kinds of films with ‘organic narration’ and his 
arguments concerning organic narration provide a good insight to dominant cinema’s 
narrative as well. Organic narration, Deleuze argues, ‘consists of the development of 
sensory-motor schemata as a result of which the characters react to situations or act 
in such a way as to disclose the situation’ (127). This definition applies to the films 
of dominant cinema where the events unfold in a cause-and-effect chain, which is 
built around the psychologically motivated actions of the characters. Based on the 
previous argument, Deleuze argues that in organic narration, time is represented 
indirectly, which means that it is a consequence of action, it is dependent on 
movement and ‘no matter how disordered it is, it remains in principle a chronological 
time (128). This is quite similar to the arguments that are previously stated. Deleuze 
also points that organic narration exhibits an economy of narration, in that it uses ‘the 
simplest route, the most appropriate detour, the most effective speech, the minimum 
means for a maximum effect.’ He describes organic narration as a truthful narration
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as well, in that it claims to be true although it is a fiction. If we use Benjamin’s 
description of organic works, which I have mentioned before, we can say that organic 
narration presents itself as a totality fixed in meaning too and I think this could also 
be derived from Deleuze’s argument.
Greenaway, who continuously argues that the vocabulary of cinema is so rich that it 
cannot be slayed for the whole purpose of telling stories, which ask to be read in one 
direction, experiments with alternative ways of structuring in his films. Although it is 
possible to depict simple narratives in those films their whole structure cannot be 
reduced to just narrative. The three films that I will examine in this section involve 
several non-organic systems of structuring such as alphabet, numbers and color­
coding, which problematize the organization of time. Moreover they exliibit a 
structure, which can be characterized by a multitude of meanings and narratives, 
which can exist simultaneously. This also implies that those films do not impose a 
single reading but rather open channels through which the films can be read in many 
direction.
4.3.1. A Zed and Two Noughts
It is possible to call A Zed and Two Noughts, as well as Drowning by Numbers,
‘museum films’, which is a term used by Elliott and Purdy to refer to
those films that alongside the narrative or dramatic stmcture that pushes the 
action forward, explore alternative logics (and desires) -such as accumulation, 
saturation, seriality, taxonomy- in their representation o f the world.
They argue that
In these films, the syntagmatic (or metonymic) axis o f  plot and narrative (the 
axis o f  combination) tends to be disrupted by the paradigmatic axis o f
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selection, foregrounded by various strategies o f metaphor and display.
(Architecture and Allegory 90)
A Zed and Two Noughts involves several plots, which can also be divided into sub­
plots. The main story concerns the affairs of two twin brothers, Oswald Deuce (Brian 
Deacon) and Oliver Deuce (Eric Deacon), after the death of their wives in a car 
accident, which is caused by a swan escaped from the zoo where the two brothers 
work as animal behaviorists. In an attempt to make sense of the death of their wives 
and reduce their grief, the brothers turn to science. Oswald studies the decay of plants 
and animals through time-lapse photography, whereas Oliver watches a documentary 
entitled ‘Life on Earth’. In the meantime they visit Alba (Andrea Ferreol) who is the 
only survivor of the accident with one of her legs amputated. The sentimental and 
sexual relationship between the three, which develops in time, ends in a set of twins 
that no one knows who is the actual father. After having her second leg amputated 
Alba gives up her life and the brothers commit suicide in front of a camera, which 
will record the decay of their own bodies. However the snails covering their bodies 
and the electronic equipment around cause a breakdown of electricity and prevent the 
recording of the decay. This story can be considered as the syntagmatic axis of the 
film, which seems to consist of a simple narrative. However, as we will see, the film 
has a very rich paradigmatic axis full of metaphors opening the film to multiple 
readings.
Throughout the film we see intercuts to a little girl, Beta, the daughter of Alba, 
learning alphabet by associating letters in the alphabet with animal names; to the 
episodes from a documentary; to time-lapse photographs of decaying animals and
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fruits; and to the affairs of different characters working in the zoo: Venus de Milo, 
the zoo prostitute; the gatekeeper wearing a dark blue uniform; Van Hoyten, the 
keeper of reptiles who makes a collection of black-and-white animals; Van 
Meegeren, the surgeon who admires Vermeer; FelipeArc-en-Ciel, the legless man in 
white who is the governor of the zoo. . . These intercuts can be considered as certain 
subplots within the film, which provide the film with stmcturing elements and 
metaphors.
The plate of the car, which is crashed by the swan at the beginning of the film, 
indicates that the car’s registration number is ‘NID 26 BAV’. I think this very small 
detail that serves as a clue for what the film is about. 26 is the number of letters in the 
English alphabet; ‘BAV’ can be interpreted as the shortened version of BlackAVhite; 
and ‘NID’ means, in French, nest, in particular, and a place which is habited by 
animals, in general. If we consider the fact that the car is driven by Alba, who speaks 
English with a French accent and who also uses French words in her speech, then we 
have enough reason to interpret ‘NID’ as a French word. The film uses alphabet as a 
structuring device and alphabet can be taken here as the representative of other 
structuring or classifying systems. The film also deals with several dichotomies 
which ‘Black/White’ can be taken as the representative of Finally the film takes 
place in the zoo, which is a kind of ‘NID’.'^ The zoo, in this sense, functions as a 
connection point.
^ If we consider the fact that the swan crashing the car was pregnant and carrying eggs then the word 
‘NID’ can also be interpreted as the nest.
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The course of the film is accompanied by Beta’s citing of the letters of the alphabet 
from A to Z tlirough associating each letter with an animal name, which starts with 
that letter, as if she plays a game with the other characters: the characters ask Beta, 
‘A is for .. .? B is for . ..? ’ and Beta responds with an animal name. We do not hear 
all the letters in the film; but the letters that we hear are always in alphabetical order, 
which implies that Beta has been continuing to cite the letters while we were 
watching other things. The cuts to Beta playing the alphabet game are followed by 
Oswald’s and Oliver’s engagements with animals. For example when Beta associates 
‘B’ with butterfly we cut to Oliver freeing butterflies from a cage. When she 
associates ‘S’ with swan we cut to Oswald who studies the decay of a swan through 
time-lapse photography. In this sense the scenes of Beta mark the transitions and the 
film concludes quickly after Beta associates the final letter, ‘Z’, with zebra. The 
alphabet game establishes another time for the film. The time period the film covers 
is more than nine months; but this takes place within the time frame determined by 
the sequence of letters. This alphabet game looks like an artifice employed by 
Greenaway to make the audience continuously aware of the fact that they are 
watching a film. The letters remind the audience about the film’s progress; whether it 
is in the middle or close to the end... Whatever is told and shown in the film, it looks 
like just a fiction whose life is limited to the length of an alphabetical series.
Letters are used in another way as well. ‘Z’ is the final letter of the alphabet, but the 
first letter in the title of the film, if we reduce ‘A Zed and Two Noughts’ to ‘ZOO’. 
Throughout the film a blue ‘ZOO’ sign in the form of neon lights. In the end of the
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film -after Beta associates ‘Z’ with zebra- in the scene where Venus de Milo enters 
into the zebra enclosure, the ‘ZOO’ sign is seen in the background from behind. 
However there is something that looks wrong with the sign; the sing is seen in the 
form of ‘OOZ’. Since the letters in the sign are seen from behind ‘Z’ should be 
backwards. Perhaps the sign is not seen from behind but just the order of the letters 
has changed; perhaps in the end of the film they have also been ordered 
alphabetically. This might be another way of expressing that the film has reached its 
end; with the ordering of the letters in its title alphabetically. This situation, I think, 
also questions the way we make sense of signs. We think that ‘OOZ’ refers to ‘ZOO’ 
seen from behind because we interpret the former by comparing it to the latter one, 
which is the one we are accustomed to see throughout the film. If we have seen 
‘OOZ’ for the first time then we probably would not think that it is ‘ZOO’ seen from 
behind. There is another play with the ‘ZOO’ sign at the beginning of the film as 
well. In the scene where Oliver cries at the location of the accident we see the letters 
in the blue ‘ZOO’ sign slowly fading. When ‘Z’ fades we are left with two ‘O’s, 
which do not form any word, but which can be interpreted as the first letters in 
‘Oliver’ and ‘Oswald’. When one of the ‘O’s fades too we are left with a single ‘O’, 
which can be either a letter or a number, zero. The films ending implies that both of 
these are possible. After Oliver and Oswald are informed by Alba that they are 
Siamese twins they become more and more similar to each other in terms of their 
appearances and in the end they wear a single suit, which, in a way, unites the two. In 
other words The two ‘O’s of the film become one ‘O’ in the end. However this single 
‘O’ is also equal to zero, in that the brothers attempts to make sense of death
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becomes vain and they commit suicide. All these show that every time there is a 
change in the order of the letters of the ‘ZOO’ sign there is also a change in our 
interpretation of it. We are always able to attribute new meanings to the new 
orderings.
The references to alphabet, the letters and the way they are ordered to create meaning 
is in fact a critique of structures, classification systems, and the attempts to make 
sense of the world through such structures and systems, which remain too shallow. 
All the characters in the film try to attribute some meaning to things through different 
engagements. The film establishes several binary oppositions out of those 
engagements such as life/death, creation/evolution, religion/science, real/fake, 
black/white, light/dark. I think the film’s dealing with twinship and its heavily 
symmetrical compositions are another expression of its engagement with 
dichotomies.
As it is stated before Oliver and Oswald turn to science in order to find an answer to 
the death of their wives. The documentary entitled ‘Life on Earth’ watched by Oliver 
and the decaying plants and animals studied by Oswald, which remind of 
Muybridge’s examination of the movement of bodies, are direct references to the 
theory of evolution. Amy Lawrence observes that decay films seen in the film 
represents the stages of evolution described by Darwin: ‘1) vegetable (apple),
2)crustacean (prawn), 3) fish (angelfish), 4) amphibious reptile (crocodile), birds
'^0(swan), small mammals (dog), large mammals (zebra)’ (93)/ The engagement of
20 The names in the parentheses refer to the decay films in the film.
122
the brothers can be contrasted as the examination of life and death as well. The 
evolution theory is also confronted with the creation myth: The brothers speculate 
about Adam and Eve after the death of their wives; Van Hoyten, the gatekeeper, 
mocks with evolution theory by stating ‘Darwin was a good storyteller. God it’s all 
such a dreary fiction.’
Another dichotomy in the film is between black and white. The characters are 
dressed in monoclirome colors. Milo and Van Hoyten are always seen in black suits; 
Alba in white, the assistant of Van Meegeren in red -but she reveals to Oscar and 
Beta that she prefers black-and-white stripped knickers. Felipe Arc-en-Ciel (rainbow 
in French) wears white suits but his name refers to a spectrum of colors, which are 
produced with the diffraction of white light. Moreover the zoo authorities stock the 
zoo with black and white animals, and kill the ones that do not fit in this category.
Another system in the film, which produces metaphorical meanings, is mythology. It 
is possible to interpret the zoo as a mythological universe where we meet the Roman 
mythological characters such as Jupiter (Zeus), Leda, Castor, Pollux (Pollydeuces),
Venus (Aphrodite), Mercury (Hermesj, Neptune (Poseidon), Pluto (Hades).21
Richmond Y. Hathom, in his book entitled Greek Mythology, writes that
Zeus had chosen Leda to be the mother o f his children, and to trick her he 
pretended to be a swan pursued by an eagle, and when the tender-hearted Leda 
had given protection to the swan, he had his way with her. That very night Leda 
lay with her mortal husband; in due time she gave birth to the immortal 
Polydeuces and the mortal Castor. (346)
The names in the parentheses refer to the equivalents of the Roman characters in Greek mythology.
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Alba, Felipe Arc-en-Ciel, Oliver and Oswald in the film can be considered as Leda, 
Zeus, Polydeuces, which is Romanized as Pollux (Hathom 82), and Castor in the 
story above respectively. The swan crashing the car in the film is called Leda too and 
we are informed that she was pregnant. I think we can interpret Alba, who lays both 
with Felipe and the brothers and who gives birth to a set of twins, as the new Leda in 
the film. The surname of the brothers is ‘Deuce’, which is a part of ‘Polydeuces’. 
Moreover one of the them engages in death -watching decay films- and the other in 
life -watching ‘Life on Earth’-. Therefore they can be taken as representing mortality 
and immortality like Castor and Pollux. Felipe Arc-en-Ciel, whose name involves a 
reference to the sky and light, represents Zeus. Hathom writes that the Indo-European 
name of Zeus means ‘Bright (Sky)’ and that he was hence a ‘Sky-Father’ (9). 
Moreover he is legless like Alba whom he lays with. I think this situation is similar 
to Zeus’ laying with Leda, who is a swan, in the guise of a swan like her. However 
we know that Oliver and Oswald are not the sons of Leda and Felipe. Moreover as 
there is more than one Leda, there is more than one Castor and Pollux so there is no 
one to one relation between the mythological story and the film. I think this is not a 
problem because I do not think that Greenaway’s aim is to repeat the same 
mythological story in the film, but it is rather to open channels which provide with 
multiple point of views and multiple readings which can exist simultaneously.
The other characters in the zoo can be associated with mythological characters as 
well. Venus de Milo can be taken as Venus, the love goddess (Hathom 228). Van 
Hoyten, who wears a black suit and who collects black and white animals and who is
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the keeper of reptiles, can be taken as Pluto, the god of underworld and death 
(Hathom 88). The gatekeeper, whom Oliver calls ‘everybody’s pimp and messenger’ 
can be taken as Mercury, ‘the raider of herds as well as their guardian’ (Hathom 
192), who ‘appears as messenger of the gods both in The Iliad and in The Odyssey’ 
(Hathom 191). There is also a keeper of fish who can be considered as being Neptune 
‘the chief god of the see’ (Hathom 112) and there is the surgeon. Van Meegeren, who 
can be considered as a ‘trickster god’ and who has a very important function in the 
film. Hathom writes that
As mankind looks toward the superhuman forces that shape his fate he has 
tendency to believe in existence o f  a spirit o f  perversity, o f  mischief, o f  
opposition contrary to the universal order established by the supreme god . . .  In 
many mythologies this spirit is personified in the Trickster, a picaresque and 
lustful figure who often takes animal form and always delights in deception. 
(189)
We are informed by Alba’s words that Van Meegeren ‘is the cousin of the faker of 
the fake Vermeers.’ He is also an admirer of Vermeer and he attempts to reproduce 
his Vermeer’s paintings through making Alba and his assistant look like certain 
female characters in Vermeer’s paintings. His interest in forgery and deception is 
expressed in another way as well. He offers Alba with a fake leg -prosthesis-, which 
she refuses. He is also a faker of animals. Based on these facts it could be argued that 
Van Meegeren is the ‘trickster god’ of the zoo whose job is deception and hence 
represents the opposite of the other mythological gods in the zoo -the film.
Greenaway can also be considered as a faker of Vermeer, in that he decorates the sets 
of the film with reproductions of Vermeer paintings and he reproduces Vermeer’s 
lighting in the film (qtd. in Woods 245). The fact that Van Meegeren is presented as
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a surgeon who admires a painter recalls Benjamin’s distinction between ‘painter- 
magician’ and ‘cameraman-surgeon’. It could be argued that Greenaway is also a 
surgeon like Van Meegeren, in that one cuts and stitches bodies and the other texts 
and images. Moreover the fact that Greenaway’s film consists of multiple fragments 
that can be arranged in many ways rather than of an organic whole, implies that
Greenaway wants to play the role of ‘cameraman-surgeon’ rejecting the role of
'^ 2‘painter-magician’.“
Consequently, it is not only the characters in A Zed and Two Noughts who try to 
order life and make sense of it through different patterns, classification systems. 
Greenaway also orders his film through such systems. However his works 
emphasizes at the same time the weakness or limitedness of such attempts in the face 
of an infinite variety of things and meanings. Van Hoyten cannot find an answer to 
the question whether a zebra is a black animal with white stripes or a white animals 
with black stripes because his system of ordering is based only to black/white 
dichotomy. Oliver’s and Oswald’s attempts to understand death through decay and 
Darwinian evolution is helpless in the face of death itself Even the last experiment 
they set up is failed by nature, by the snails, which are described by Oliver as a 
‘primitive life form’. The snails not only disrupts the experiment but also the film, 
rejecting its attempt to order. When the snails cover the bodies of the brothers and all 
the electronic equipment around, including the record player they cause a short- 
circuit, which slowly distorts the music in the record and finally stops it. However it
Remember Benjamin’s argument that in the case o f ‘cameraman-surgeon’ the picture obtained does 
not consist of a whole, contrary to the case of ‘painter-magician’, but of ‘multiple fragments which 
are assembled under a new law’ (The Work of Art 234)
126
must be noted that it is not only the ‘Teddy Bears’ Picnic’ song -which has been 
playing by the record at the moment of the experiment- which is distorted by the 
snails but also the music of the film that we have been hearing throughout the film.
Christian Metz argues that every narrative is a discourse made by someone (Film 
Language 20) and that this is also true of filmic narrative by referring to Albert 
Laffay’s Logic du Cinéma. He states that the spectator perceives images which have 
been selected and arranged like the pictures in an album. However, he argues, it is 
not he who is turning the pages but the film itself which is spoken by some author 
(not necessarily the author of the film) behind (Film Language 21). I think A Zed and 
Two Noughts challenges such a structure. It is true that the film offers a series of 
pictures selected and arranged before, in that sense it can be considered as an album. 
However the system, which seems to hold these pictures together, is as simple as an 
alphabetical series. This simplicity suggests that the order it exhibits is too arbitrary 
and invites the spectator to search between the pages of the album and see how many 
new worlds and meanings, which are far different from and richer than the 
appearances on the surface, can be constructed. In this sense the film, in my opinion, 
invites the spectator to be the author of the film.
4.3.2. Drowning by Numbers
Drowning by Numbers structurally is very similar to A Zed and Two Noughts. The 
main story revolves around three women, all named Cissie Colpitts -grandmother, 
mother and granddaughter (Joan Plowright, Joely Richardson, Juliet Stevenson) who
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drown their unsatisfactory husbands and conceal the crimes with the help of the local 
coroner, Madgett (Bernard Hill) who declares the drownings to be accidents while 
expecting some sexual gratification in return from each woman. When Madgett 
cannot get what he has expected and hence decides to reveal the truth the women 
drown him as well. Although that seems to be the main story, the film is mostly 
about numbers, which are the main structuring devices of the film.
03
The film starts with a teenage girl who names and counts the stars while skipping." 
After counting a hundred she stops. When the oldest Cissie asks why she stopped she 
answers that, ‘a hundred is enough. Once you’ve counted a hundred, all other 
hundreds are the same.’ This scene functions as a prologue to the film, which gives a 
clue about the course of the film both in terms of its structure and its main story. 
For example the first name she assigns is ‘Antares’, which sounds like ‘Anteros’, ‘the 
god who represented the requital of love or revenge for love unrequited’ (Hathom 
102). If we consider the fact that the women drown their husbands due to their 
unsatisfactoriness in ternis of love then the name of the first star looks like a small 
clue for the film. Like the girl, the film also counts from 1 to 100. Throughout the 
course of the film we either see the numbers placed or written arbitrarily on objets, 
bodies in the scenes or we hear them in the dialogues. We see 1 on a tree just after 
the title of the film disappears and 100 on the boat, which is about to cause Madgett’s 
drowning -which is also the last image of the film. The numbers between are seen or
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The names she assigns to the stars are not real names. They look like random names which include 
characters’ names in Greenaway’s other films such as Kracklite, Spica, Hoyten; artists’ names like 
Kitaj, Kruger; mythological names and several others.
The fact that the title of the film is superimposed after this scene strengthens the idea that the 
skipping girl’s counting of the starts is a prologue.
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heard always in strict order throughout the course of the film. In this sense it could be 
argued that the numbers in this film serve the same function with the letters of the 
alphabet in A Zed and Two Noughts. Greenaway’s argument on the use of numbers 
in Drowning by Numbers is that
Narrative and number count both propel the film along -the narrative obeying 
the free-will choices made by the characters, and the implacable number-count 
-the limits o f free-choice. However freewill is exercised -there are severe 
limitations. The boundaries are invariably marked. tFear o f Drowning 7).
The same argument could be made for the letters in A Zed and Two Noughts too. In
that sense it seems that in both films it is not the characters’ freewill and actions,
which determine the limits of the course of the film -contrary to organic narratives-
but it is the film materialized in the form of alphabet or number count, which
determines the limits of the actions of the characters. Although sometimes the
spectator might lose the track of the numbers by getting involved in the events the
numbers always find a way to remind the spectator that they are there and counting.
Beside telling a simple story three times -a wife drowning her husband- the film 
introduces us to games, which are always organized by numbers and which are based 
on counting. This is achieved mainly tlirough the Smut character (Jason Edwards) 
and his father Madgett. Madgett devises a series of games with complicated rules and 
regulations. Brueghel’s painting entitled Children’s Games stands beside his bed as if 
it is his inspiration when inventing games. Smut imitates his father in two ways. 
First he is also engaged in corpses, in that he counts and collects them. Second he 
invents games by interpreting the events around him as if they are games with rules
25 This is only one of the paintings used in the film to make an association. For example there is also 
Ruben’s Samson and Delilah, which associates the vulnerability of man to woman.
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and regulations. He even turns the deaths into games by recording them in his 
notebook with special marks, taking their photographs and celebrating every death 
with fireworks. There are several games in the film that people play such as 
Deadman’s Catch, Hangsman’s Cricket, Tug of War. While we see people playing a 
game we hear Smut’s overvoice describing the game, its purpose and instructing the 
rules. However Smut’s overvoice is not heard only during the games but throughout 
the course of the film, which implies that everything we see in the film can be easily 
transformed into games. Smut is able to name every event as if it is a game and 
sometimes as if he is the only player of the game. He is also a cataloguer. He divides 
the days of the week into ‘yellow paint days’ and ‘red paint days’, which looks again 
like a game.
When we look from the point of view of Smut we see that even the drownings can be 
interpreted as a game based on counting. The first Cissie counts until three when 
drowning her husband, and when all drownings are taken together they can be 
interpreted as a game of counting the drownings. The film, in a way, tells the stoiy of 
a woman drowning a man three times. Each drowning is followed by the same 
sequence of events, which form a triplet, as well: autopsy, funeral, (un)reckoning in 
the car. Moreover after a while the drownings become more and more unreasonable 
and arbitrary. The last two drownings give the impression that they have taken place 
to complete a sequence, which is initiated by the first one.
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The film also looks like a game of counting that Greenaway plays with the spectator.
It is him who sets the rules and who determines when it begins end ends. The
spectator can engage himself in seeking the numbers scattered throughout the frames
and the text in order to count. When he/she counts a fifty he/she knows that there
remains another fifty to count and when he/she reaches at hundred he/she
accomplishes the game. In this sense it could be argued that the film emphasizes its
being an artificial construct based on several rules as well. Greenaway suggests that
Cinema is like an elaborate game with rules. The aim o f the game is to 
successfully suspend disbelief. The audience has been well trained over some 
eighty years o f practice. Necessary circumstances are darkness and a bright 
projection -bulb and a screen. The audience agree to enter a dark space and sit 
facing in one direction. They will be prepared to sit for some two hours - 
usually in the evenings. /Fear o f Drowning 83)
Greenaway’s description, which sounds like Smut’s description of the games in the
film, points to the fact that films are in general games. However it refers mostly to
the films of dominant cinema as games of suspension of disbelief
This heavy reference to games does not seem to be based on an arbitrary decision by 
Greenaway. A game is based on numbering, counting, classifying, and in that sense it 
is a matter of ordering. The film ironically implies that all human effort to organize 
life into meaningful patterns and sequences through restrictions, classifications, 
predictions, rules can be called ‘games’ people play. For Greenaway what we call 
civilization is a set of ‘elaborate conventions, rules and games’ (Fear of Drowning 7). 
We can also interpret the civilization as a game whose object is to impose order on 
chaos. However the film; throughout the Smut character, who is able to impose any 
kind of pattern on events, and Madgett character, who is able to construct any kind of
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narration for the events around him -like the drownings; implies that the number of 
theories, patterns and systems that can be applied to the facts are almost infinite. In 
this sense it could be claimed that the film mocks with the idea of ordering. It even 
mocks with the filmic narrative, which is another effort to order, by using numbers as 
a device for structuring the course of the film.
Although all the characters in the film participate into some kind of game it is mainly 
Smut and Madgett who construct and run those games, those organizing systems. 
However in the end they both become the losers. I think Smut and Madgett’s 
situations do not differ much from those of Neville in The Draughtsman’s Contract. 
Kracklite in The Belly of an Architect, Oswald and Oliver in A Zed and Two 
Noughts, and Albert Spica in The Cook. The Thief. His Wife and Her Lover, all of 
whom represent male characters engaged in imposing order on things in their own 
way but who fail in the end and become the losers. However despite the humiliations 
and exploitation they are subjected to by men the female characters in those films 
become the winners in the end like the three Cissies in Drowning by Numbers who 
can also be interpreted as one woman at three stages of her life. Several people have 
interpreted Greenaway’s films as simple stories of men defeated by women. This is a 
recurrent theme in Greenaway’s films but I think it is not quite right to interpret this 
theme so literally. In my opinion this ‘men defeated by women’ formula is Just a 
metaphor, among many others, of the struggle between man and nature, which is one 
of the major topics Greenaway deals with. In his films women are associated with 
nature and reproduction whereas men are associated with ordering and production.
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Moreover women are also presented as being one of the subjects/objects of men’s 
effort to control, order and dominate. In that sense the victory of women over men in 
Greenaway’s films can be interpreted as the victory of nature over human attempts to 
discipline it; in other words the victory of nature over culture and civilization.
Drowning by Numbers starts with the skipping girl who counts the stars, which are 
the most common metaphor of endlessness. Then Smut counts the hairs of a dog, 
leaves of a tree, which are not much different from counting the stars. The film 
continuously refers to the weakness of counting in the face of endless things to count. 
This idea is not expressed only through the attempts of the characters but also 
through the representation. The detailed frames, which are full of big and small 
inanimate objects as well as fmits and insects, recall the still-life paintings of 
seventeenth-centuiy Dutch Art. Still life paintings exhibit a universe, which extends 
towards small details suggesting variety and richness and endlessness. Norbert 
Schneider points to an important difference of these paintings from their 
contemporaries. He writes that
‘such paintings did not accord with the current notions of a dignified order -an order 
that should follow the etiquette of absolute monarchies and proclaim the sublime as a 
standard for all artistic endeavor (7). When we look at those paintings we see that 
they are dominated by objects, fruits, animals, insects, and ordinary people engaged 
in daily works rather than highly meaningful religious motifs. They look as if they do 
not try to convey any messages, or any major truth. They exhibit such a variety and
26 Schneider also points that still life paintings were given the lowest rank within the hierarchy of the 
genres of painting for some time.
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richness that they resist meaning.^^ In that sense the inclusion of still lifes into the 
representation in Drowning bv Numbers seems to be quite meaningful within the 
framework of the matter the film deals with. People’s simple systems of counting 
and organizing turn into vanity in the face of the variety and endlessness of things
themselves.28
4.3.3. The Cook, the Thief, his Wife and her Lover
The Cook, the Thief, his Wife, and her Lover has been considered as the film by 
which Greenaway has come closest to mainstream cinema by several critics. This 
was mainly due to the relatively clear and direct story of the film. However although 
the film has a simple revenge story at its core its way of handling the story is not so 
simple. Moreover this is not the only story in the film and the film’s narrative is quite 
distinct from the narratives of mainstream cinema, in that it opens to a variety of 
other stories through metaphors and structuring devices rather than exhibiting an 
organic whole.
The action mainly takes place in a French restaurant, ‘Le Hollandais’, which is 
owned by Albert Spica (Michael Gambon) and which offers a wide variety of foods 
prepared by the head cook, Richard (Richard Bohringer). Albert is a rude leader who
I know that ‘Vanitas’ type still life paintings do not confirm that argument, in that they are assigned 
a fixed meaning. They have been considered as conveying the message that despite all material 
richness everything is transitory in the face of death itself Here with the term still life I refer to the 
types other than Vanitas.
The film uses another aspect of still life too, which is ‘trompe I’oeir: a play between ‘what appears 
to be there’ and ‘what we know to be there’. For example in the scene where Madgett takes the 
photographs of Smut in his room the oldest Cissie appears suddenly in the room with the flash of the 
camera. As another exempla, when the number 50, which is in the form of a large yellow marker on 
the beach at Cissie two’s house, is seen from behind it looks like 05 but 5 should be backwards.
28
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cornes to the restaurant every night with his wife Georgina (Helen Mirren) and his 
cronies, and who tries to show off his richness and power by talking about everything 
he knows or does not know, and disturbing all the people around. On the first night 
they eat in the restaurant Georgina, who always look bored, notices a man who has 
been reading book while having his dinner on a comer. The man, Michael (Alan 
Howard), catches the eye of Georgina and soon they start a sexual relationship first in 
the lavatory and then, with the aid of Richard, in various parts of the kitchen. After a 
while Albert becomes aware of their relationship and the lovers flee to a book 
depository where Michael works. Albert finds Michael and kills him in the absence 
of Georgina by making one of his cronies ram the pages of a book -Michael’s 
favorite book on French Revolution- down his throat with the handle of a wooden 
spoon. Georgina, in an attempt to take revenge , convinces Richard to cook the body 
of Michael and forces Albert to taste it. After Albert takes a piece of meat from 
Michael’s cooked body to his mouth Georgina kills him with a gun.
The film starts with a crane shot, during which the camera moves up from stray dogs 
to two uniformed ushers who open the curtains. What we see during this crane shot, 
between the stray dogs and the curtains, is certain metallic constn.ictions, which look 
like a scaffold in a film set. Therefore the opening shot gives the impression that 
what we are ready to see is a play within a film. This seems to be one of the 
strategies of Greenaway to reveal the artifice behind the film and make the audience 
remember that they are not watching a slice of life, the film ends with curtains
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closing and it is structured as if it consists of seven acts, which are indicated by the
insertion of the shots of the restaurant’s daily menu.29
It seems that Greenaway has been influenced by seventeenth-century Dutch still life
paintings in his arrangement of the frames. The restaurant, especially the kitchen,
looks as if it is homage to Dutch art with the still life objects it depicts. I think there
is also a connection between the name of the restaurant, ‘Le Hollandais’, which
means Dutch in French, and the Dutch art it refers to. It seemed to me that the aim of
this reference extends beyond a mere repetition of art history in the film. Dutch still
life paintings have been praised in general for their realistic look, which was
considered to be resulting from the representational skill of the painter; from his skill
in imitating nature. However there have been also alternative interpretations of still
lifes such as Celeste Bursati who argues that those paintings are in fact the product of
an artifice, which is naturalized in the final outcome. Bursati criticizes the realist
view of still life for its failure to acknowledge that ‘contrary to the fictions the
paintings purvey, still lifes do not record as much as they remake the material world
for particular kinds of visual consumption’ (145). He argues that
artists draw attention to this naturalizing artifice by emphasizing particularizing 
details such as tiny veins delicately enumerated on the petal o f  a flower, the 
complex play o f light as it passes through and reflects o ff o f  glass and 
metalware, or the telling highlight that reveals the differentiated textures o f  
lemon peel, grape skin, nutshell, engraved silver, or plush velvet. (145)
It is possible to observe a parallelism between the discussion the nature of
representation in still life paintings and the discussion on the nature of cinematic
29 The use of the days of the week seems to have a similar function with the use of numbers in 
Drowning by Numbers and letters in A Zed and Two Noughts.
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representation in terms of their relation to reality. In this sense still life seems to 
provide an appropriate metaphor for cinema and I guess Greenaway, in The Cook, 
the Thief. His Wife, and Her Lover, implies such a relationship between still life and 
cinema as well since reality/artifice formulation is one of the apparent dealings of the 
film.
The film, like A Zed and Two Noughts and Drowning by Numbers, presents with 
characters who have some system by which they try to order life. For exempla the 
kitchen is the site of such a system, in that it is a place where some raw materials are 
shaped and transformed into products of culture. Richard is the head of this system. 
If his system of ordering is cooking Albert’s system of ordering is eating. All of his 
actions, including his cruelties, could be associated with eating. It could be said that 
Greenaway’s ordering system is -more important than the days of the week- color­
coding.
All the locations we see in the film are coded with the hues of a particular color: The 
parking-lot with blue, the kitchen with green, the restaurant with red, the lavatories 
with white, the hospital and the book depository with the hues of yellow. Among 
those places, the action mostly takes place in the kitchen, the restaurant and the 
lavatories with characters moving between. The passage from one place to the other 
is not given through cuts but with the lateral tracking of the camera, as if the places 
are continuous on a linear line and have only three walls. Among the characters, 
Georgina’s, Albert’s and his cronies’ outfits change in color as well, as they move
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between the kitchen, the restaurant, and the lavatories. For exempla in the first scene 
in the parking-lot Georgina and Albert dispute about the color of Georgina’s outfit. 
Albert claims that it is black whereas Georgina states that it is blue. In fact it is dark 
blue. Albert and his cronies wear blue sashes on their black suits. When they move 
into the kitchen Georgina’s outfit changes into green as well as Albert’s and other’s 
sashes, and when they move to the restaurant they change into red respectively. In 
the lavatories they become white. Each time those characters move between those 
places, a part of their outfits change in color and takes the color of the place 
throughout the film.
The color codification in terms of the places and costumes has several functions in 
the film. First the bodies of the actors look like one of the compositional elements of 
the representation rather than being totally transformed into characters which move 
the action forward. Second they produce a sense of artifice. Third the color 
codification interrupts the narrative by distracting the attention from the story to the 
formal changes in the film. It also offers the spectator room for becoming 
intellectually involved in the film by encouraging him to produce meanings from the 
fragments. For example it is only Richard and Michael -among the main characters- 
whose costumes do not change in color and these are the characters who are not 
dominated by Albert as much as the other characters. Based on that the change in the 
color of other characters’ costumes can be interpreted as a metaphorical way of 
representing Albert’s sphere of influence.
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Although the film, on the surface, covers seven days of the week it has been argued
that it refers to a wide range of history through the organization of the places by
certain critics. Leon Steinmetz interprets the historical associations of the places as a
‘joke on human progress.’ He suggests that
The kitchen with its cast-iron stoves, huge cauldrons, dismembered fowls, and 
‘food o f all sorts and in all stages o f preparation’ -is the eighteenth century, 
simultaneously pastoral and savage; the Dinning Room, upholstered in opulent 
fabrics, gleaming with porcelain and silver, is the nineteenth century -lush, 
wealthy, and industrial; and the surgically sterile, futuristic Lavatory- is our 
modem times. (100)
I think the color codification of those three places is also a supporting factor for such 
an interpretation.
Another sub-theme, which can be read throughout the film, is the creation myth. 
Seven days of the film can be considered as the seven days of creation. Naked lovers, 
Georgina and Michael, making love in several parts of the kitchen remind of Adam 
and Eve. The film supports the idea that Albert is the evil both through his 
personality and through a word play that we observe in the scene where Georgina, 
Albert and his cronies move from the parking-lot to the kitchen after Roy has been 
tortured. When they enter into the kitchen Albert’s cronies, in the background of the 
scene, join the pieces of a neon sign, which consists of letters. First the pieces joined 
make the word ‘ASPIC’, which refers to a poisonous snake in French. Later one of 
Albert’s cronies changes the place of ‘A’ moving it to the end of the word. The sign 
turns into ‘SPICA’, the surname of Albert. Based on that Albert could be considered 
as representing the evil serpent, which led to the fall of Adam and Eve from the 
Garden of Eden by making them eat the apple of the tree of knowledge. In fact the
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parts of the kitchen where the lovers meet can be taken as the Garden of Eden and 
their movement from the kitchen, which has also a religious atmosphere due to the 
songs of Pup, into the van full of rotten meats -whose driver is also called Eden- can 
be read as the Fall from Eden. If we consider the fact that all human suffering has 
started with eating -eating the apple- then the creation myth becomes an appropriate 
metaphor for the film, which has eating at its core which can further be interpreted as
a metaphor for the capitalist society.30
As I have tried to show even The Cook, the Thief, his Wife and her Lover, which is
supposed to be the most straightforward film of Greenaway, is marked with multiple
meanings and readings, which are opened by a multilayered organization of the
material at hand through several formal codes, structures, and metaphors. I have
previously borrowed the term ‘museum films’ from Elliott and Purdy to describe A
Zed and Two Noughts and Drowning by Numbers. The same term applies to The
Cook, the Thief, his Wife, and her Lover as well. I think these films resemble also to
Borges’ ’Chinese encyclopedia' that is quoted in Foucault’s preface to The Order of
Things. The passage refers to a classification of animals (taxonomy):
Animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) 
tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in 
the present classification, (I) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very 
fine camelhair brush (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) 
that from a long way off look like flies, (xv)
The passage, according to Foucault, demonstrates another system of thought, which 
at the same time points to the limitation of the conventional system of thought.
30 The film has been widely interpreted as a critic of Thatcherian capitalism by several critics as well 
(Lawrence 166).
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The ‘animals’ in this taxonomy, seem to be classified randomly; according to some 
random preferences and characteristics. As Foucault argues, the only thing that 
makes the taxonomy a system that links the categories to one another is the 
alphabetical enumeration, which exists only within the space of language. In this 
sense the taxonomy sounds like an irony on the conventional way human thought 
orders things by dividing them into categories on the basis of their similarities and 
differences, and suggests the possibility of an unlimited number of other 
arrangements.
The impression given by the organizing systems Greenaway uses in his films is 
similar to that of Borges’ Chinese encyclopedia. The three films I have mentioned in 
this section have simple skeletal structures, which links the parts of the films to one 
another such as the alphabet, numbers, days of a week, color-coding. These 
structures, like the letters in Borges’s Chinese encyclopedia, can be considered as an 
irony of the systems of ordering created by men. However the meanings those films 
present do not have any clear relationship between themselves. They seem to belong 
to different levels of thinking, different logics, different organizing systems like the 
categories in the Chinese encyclopedia.
Those films suggest that anything that move forward, like 1-2-3 or A-B-C or 
Monday-Tuesday-Wednesday, can be considered as a narrative. However they show 
that cinema is able to hold multiple meanings as well and that a simple narrative, one
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story told chronologically, seems to be too easy in the face of such a multiplicity and 
richness. As the films imply, it is not only too easy but also illusory in the face of the 
complexities and multiplicity in life. The narratives of dominant cinema consist of 
single stories, which describe the world as something knowable, coherent, and 
continuous. They imply that, despite the difficulties, there is always a way to 
discipline or order it through well-directed human action. In this context 
Greenaway’s films can be considered as the expressions of a revolt against such a 
reductionist illusion both on the level of the content and the form in cinematic 
representation.
4.4. On the Image, the Text, the Frame, the Chronology
Greenaway mentions his dissatisfaction with the limitation of cinema in the 
catalogue of his exhibition entitled The Stairs Munich Projection. Three of them 
concern the frame, the narrative and the audience. He argues that the persistence of a 
rectangular frame with a fixed aspect-ratio, which functions as a unifying element in 
a film, when coupled with the dominance of a linear and clironological narrative, 
which is under the ultimate control of the director, produces a passive audience 
whose ability of personal interpretation is reduced to the minimum (19-24).
Greenaway posits the existence of the rectangular frame in cinema, which does not 
exists in nature, as a factor which challenges the Bazinian idea that cinema is a 
window onto the world. His films -the ones I examined so far- exhibit a 
consciousness of the frame, in that they continuously drawing attention to the limits
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of the frame through symmetrical compositions arranged according to those limits. 
Having recognized its persistence, Greenaway questions the flat, two-dimensional 
and fixedly proportional aspect of the cinematic frame. One of the specific questions 
he asks in relation to this matter is ‘whether the frame can be changed at will to 
complement its content’ CThe Stairs Munich 20).
Another question he asks is ‘whether cinema can deal with simultaneity of action’ 
through ways other than simple split screens showing events like telephone 
conversation; and with the simultaneity of different perspectives as opposed to the 
chronological progress of the events and the shot/ reverse-shot formulation in a linear 
narrative (The Stairs Munich 21). This question could also be formulated as whether 
it is possible to reorganize filmic space in a Cubist manner.
It seemed to me that these questions; which can also be considered as a searche for an 
active audience who is given enough opportunity to (re)imagine and to (re)interpret; 
lie at the core of Prospero’s Books and The Pillow Book. In both films Greenaway 
experiments with different organizations of the filmic space by means of 
sophisticated video post-production techniques, including high-defmition television 
(HDTV) and the digital Paint Box. The images layered one upon the other, frames 
with different aspect ratios superimposed one within the other, multiple screens, texts 
superimposed on images are some of the experimentations, which serve in 
Greenaway’s films to produce multiple spaces, to rearrange the chronology, and to 
unsettle the hierarchical relationship between the image and the text.
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It could be said that these two films are in the form of mise-en-page rather than shots 
connected to one another in a seamless way, and that they reflect the painterly and 
writerly attitude of Greenaway. Based on that it is possible to establish a parallelism 
between Greenaway’s view of the cinematic representation in these films and 
Alexandre Astruc’s view of the cinema as caméra stylo. The term caméra stylo, 
which is coined by Astruc in the 1950s, refers to cinema as a type of free writing-in­
movement which is freed from its ties to theatrical or novelistic narrative and 
Bazinian realism. He states
I would like to call this new age o f cinema the age o f caméra stylo. By it I 
mean that the cinema will gradually break free from the tyranny o f what is 
visual, from the image for its own sake, from immediate and concrete demands 
o f narrative, to become a means o f writing just as flexible and subtle as written 
language, (qtd. in Oswald 248)
It could be concluded out of this passage that Astruc’s view of cinematic 
representation, which is summarized in the term caméra stylo, differs significantly 
from his contemporary, Bazin’s view of the cinematic representation. Astruc 
emphasizes the relationship between the elements in the film frame which is open to 
free manipulation of the filmmaker whereas Bazin emphasizes the importance of 
seizing visual reality in the film image. Laura Oswald who formulates the term 
cinema-graphia out of Astruc’s caméra stylo compares the approaches of Bazin and 
Astruc to cinema as follow
Bazin claimed that the origins o f cinema in photography determined a priori 
subservience o f film discourse to the laws o f photographic realism, including 
the codes shaping an illusion o f unbroken space and a coherent and complete 
composition within the frame. Astruc, on the other hand, shifted focus away 
from the image as such to the movement between sounds and images in the 
film chain, suggesting means o f locating the ‘essence’ o f cinema in the play o f  
difference and contrast between elements o f film enunciation. (249)
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Oswald, setting out from Astruc’s caméra stylo develops the term cinema-graphia
and suggests it as an alternative for the term cinematography. She argues that
whereas the conventional term ‘cinematography’ names ‘the art or science of 
motion-picture photography’, ‘cinema-graphia’ names a kind o f writing freed 
from the tyranny o f the image for its own sake . . .
Rather than signifying a theory and practice o f cinema founded on the presence 
o f meaning to consciousness within the frame, cinema-graphia designates a 
theory and practice o f cinema focused on relations between elements o f the 
enunciation, across û it frame. (250)
Both Astruc’s caméra stylo and Oswald’s cinema-graphia emphasize the use of the 
camera not just as an implement for recording reality or for producing an organic 
whole where meaning lies in totality but as an implement for shaping meaning across 
the filmic space. In that sense their view of the cinematic representation involve the 
use of the camera freely like the pen used by a writer.
Astruc’s ideas about cinematic representation have been influential on the directors
of French New Wave movement and I think it is possible to observe such an
influence on Greenaway as well. When talking about the use of digital Paint Box in
Prospero’s Books and The Pillow Book Greenaway states that
This machine, as its name suggests links the vocabulary o f electronic picture 
making with the traditions o f the artist’s pen, palette and brush, and like them 
permits a personal signature, (qtd. in Elliott and Purdy, Peter Greenaway and 
Technologies o f Representation 21)
As the statement points out the digital Paint Box endows the filmmaker with the 
freedom of manipulating the relationship between the elements in the filmic space in 
the way he/she desires and this is what Astruc’s emphasizes with caméra stylo.
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4.4.1. Prospero’s Books
Prospero’s Books is an adaptation of Shakespeare’s last play, The Tempest, to 
cinema. At first look such an adaptation by Greenaway might seem to be in conflict 
with his criticism that ‘cinema is still mimicking theater . . .  It is still in the business 
of transferring text into film’ fThe Stairs Munich 13). However Greenaway, in 
Prospero’s Books, provides a ‘cinematic’ commentary for Shakespeare’s text rather 
than simply transferring the dramatic story of the play into images, and in this sense 
the film differs from several other adaptations of Shakespeare’s -and other writers’- 
plays to cinema, which do not add almost anything ‘cinematic’ except transferring 
texts into images. Those adaptations generally use almost the same vocabulary with 
the text whereas Prospero’s Books adds a ‘cinematic’ vocabulary to it.
Cinema’s capacity to offer multiple perspectives has been considered to be one of the 
aspects which distinguish its spatial field from that of the written text (Buchman 12- 
32). However this aspect has generally been used in a way that only renders cinema 
more capable of emphasizing the dramatic dimension of the text or the play and of 
increasing the audience’s emotional involvement. It is still the story or the dramatic 
dimension of the text which is dominant in most adaptations from novel or theater to 
cinema. In Prospero’s Books neither the story nor the dramatic dimension of 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest is dominant.
At first look the film, like The Tempest, seems to revolve around Prospero (John 
Gielgud), Duke of Milan, who lives on a small island for twelve years. We leam
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tliroughout the course of the film that Prospero has been deposed by his brother with 
the aid of the King of Naples and sent to exile together with his daughter Miranda in 
a boat. With the help of the knowledge involved in the books, which has been thrown 
into the boat by his loyal counselor, Prospero has arrived at the small island where he 
lives now. Those books, which are very briefly mentioned in The Tempest (Jacobsen 
136), have been put at the core of the film by Greenaway.
The island, as well as its inhabitants, looks like a product of Prospero’s imagination 
guided by the knowledge he got from his books. All the characters in the film can 
only talk with the words given them by Prospero. In fact it could be said that they do 
not even talk because these words are voiced by Prospero as well. John Gielgud, who 
is the person who proposed Greenaway to put The Tempest on screen, states that the 
scenario consists entirely of Shakespeare’s text; ‘there is not a word in it that is not in 
the play.’ Based on these it could be concluded that Prospero is not only the 
protagonist of the film/play but also its creator; he is in a way both Prospero and 
Greenaway as well. This can also be supported by the fact that everything in the film 
is the product of his imagination. Throughout the film we see Prospero sitting in his 
cell reading his books and writing/creating the play that we see as well as 
participating in what he creates.
The books, which consist of twenty-four volumes -Greenaway assumes-, function as 
a framework for the organization of the cpurse of the film. In this sense they are 
similar to the numbers in Drowning by Numbers and letters in A Zed and Two
147
Noughts. The superimposition of frames showing each open book over the frame of 
the main action, accompanied by the number and the title of each book below, 
functions, in a way, as chapter headings in a book.
The only stoiy in the film is that Prospero magically creates a storm and causes his 
brother and his courtiers who have been sailing from Africa shipwreck onto the 
island in order to take revenge. However in the end he forgives them and marries his 
daughter to the son of the King of Naples. He liberates the inhabitants of the island 
by giving them a voice of their own. In an attempt to liberate himself from the past 
he closes his books and destroys them. In the end of the film Prospero turns to the 
audience and asks them release him from the world he has created.
However the focus of the film is not this story but the process of telling it. The story 
is told through superimposed frames with a different aspect ratio, which relate to the 
past, present, and future; and it is supported by the interplay between reality and 
imagination, written and spoken word, image and the text. These fomial 
experimentations, including the animation of the images in the books, distract our 
attention from the course of the story to the representation before our eyes and ask 
for a free participation rather than a subordination to ‘what happens next’.
Mariacristina Cavecchi interprets Prospero’s Books as a mannerist work. She argues 
that the film exhibits a ‘mannerist tendency to disrupt the spatial unity and to 
combine things from different spheres of reality.’ Mannerism has been described as
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the ‘stylish style’ between Renaissance and Baroque, which gave priority to variety 
and multiplicity as opposed to Aristotelian unity (Sherman 19-23, 140-51). Departure 
from naturalness, attention to details, emphasis on the parts rather than the whole, 
tendency to place the expression of artistic qualities before the subject are some of 
the main characteristics of mannerist works. Within the framework of such a 
description Cavecchi’s observation seems to be right since these characteristics are 
also observable in Prospero’s Books. Greenaway creates multiple layers, or spaces, 
which become significant on their own. There is almost nothing that makes them 
chronologically or spatially continuous, except the twenty-four books, which appear 
on the screen in successive order and which gives an organization to those spaces 
outside clironology. It is possible to say that in Prospero’s Books filmic unity turns 
into a polyphony of multiple spaces.
The film opens with the close-up of a text, which is written and read by Prospère;
Knowing I lov’d my books, 
he furnished me from mine 
own library with volumes 
that I prize above my 
Dukedom.
After a while it becomes clear that Prospero is writing the play that we see on the 
screen, in other words our watching the play and Prospero’s writing it are 
simultaneous. In this sense the film declares explicitly at the beginning that what we 
see is originally a text, something written. Just at the first scene Greenaway 
experiments with the interaction between two different spaces: the space of the word 
-spoken word and written word- and the space· of the image, which makes up the 
film. The following image is the image of the first book, ‘A Book of Water’, forming
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a second frame -drawn by the edges of the book- within the black film frame. The 
voice of Prospero describing the characteristics and the content of the book 
accompanies the image showing the opening pages of the book. At the beginning we 
only see texts and drawings on the pages, then some other images -the clouds, a ship 
on a wavy open sea-, which are superimposed on the pages forming further frames. 
We cut from Prospero’s hand superimposed on the same image of the book to a 
medium shot showing him turning the pages of the book and glancing at the pages. 
We can say that what we have seen so far are what Proaspero sees and imagines on 
the pages of the book. In this sense it could be said that the frames within frames and 
superimpositions have replaced shot/reverse-shot system. The first difference 
between the two is that the former exhibits different moments and spaces 
simultaneously whereas the latter consecutively, and the second difference is that in 
the latter case you are always sure about what you see but in the former you are not, 
you just try to find a possible interpretation. After this scene we cut to the close up 
of another word in the process of being written on a piece of paper with a pen. As the 
pen writes the word ‘boatswain’ the close up of Prospero experimenting with the 
different pronunciations of the word ‘bosun’ is superimposed on the page. We see 
simultaneously Prospero reciting ‘bosun’ in different styles -angry, interrogative, 
curious, etc.- and the pen writing ‘boatswain’ repetitively. While the layer of image 
showing the writing remains in close up we cut to a medium shot of Prospero 
speaking the word in the second layer of image. It appears that Prospero is in a 
bathhouse. In this sense the film again exhibits Prospero writing in his cell and 
Prospero in bathhouse -two different space-time, simultaneously. All these
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juxtaposition of shots, frames, superimpositions, which look independent and 
discontinuous at first instance constitute the process through which Prospero creates 
the tempest that causes his enemies shipwreck onto the island. We see Prospero 
examining the victims in a mirror. We can say that Greenaway presents this tempest 
through a series of associations, which are only possible in cinema, the part of the 
film so far is also characteristic of the whole film. Frames within frames, 
superimpositions, interaction between the written word, spoken word, and the image, 
simultaneity of actions are dominant overall the film. Although the film’s source is a 
text, and it has also books at its core it creates a really cinematic discourse out of text.
The film continuously experiments with the interaction between the space of the 
word and the space of the image through Prospero. Just as Greenaway develops his 
film out of a text, so Prospero creates his universe in relation to what he reads in his 
books. However those books do not involve just strings of words but an interplay 
between image and text. Greenaway animates the books on the screen. Prospero 
creates the events by writing and by calling out what he has written, in other words 
he builds his outer world through writing and speaking, which result in images. We 
also have access to his inner world through mirror images. Prospero examines his 
imaginations in mirrors -which can be considered as another way through which 
Greenaway creates frame-within-frame. The view of his imaginations in the mirrors 
gives him the possibility of acting on them as if the mirrors reflect a simulation of a 
future reality. For example in the end of the film Prospero forgives his enemies after 
being confronted with the disastrous result of his revenge plan in the mirrors hold up
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by Ariel. The process through which Prospero creates events associates the process 
of filmmaking. As their titles and descriptions suggest, the books represent the 
accumulation of every kind of knowledge and experiences, which might be taken as 
representing the accumulated knowledge and experience by a filmmaker, like 
Greenaway, too. In this sense both Prospero and the filmmaker construct their ideas 
through such an accumulation; shape them with images and words, and watch them 
on the mirror/screen.
The film plays with the interaction between the spoken word and the written word, 
and between the text and the image without creating a hierarchical relationship. 
Prospero’s experimentation with different pronunciations of the word ‘bosun’ and the 
film’s juxtaposition of this spoken word with the written word ‘boatswain’ exemplify 
this fact. Prospero’s speaking the word repeatedly robs it from its significance -its 
function- and turns it into an ordinary thing, ‘a thing to be played with’ (Lawrence 
142). The superimposition of the written word ‘boatswain’ -which has the same 
meaning with the word ‘bosun’ in colloquial language (The Oxford English 
Dictionary)- on top of the image of Prospero draws attention to the difference 
between the spoken word and the written word. It could be said that Greenaway’s 
approach towards these two different spaces is similar to Derrida’s approach to 
speech/writing opposition in Saussure and Western metaphysics. First Prospero’s 
experimentation with the spoken word can be considered as an example which 
challenges the natural unity that is assumed to exist between the phonic signifier (the
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spoken word) and the signified (sound image) by Saussure.^' i think Prospero’s 
pronunciation cannot be reduced to a signifier/signified relationship. It remains on 
the level of signifier. Second the way the film juxtaposes the spoken and the written 
word suggests that writing is not just a corrupted derivation or a supplement to 
spoken word, as Derrida argues in Of Grammatology. but it is something that 
belongs to a different space, to a different performance. Moreover every word that is 
spoken in the film is first written, like in the case of ‘boatswain’ / ‘bosun’ but this 
does not mean that Greenaway tries to reverse the hierarchy. It seemed to me that the 
film presents spoken word, written word, text, and image as separate inscriptions 
participating in a more general writing, which articulates the differences between 
them. This seems similar to what Derrida means with ‘arche-writing’. The writings 
and speeches accompanying images do not explain or clarify each other. On the 
contrary their juxtaposition becomes something, which defy any clear and unitary 
meaning.
The film owes its experimentation with such relationships to the high technology it 
uses. With the use of HDTV and digital Paint Box the film is no longer a mere 
reproduction of once-recorded images but a form of writing, a form of inscription on 
the filmic space. Dominant cinema attributes primacy to ‘the visual’ in the way 
Saussure does to the ‘speech’. Saussure believes in the existence of a one-to-one 
correspondence between the spoken word and the external world. Dominant cinema 
suggests the same correspondence by replacing ‘the spoken word’ with ‘the visual’.
Saussure argues on this subject in Course in General Linguistic. For a clear explanation on 
Derrida’s discussion of Sassure’s arguments see also Beardsworth 6-18.
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We cannot deny that Prospero’s Books is highly visual. However we cannot say that 
‘the visual’ in it functions in that way neither. On the contrary the film denies such a 
relationship between the visual and the external world, by stressing continuously the 
artifice, illusion, the frames which are further framed. The meaning, in Prospero’s 
Books, does not derive from the images and texts it depicts but rather from the way 
they are manipulated across the screen.
4.4.2. The Pillow Book
It was The Pillow Book of Sei Shonagon, one of the Japanese literary classics, which 
inspired Greenaway to make his last film. The Pillow Book. However the film, 
Greenaway states, does not include the whole content of the book and it does not 
follow its novelistic narrative; in other words it does not illustrate it. It only picks up 
some of the sentiments and ideas present in it and makes some quotations (The 
Pillow Book 5). The film has many characteristics in common with the Prospero’s 
Books, in terms of its structure and just Prospero’s Books is not an adaptation of 
theater in ordinary sense, so The Pillow Book is not an ordinary adaptation of novel. 
Here I will only mention some additional aspects of the film when compared to 
Prospero’s Books.
The film mainly tells the story of a Japanese girl, Nagiko (Vivian Wu), who is 
interested in delighted by calligraphy like her father who used to write a special 
greeting in calligraphy on her face on every birthday when she was a child. After a 
short unsatisfactory marriage Nagiko starts to search for an ideal calligrapher to offer
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her body to be used by him as paper. However the English bisexual translator she 
meets in Hong Kong, Jerome (Ewan McGregor), convinces her that she should be the 
pen not the paper. Hereafter she starts to write calligraphic texts on the bodies of 
men, including the body of the translator who becomes her lover, and send them to 
the gay publisher (Yoshi Oida) who used to be her father’s publisher as well. The 
film revolves around the relationship between Nagiko, the publisher, and Jerome, 
which ends in the suicide of Jerome and the murder of the Publisher.
Greenaway continues on the experimentations he has started in Prospero’s Books in 
The Pillow Book as well while adding more variety. The film involves not only 
frames-within-frames but also multiple screens with varying aspect ratios -sometimes 
as small as a postage stamp. Moreover these are not just placed at the center of the 
screen, contrary to Prospero’s Books, but scattered across the screen. They can 
appear anywhere. There is again a huge amount of text on the screen. Sometimes 
they appear above and below the frames in the form of English or French words, 
sometimes they are in the form of calligraphic text on a page, which is superimposed 
on the images, sometimes they are directly superimposed on the positive and 
negative spaces as if they decorate walls and other flat surfaces in a room, and finally 
of course, they appear in the form of calligraphies written on the bodies. Even the 
subtitles can be considered as being a part of the spaces defined by the film. Because 
sometimes the subtitles seem to serve functions other than translating foreign 
languages like making associations or producing contrasts. The end credits of the 
film have also such an aspect. They move to the sides of the screen as if they want to
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open room for the growing plant, which is the last image of the film. In this sense the 
interaction between the image and the text is one of the focuses of the film, like in 
the case of Prospero’s Books. The texts and images are sometimes accompanied by 
Nagiko’s over-voice and sometimes by that of her aunt reading passages fi'om The 
Pillow Book of Sei Shonagon. There are some foreign languages, which are not 
translated and which therefore sounds like a kind of musical rhythm. These 
untranslated voices associate the word ‘bosun’ spoken by Prospero repeatedly.
It seems that it is not a coincidence that the film has so much to do with calligraphy. 
An article on the web about calligraphy in The Pillow Book, defines calligraphy as 
the Chinese and Japanese writing systems and compares it to the Western writing 
system as follows
The Chinese and Japanese writing systems remain essentially pictographic, 
with every schoolchild learning the images lie behind the characters. Such a 
system can be read without pronouncing the words in the head. The abstracted 
images pass directly into the mind as meaning. The phonetic systems o f the 
West retain no memory o f their pictographic origins. Words are pronounced 
silently in the head (a fairly modem skill: the medieval reader mumbled as he
32read); meaning is ‘heard’.
This description implies that calligraphy combines text, image, and meaning whereas 
the western writing combines text and sound while holding meaning as a derivation 
from sound. For Greenaway Western writing represents the divorce between image 
and the text and the calligraphy suggests the possibility of reuniting them (qtd. in 
Cody). I have already discussed how Greenaway attempts to unsettle the hierarchical 
relationship between the image and the text. The same attempt is also observable in
32 The article is mentioned to belong to Cinema Mondo rather than a specific author. It is available in 
the address: movienet.cultnet. fi/mondonet/movies/pillow/ calli.htm.
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The Pillow Book and in that sense the reference to calligraphy in the film can be 
considered as a metaphorical expression of such an attempt. Calligraphy could also 
be, Greenaway argues, ‘a good template for cinema’ in that cinema has the capacity 
to reunite the image and the text (qtd. in Woods 266). The Pillow Book exemplifies 
Greenaway’s attempt to experiment with this capacity, in that the film tries to 
interweave the image and the text through various ways, while keeping their identity.
The Pillow Book has a lot of things to do with the body and the film’s implications 
about the body have been the subject of several articles on the film such as Paula 
Willoquet-Maricondi’s article entitled ‘Fleshing the Text: Greenaway’s Pillow 
Book and the Erasure of the Body’. Maricondi, in her article refers to David Abram’s 
argument that alphabetic writing brought a split between language and the body and 
she argues that ‘The Pillow Book brings the written word and the body together. ’ 1 
think the film refers to such a relationship between writing and the body in certain 
metaphorical ways. First it puts writings back on the bodies, second it emphasizes 
calligraphy, which is considered to involve bodily gestures as well as emotional 
states and physical characteristics of the body, and third it continuously associates 
writing with the sacrifice of the body. Although I find this relationship between 
writing and the body worthy of discussion, I do not want to keep it long here since it 
extends beyond the framework of this study.
Beside the interplay between the image and the text, the film exhibit an 
unconventional organization of filmic space-time. It is possible to summarize the
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most important aspects of it, in terms of this organization, in three items, which are 
interdependent: multiplicity of views, the notion of being able to change the aspect- 
ratio of the frames and rearranged chronology.
Multiple screens scattered across the screen enable the spectator to view either 
different events belonging to different time-spaces simultaneously or the segments 
which make a single event from different perspectives like in the case of cubist 
paintings. This encourages the spectator to involve in a lateral thinking process. The 
screens differ in their sizes depending on their content. Although the use of multiple 
screens in this way exhibit a different arrangement of the filmic time-space it is the 
frames-within-frames which directly present the spectator with a rearranged 
chronology. It is possible to observe a chronology in the film, but this chronology is 
not in chronological order. This is achieved by inserting a second frame with a 
smaller size within the main frame. While the main frame shows an event the 
inserted frame shows the event at a few moment before or after, and sometimes the 
inserted frame shows the event following the one in the main frame. In this way the 
image becomes not mere presentation of an action, but the presentation of time. The 
film does not present time as something directly dependent on the action. The past 
present and future are not in classical order, they interweave, they coexist and 
becomes parallel to our perception of time. In that sense, I think, the image in the 
film can be considered as a different form of ‘time-image’ that Deleuze describes in 
the second volume of his book entitled Cinema and compares it to the ‘movement- 
image’.
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The Pillow Book. like Prospcro’s Books, uses the possibilities of HDTV and digital 
Paint Box and mixes cinema language with TV and video languages. Many of the 
experimentations in the film recall those that have been tried by experimental video 
artists rather than the films of certain filmmakers. It is certain that Greenaway is not 
the first one who uses split screens, multiple screens, superimpositions, etc. However 
this is not a factor that reduces the importance of those films because their 
significance lie not simply in the techniques they involve but in the way these 
techniques are used; in the concepts they are serviced to. It could be said that 
Greenaway gives a new order to what is at hand -which can also be said for his 
previous films. There are many films, which are based on the reflections of 
technological developments in cinema, but which still uses the old nan'ative 
conventions. A great part of their significance lie in the special effects they involve. 
In other words it is the technology, which dominates the film. In The Pillow Book, 
like in Prospero’s Books, cinema is not made slave to technology but rather it is 
technology which is put under the service of cinema. It serves to Greenaway’s 
experimenting with and expansion of the vocabulary of cinema rather than becoming 
its own special show.
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4. CONCLUSION
Throughout a large part of this study I have tried to order the works of an artist who 
has ironized all kinds of ordering mechanisms through his works. I have searched for 
some meaningful patterns in the films, which continuously point to the vanity in such 
a search in the face of the ultimate multiplicity of possible meanings. However this 
study has never claimed that it is an exact and exhaustive analysis of those films. The 
aim has generally been to show how they stimulate the mind through a wide variety 
of references, juxtapositions and how they turn into a set of ideas on art, 
representation, and cinema behind the cover story once the spectator follows those 
stimulations.
Peter Brunette and David Wills, in their book entitled Screen/Plav. argue that ‘in film 
criticism, as in literary criticism, the understanding or interpretation of a text taken to 
be the best is usually the one that manages to explain the greatest number of 
particular textual details’ (34). Some of the details I have mentioned in this study -the 
car plate and mythological names in A Zed and Two Noughts, the belly and the 
visionary architects in The Belly of an Architect, the word plays, etc.- might look as 
if I have been trying to achieve what Brunette and Wills criticize. Moreover they 
might also look as if they are diverting the study from its main purpose. However I
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believe that such details constitute a great part of the significance of Greenaway’s 
films. In other words such an attempt was necessary in the case of an analysis of 
those films. Because as it is tried to be shown throughout the study Greenaway works 
through metaphors and allegory, which serve to make his films represent many 
different meanings simultaneously. Therefore there is always the possibility that any 
element, which might look as being unimportant or non-serious at first look, could be 
a gate opening to an important idea or a serious argument. Moreover the details that 
are mentioned in this study are only those which relate to the topics within the 
framework of this study and they represent an average percentage among many other 
possible examples. Just as it is not absolutely necessary to catch all the numbers one 
by one in Drowning by Numbers in order to see that the film counts from 1 to 100, so 
an average number of examples was enough to argue that the films were opening to 
multiple meanings and encouraging multiple readings through metaphors. In 
addition, some of the connections that are established between the ideas observed in 
those films and the arguments of several philosophers might look as being excessive 
or exaggerated. However I believe that such connections points to the capacity of 
those films to provide the viewer with such a possibility even if the connections 
might look irrelevant. As Allan Woods argues ‘ a work of art is not a crossword 
puzzle, to be solved, with only a single correct answer; it is better to have counted 
and lost count than never to have counted at all’ (25).
Cinema has always been a field of investigations and experimentation as well as the 
object of excitement, interest and admiration due to the capacities of the medium.
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The history of cinema has been shaped by films representing different approaches 
towards film and filmmaking. However although there has always been an alternative 
mode of film practice beside the dominant one -like avant-garde film whose history 
dates back to 1920s- those alternatives have never been able to compete with the 
dominant at the level of the support of producers and audience. Today a single mode 
of filmmaking dominates the cinemas of various countries. This is, as it is argued in 
this study, Hollywood-type cinema, which is based on stars, storytelling, 
identification, emotional involvement and catharsis, and which still in the process of 
using mainly the medium’s capacity of producing photographic images in movement 
and sound.
The conservativeness of dominant cinema has been a motivation for alternative film 
practices, which question the conventional viewing habits and limitations of 
dominant cinema. Those alternative practices can be characterized by their emphasis 
on the medium and their experimentations with it as if they seek to redefine or 
‘reinvent’ cinema. Godard’s statement that ‘cinema is twenty-four frames a second, 
and that’s tmth’ has become a symbol for such practices. This is a very important 
statement, in that it refers to the filmic material as being the true object of the film. In 
other words it implies that the only truth a film can convey is the artificiality of itself 
The emphasis on how a film is made is the most important characteristic of the 
alternative film practices.
162
As this study argues Peter Greenaway’s work is one of those alternative practices. 
The analyses of his films imply that for him cinema is a medium of thought and 
investigation on cinematic representation itself as well as on representation and art in 
general. Rather than claiming to be a window onto the world his films present 
themselves as the sites of convergence of several theories of representation, different 
artistic genres as different modes of representation, and different media. Rather than 
isolating cinema as an organic whole independent of the other modes of 
representation, Greenaway, subjects it to the questions and discussions that have been 
asked in the history of representation including the cinematic representation and 
tests its potentials and limitations in the light of those questions and discussions. In 
this sense the cinema that is implied by those films does not derive its particularity 
from its being photographic images in movement, its impression of reality and its 
ability to tell entertaining stories but rather from its capacity of holding multiple 
meanings and of self-reflexively questioning the notion of representation in cinema.
Greenaway’s films do not suppress the artificiality of cinema, on the contrary they 
emphasize it. Moreover this artificiality is one of the factors which encourage the 
spectator to read the films allegorically. However although they present with many 
layers of meanings they do not imply or impose any true reading. On the contrary 
they imply that they are just one of the possible orderings and self-reflexively they 
call into question their own way of ordering.
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A consideration of Greenaway’s films in chronological order points to a development 
in Greenaway’s engagement with the question of cinematic representation. A 
comparison of The Draughtsman’s Contract and The Pillow Book, while considering 
at the same time the films in-between, suggests a gradual change in Greenaway’s 
way of dealing with cinematic representation. For example while The Draughtsman ’ s 
Contract and The Belly of an Architect comments on cinematic representation 
indirectly as a part of representation in general Prospero’s Books and The Pillow 
Book raise more directly questions on cinematic representation. It is also possible to 
observe an increase in the variety of Greenaway’s experimentations with the 
possibilities and limitations of cinematic representation. However this should not be 
considered as a progress but rather as a continuation of a search.
Greenaway has been making a new film entitled Eight and a Half Woman, which is
expected to be shown in 1999 Cannes Film Festival. The information on this film
support the argument above as well. In an interview Greenaway describes the film as
being an homage to Godard and Fellini, a film about the structure of film language,
and about eight and a half male sexual fantasies. Since the film is not available yet
for watching I quoted his own arguments on the film below:
The title ‘Eight and a Half Woman’ obviously refer to Fellini. I think it’s the 
most intelligent movie about the cinema, ever made. Later there were many 
films like that, but this one is about the very conception, it’s about where the 
ideas come from. It’s a very important film for every filmmaker, and it’s also 
celebrates Italian Fellini women, in the famous fantasy sequence. It is a 
centerpoint o f  some era in European filmmaking. After that point, what I call 
‘Casablanca Syndrome’ began to break up. It all begins with quoting Fellini 
films, and finishes with quoting Godard films, because Godard is the man who 
break the European cinema apart, (qtd. in Orlinski)
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It seems that Eight and a Half Woman will be the film through which Greenaway 
most directly will speak on cinema. It is also said that the film will be a comedy. 
This, in fact, points to an important characteristic of Greenaway’s films, which 
distinguishes them in one respect from avant-garde films. Greenaway shares almost 
all of the principles of avant-garde filmmakers concerning cinematic representation. 
However his films cross the boundaries of the hierarchies of cinema by carrying 
those principles to the heart of dominant cinema. The fact that Eight and a Half 
Woman will be a comedy does not mean that Greenaway gets closer to the dominant 
cinema. In fact there have always been something of the dominant in Greenaway’s 
films. A reconsideration of the cover stories in his films would reveal this fact. 
However, as we have seen, those stories become very negligible in the face of the 
multiplicity of ideas they involve. Greenaway, in his films, show us that it is always 
too easy to tell stories and cinema is able to offer more than that. It is not important 
that Greenaway makes a comedy film, or a horror film -he has already done many 
‘murder films’-, or a melodrama; the important thing is ‘what kind o f  a comedy 
film, horror film, or melodramatic film he makes. I can claim that in either case they 
will be films made not in dominant cinema’s conventions but, in Greenaway’s own 
terms.
Finally, a large number of articles have been written based on the stories, characters, 
and events in Greenaway’s films. While this study focuses on cinematic 
representation in those films it does not claim the inferiority or inappropriateness of 
such studies. The aim is just to point to the fact that there is always something more
165
in those films than what is explicitly shown and told. And these are: SENTENCES 
ON CINEMA .. .
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